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ABSTRACT
THE MESSY NUCLEAR LANDSCAPE:
USING FUZZY COGNITIVE MAPPING TO EXPLORE PLAUSIBLE NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT SCENARIOS
Ryan M. Nixon
Old Dominion University, 2019
Director: Dr. Jesse Richman
Nuclear weapons are seemingly permanent fixtures in international relations. Although
nuclear abolitionists and actors within the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have taken significant steps towards designing a world without
nuclear weapons, the longstanding realist logic that suggests nuclear disarmament is nonviable
has born more fruit. On the other hand, some proponents of realism have suggested global
nuclear disarmament is feasible, given that certain international instabilities are stabilized and
that special care is taken during diplomatic negotiations. This presents an opportunity to test
these predictions using fuzzy cognitive mapping, a computational modeling technique that
identifies problems, their stakeholders, and stakeholders’ components in order to determine
scenarios that solve complex disputes in ways that benefit the system as a whole. This study
identifies two problems regarding nuclear disarmament. First, nuclear weapon states are resistant
to giving up nuclear weapons, despite agreements to disarm. This problem follows realist logic.
Second, the role that the IAEA plays in safeguarding special nuclear materials while
guaranteeing states’ rights to nuclear technology is contrasted by states’ interest in maintaining
levels of secrecy. These two problems constitute a “mess” that this study analyzes. Synthesis
between the problems requires that solving one does not make the other worse. Therefore, this
study tests various scenarios and finds that, given present-day international instabilities are
stabilized, nuclear disarmament is feasible if three conditions are met: First, a global

disarmament agreement must not unreasonably affect states’ sovereign rights outside of the
agreement. Second, states outlying the NPT must be brought into the negotiations. Finally,
present states with nuclear arsenals adopt the IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
with the Additional Protocol as a measure of good faith. A final factor suggests states’ rights to
the technology inevitably means states should have an ability to re-proliferate in the event of
future international instability that threatens global security. Once these steps are taken and
technological rights guaranteed, this model suggests global nuclear disarmament is possible.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Mess Articulation
Problems do not exist in vacuums. Solving one problem might exacerbate one or more
related problems, despite our best intentions. Industrial and technological modernization comes
to mind. While modernization leads to increased life quality and expectancy, it displaces
indigenous species, pollutes waterways, and contributes to rising global temperatures. The shortterm benefits of industrialization and modernization outweigh the short-term costs, but the
overall costs might prove too costly for future societies. The balance between industrialization
and environmentalism is highly contentious, and many stakeholders are firmly and squarely on
one extreme end or the other. Solving these problems requires, in a non-dictatorial world,
something more holistic than simple political debate in legislatures and democratic elections.
While useful, these institutions have thus far proven incapable of solving the problem. The
various stakeholders, each with independent influence, can slow or stop problem resolution.
Therefore, it might be more feasible to approach problems at this magnitude with a methodology
that attempts to satisfy, or at least satisfice, all relevant stakeholders.1
As in the climate change debate, in international politics the question of nuclear weapons
presents a problem that has thus far avoided synthesis. Stakeholders have for decades attempted
to resolve the problem, or to at least soften the edges.

1

Obviously, on the other hand, it is impossible to satisfy or satisfice all ~7.7 billion humans and
countless states, multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, and others.
Attempts should be made to satisfy or satisfice the most stakeholders as possible.

2
The nuclear disarmament movement has been around since almost immediately after the
1945 atomic bombings of Japan. The normative argument is one of morality. Nuclear weapons
shrink a total war into a few short hours while maintaining total war’s pain,2 which, according to
the abolitionist, is an unacceptable capability for any state to possess. Furthermore, they argue,
nuclear weapons pose the risk of accidental detonation or the proliferation through theft or sale
to non-state actors that cannot be deterred by conventional means. These moral arguments stem
from knowledge of the direct consequences of nuclear attack, including immediate and delayed
fatalities, in addition to unintended consequences dozens of miles away, such as the Daigo
Fukuryū Maru (F/V Lucky Dragon 5) incident in which a Japanese fishing vessel was irradiated
during the Castle Bravo thermonuclear test in 1954. To the disarmament movement, it is often a
question of good versus evil.
To nuclear weapons states, the question is one of survival. To survive the “Thucydides
Trap,”3 nuclear weapons are necessary because they erase incentives for a military power to
attack a rising power. The US cannot survive a nuclear war with China; therefore, if and when
China overtakes the US as a global or regional hegemon, the simple fact that both states have
nuclear weapons with second-strike capabilities that can survive a first strike means the
transition in the balance of power will not delve into total war. Nuclear weapons states argue,
therefore, that nuclear weapons are necessary to preserve the precarious international stability
and prevent a major war. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, many thinkers and actors take this
argument to a seemingly extreme conclusion—nuclear weapons should be horizontally spread to
states that are likely to be good stewards of nuclear technologies. Indeed, Kenneth Waltz argues
2

Adapted from Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1966), 21.
3
This term was coined in Graham T. Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape
Thucydides’s Trap? Kindle edition (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).

3
nuclear weapons would bolster peace in the Middle East if Iran had a nuclear deterrent to counter
Israel’s nuclear deterrent.4 To nuclear weapons states, therefore, the question is not Biblical; it is
not about good versus evil, but it is certainly about preventing Armageddon. At the very least, it
is about preventing World War III.
But the nuclear weapons problem is not merely a battle between disarmament activists
and nuclear weapons states. There are roughly 200 recognized states, and fewer than ten of them
have nuclear weapons, and the majority of those that do not possess nuclear weapons make up a
considerable UN voting bloc, the Non-Aligned Movement. There are weapons systems
production firms within nuclear weapons states. There are international verification and
compliance agencies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. Religious leaders and the
media, while not necessarily particularly powerful to solve the problem, certainly have some
noticeable level of influence over the faithful and the curious. Finally, Outlier States must be
acknowledged. How does the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) or the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan fit into the problem? Can synthesis be reached in a way that can get
these states onboard with the rest of the international community in the event that a global
disarmament treaty is negotiated?
And the nuclear weapons problem is not limited to a single problem. On the one hand, as
already acknowledged, there is, quite simply, a disagreement over whether or not states should
have nuclear weapons. This is a normative argument about how the world ought-to-be. On the
other hand, solving this problem by simply banning nuclear weapons would require significant
verification, and many, if not all, former nuclear weapons states would likely resist inspections
that are too invasive, calling them violations of sovereignty that are unnecessary. Nuclear
4

Kenneth N. Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean
Stability,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (2012): 2-5.

4
weapons states would, therefore, likely abandon international arrangements that allow the
International Atomic Energy Agency to perform inspections that are too comprehensive.5
Therefore, in addition to the morality-versus-survival problem, there exists a problem of
governance. Is it possible to negotiate a path towards nuclear disarmament while simultaneously
guaranteeing former nuclear weapons states do not feel trapped and do not feel like their
sovereign rights have taken a backseat to the new world order? This becomes even more
complicated when we attempt to bring in the Outlier States mentioned above. These two
problems, when taken together and acknowledging that solving one might make the other worse,
constitute what I refer to in the rest of this text as the “mess.”
Before modeling can even attempt to solve these problems and the constitutive “mess,” I
must offer a major acknowledgment. The international environment, at the time of writing, is far
too complex to solve the problem right away. I make no claims to have found an immediate and
simple (or even difficult) solution to the “mess” or the problems. There are at present several
“messes” that need to be solved prior to any attempts to reach an international consensus on the
nuclear weapons problem. These are discussed in Chapter 8 and include the problems in Eastern
Europe, particularly Ukraine and Georgia; the problems with the South China Sea and other
disputed maritime shipping lanes; the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan; and three
lesser but important disputes. These include the Middle East problem, the question of Taiwan,
and the dispute on the Korean Peninsula. It is unlikely synthesis between stakeholders can be
reached until these problems and “messes” are addressed, and solving all of those problems and

5

For example, presently there is debate about how to safeguard Brazil’s planned nuclear
submarine, which falls under a military exemption. Future safeguards arrangements that unexempt secret military systems are likely to fail to reach agreement.

5
“messes” at once is far outside the scope of this research, which is focused solely on the nuclear
weapons problem.
This acknowledgment is not novel in the disarmament literature. O’Hanlon has explicitly
acknowledged this reality of international affairs. These contentious issues, he writes, make
disarmament improbable, but solving them, he adds, makes resultant war in a disarmed world
implausible.6 In other words, solving the nuclear “mess” in a world devoid of the aforementioned
international disputes, and avoiding creating new disputes, avoids the risk of World War III or a
“Thucydides Trap.” Therefore, modeling in this research takes place under the assumption that
O’Hanlon’s imagined world is possible and then asks the question, “Is global nuclear
disarmament possible?”
Finally, given that these international problems are resolved and given that the model is a
good representation of the problems, I hypothesize that three of the “mess’” variables can be
altered so that nuclear weapons can be removed from the system without making either of the
problems worse. First, sovereignty must remain a staple in international affairs. No former
nuclear weapon state should be forced to endure reductions to its sovereignty outside of what
presently is agreed upon through existing treaties. Second, a future disarmament treaty must
affect only the disarmament process and be potentially temporary, depending on the security
needs of independent states. In other words, the treaty cannot be “too big.” Third, it is important
that Outlier States be given more international recognition. States like the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea should be not only brought into the disarmament negotiations but should be
given more representation on other international platforms. This does not mean increasing their
prestige so far that they are more important than the permanent members of the UN Security
6

Michael E. O’Hanlon, A Skeptic’s Case for Nuclear Disarmament, Kindle edition (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), Kindle location 985.

6
Council, for example; rather they should be given slightly more prestige than non-nuclear states.
A final consideration is that the only known mechanism for stabilizing security in a disarmed
world is to accept the ability to re-proliferated in short order.

1.2 Study Approach
Nuclear weapons pose a prisoners’ dilemma. The possible strategies include cooperating
(disarming) and defecting (not disarming). The payoffs for mutual cooperation might be better
than mutual defection, which does not preclude the possibility of nuclear war,7 but the cost
imposed on me if I disarm while the other side defects is a powerful reason to accept mutual
defection. The possibility of nuclear war through mutual capability is better than being caught
unprepared for a nuclear war. Evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins calls the cost imposed on
a unilateral cooperator the “sucker’s pay-off.”8 In a dyadic relationship between belligerent or
potentially belligerent states, the “sucker’s pay-off” in the nuclear world might be to receive
nuclear attacks while lacking the capability to retaliate, as Japan suffered during WWII.
But this does not mean that mutual disarmament is impossible. Indeed, the above
prisoners’ dilemma assumes two sides only get one shot at either cooperating or defecting. This
compels “egoistic” behavior because defecting is always a dominant strategy to cooperating in
single-round matches. But Robert Axelrod notes that international relations occurs on a
continuous timeline. States have the expectations of running into one another again in the future.
Mutual defection breaks down as the dominant strategy if the game is played on an indefinite

7

See Chapter 2 for a discussion about the costs of nuclear war.
Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene: 40th Anniversary Edition (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2016). Kindle edition: 263.
8

7
timeline.9 I can apply Axelrod to the nuclear weapons problem and suggest that there is a time
horizon where nuclear cooperation becomes possible, if only because “egoistic” impulses drive
states towards mutual cooperation and a better payoff. Work has already been done in this field.
Russett10 and Brams11 demonstrate that Axelrod’s iterated prisoners’ dilemma can be applied to
arms control and nuclear weapons. McGinnis, on the other hand, notes that cooperative
relationships in arms control are weak and tend to break down as players seek to include or
resolve other issues.12
This demonstrates the need for an alternate model with specific assumptions about state
goals. These include several key issues that are expanded upon throughout the body of this study.
These include 1) assumptions about security, 2) assumptions about confidence in the status quo
and worlds we are capable of achieving, 3) assumptions about the role nuclear weapons and
developments subsequent to their creation play in either transforming or maintaining
international politics, and 4) assumptions about state goals, specifically assumptions about what
it takes to convince states to buy in to global disarmament.
First, this study relies heavily on an assumption that is explicitly built into the model.
That is, the human knowledge of nuclear fission and fusion is a permanent fixture. Therefore,
there is an inherent ability that, even in a world without nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation is
always within the realm of possibility, be it horizontal or vertical proliferation. Therefore, a
major assumption this study makes is that embracing, rather than trying to smother, this re9

Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation: Revised Edition (New York, New York: Basic
Books, 2006). Kindle edition: 10
10
Bruce M. Russett, The Prisoners of Insecurity: Nuclear Deterrence, the Arms Race, and Arms
Control (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1983).
11
Steven J. Brams, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
12
Michael D. McGinnis, "Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution 30, no. 1 (1986): 141.

8
proliferation capability can maintain security. In a disarmed world states can threaten rapid
proliferation to deter other actors from nuclear, or even non-nuclear, transgressions. This creates
a binary set of options from which states can choose in reference to disarmament. Either we can
enjoy security with nuclear deterrence or we can enjoy security with the threat of nuclear
deterrence. One of these options carries an inherent threat of nuclear war, while the other
requires an extra step before the inherent threat is achieved. Scott Sagan believes the ability to
rapidly reconstitute nuclear forces creates intense instability and will likely result in nuclear war
because the first side to build a warhead will believe it can win the war through first use.13 On
the other hand, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, it will also consider how a first use or first strike
will affect the global environment and politics. Furthermore, Schell argues the attacked will
likely retaliate against the attacker, even if not immediately. This changes the potential attacker’s
calculus and maintains mutual deterrence even when one side reconstitutes its nuclear capability
first.14 In other words, short-order re-proliferation capability (defined later as rearmament within
a matter of weeks) does not destabilize the system or increase the likelihood of nuclear or
conventional war if a realist critique is adopted. This requires a realist understanding of what is
at stake when designing a disarmament treaty. If we are willing to try to live in a world without
immediate nuclear deterrence, getting the treaty right demands we weigh the costs and benefits.
Therefore, second and similarly, as is explained by the arms control, disarmament, and
other literature on international politics woven through this study, I make key assumptions about
confidence. With the two options states possess, which offers more confidence regarding our

13

Scott D. Sagan, "Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament,” Daedalus 138, no. 4
(2009): 158.
14
Jonathan Schell, “The Abolition,” reprinted in The Fate of the Earth, and The Abolition,
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 161.

9
security needs? Schell argues our confidence is increased with “weaponless deterrence,”15
especially if one considers our imperfect confidence that nuclear deterrence can hold. This
position is held to various degrees of confidence by Perkovich and Acton,16 Schelling,17 Wheeler
and Booth,18 and O’Hanlon.19 I too follow this line of reasoning (in Chapter 8 I illustrate this
fully through an extended form game). That is, adopting a realist critique that assumes states are
cost-benefit calculators, confidence is increased without nuclear weapons and with reproliferation capability maintained by the former nuclear weapons states. This confidence boosts
security considerations in the first assumption.
Third, the question remains as to whether or not nuclear weapons have transformed
international politics. Are nuclear weapons the best source of security by eliminating the
uncertainty of your adversaries’ capabilities? Recall Kenneth N. Waltz’s confidence above and
belief that Iran should have nuclear weapons. If yes—if nuclear weapons have transformed the
system by eliminating the threat of major war—then there is no reason to continue this
conversation. But history has not played out in the Waltzian way. Horizontal proliferation has
not born fruit, and, defying normative claims about who should have nuclear weapons, major
events have unfolded that bolster arms control, if not disarmament. For example, the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (the “Iran Nuclear Deal”) demonstrates that even Iran does not
necessarily agree with Waltz. It is also unlikely that they have eliminated the threat of major war.
The 2019 India-Pakistan crisis demonstrates that even nuclear-armed states are willing to risk
15

Schell, 158.
George Perkovich and James Acton, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, Adelphi Paper 396
(London: Routledge for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008).
17
Thomas Schelling, "A World without Nuclear Weapons?" Daedalus 138, no. 4 (2009): 126.
18
Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Beyond nuclearism,” in Security Without Nuclear
Weapons: Different Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Security, ed. Regina Cowen Karp (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992).
19
O’Hanlon, Kindle location 937.
16

10
escalation, even if realist logic suggests both nuclear-armed states will ultimately back down.20
Ultimately, when two nuclear-armed states at the brink back down, determining which cause and
effect is true (the threat of escalation or diplomatic success) is as difficult as proving a negative.
Furthermore, the question of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) persists.
To what extent has or should the IAEA transform international politics? If the IAEA is too
empowered, nuclear weapons states might not sign onto a future disarmament treaty. Therefore,
states must empower the IAEA, rather than eliminating nuclear sovereignty. Baroness Shirley
Williams disagrees, writing that, “What we really need now is the additional protocol that
enables the IAEA to simply walk into any place it fears might possibly be involved in the
development of nuclear weapons—a laboratory, factory or anywhere else—without giving any
advance notice before it conducts inspections.”21 The IAEA’s 1997 Additional Protocol does
outline various scenarios that give inspectors sweeping authority to inspect anywhere they please
if they have reasonable suspicion that clandestine activities can take place in certain locations,
but adoption of the Additional Protocol is not compulsory, and there are time restrictions.
Baroness Williams’ prescription for solving the nuclear weapons problem is near perfect in that
it greatly diminishes the risk of clandestine operations, but it is far-from-perfect in that it requires
states to adopt it. If a state seeks to clandestinely develop a nuclear weapons program, it will
likely circumvent Williams’ IAEA.
On the other hand it is obvious that some level of state-driven IAEA empowerment is
warranted if disarmament talks are to be successful. Cheating is a major concern in a disarmed or
disarming world. It would be reasonable for a disarming Russia to expect the US will hide away
20
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half a dozen bombs before the inspectors arrive, and therefore, Russia has incentives to hide
away half a dozen (or maybe half a dozen plus one) before inspectors arrive. Dealing with
potential cheaters requires more than a multilateral approach. There needs to be an IAEA with
increased state-driven power in at least some circumstances,22 but this power is conditional to the
specific and immediate needs of the international community of states. The aforementioned reproliferation capabilities ensure that the IAEA does not take on a life of its own.
Therefore, nuclear weapons have only transformed the international political system
insofar as states assume it has. On the other hand this transformation is weak; states can envision
a collectivity of empowered inspectors to oversee and manage the knowledge of proliferation.
Finally, fourth, what would it take for states to buy into disarmament? This question
raises multiple questions that must be addressed in order to answer. First, how do you dismantle
a nuclear warhead? In other words, is the nuclear problem merely technical in nature? The first
thing we must do is to acknowledge that the solution requires a political answer because the
nuclear weapons problem is not merely a technical problem. We have dismantled nuclear
warheads in the past. Getting states to buy into disarmament requires several assumptions, raised
by basic additional questions.
Where do we want to be? The first and obvious truth—the realist truth—is that we desire
security. More than mere security, we desire stable security. This harkens back to the first and
second assumptions. If, for example, rapid re-proliferation capability destabilizes political
disputes and increases the likelihood of major war, including nuclear war, then obviously that is
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not where we want to be. If, on the other hand, we can disarm without risking war, then we have
added more stability (by essentially also eliminating the threat of nuclear war). And if we look at
the problem through the security lens, we can separate ourselves from moral prescriptions that
presuppose nuclear weapons are bad and disarmament is good. If the referent object is about
stable security then we can dispense with arguments about good and evil, and we can focus
solely on risk and basic survival. I deviate from Schell, who frames nuclear abolition as a
question of the survival of the human species and, by extension, the survival of our loved ones.23
Stable security, and thus diminished risk and increased survival, is obviously based in selfish
bias for personal life over non-life, and if we accept this then we can also accept that human
beings (and thus states) will generally bias decisions that promote personal life over non-life. If
we accept this then we can answer the question—where do we want to be?—with a discussion
about goals.
On the one hand there are nine states possessing nuclear weapons. In this sense nuclear
weapons are “possession goals” to enhance national standing in terms of security in an
international system governed by anarchy. On the other hand there are other goals states seek
that often contradict “possession goals.” Arnold Wolfers differentiates “possession goals”—
goals that enhance the state’s survivability through obtaining something of value—and “milieu”
goals, which “aim instead at shaping conditions beyond [the state’s] national boundaries.”24
Milieu goals are not necessarily altruistic in nature; states often make certain concessions in
international politics because it values the benefit it receives from cooperation in concession
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more than the cost of the thing it sacrificed. In other words what we want depends on the benefit
we expect to receive from either possessing nuclear weapons or disarming.25
What about risk management? Under what conditions do we expect nuclear weapons to
either manage or increase risk? Would disarmament be the reverse? Ultimately, answering this
question is to help us better fully understand survivability. If nuclear weapons establish order
through certainty, then disarming would require massive changes to management in the
international system of states. But the world we build to replace nuclear weapons must be
recognizable. As previously mentioned, and as will be more fully developed in the ensuing
chapters, a New World Order—a single world government—is an unacceptable alternative to
stability through nuclear deterrence. Managing risk means we can conceive of disarmament in
the world that already exists.
To figure out what we want, we need to understand security with nuclear weapons and
security without nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons contribute to our security in several ways.
They do so by changing state options. In a dyadic relationship they deter direct wars by
establishing mutual assured destruction (MAD), which reduces our beneficial options to one—
back down; they prevent inadvertent war and increase de-escalation in the event of hostile
developments; and they establish the threat of death as a major deterrent. Taken together, nuclear
weapons increase our security.26 Additionally, nuclear weapons can help compensate for weak
conventional forces. For example, as the US increases its military budget, Russia need not
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balance conventionally, as it already has achieved nuclear equilibrium.27 They allow states to
resolve disputes through the threat of force, rather than escalating to actual force. They all-but
eliminate the threat of attrition warfare, if one follows the conclusions of MAD. They allow nonnuclear states to enjoy security guarantees from major powers under “nuclear umbrellas,” which
frees up smaller states’ resources so they can be spent on building international prestige in nonmilitary ways. And finally, nuclear weapons create the hierarchical system and, therefore, they
create a recognizable and stable order.28
On the other hand, nuclear weapons pose enormous risk—and thus insecurity—in several
ways. Addressing these is the other side of the coin we are trying to figure out. First, there exists
the unavoidable threat of nuclear accident. While states can do their best to avoid an accident,
accidents happen despite our best intentions.29 The possibility of nuclear terrorism, irrational
actors inhereting nuclear arsenals, inadvertant militarized escalation, and regional competition
over nuclear potential exasperate insecurity. Additionally, nuclear weapons programs are
expensive, meaning there is a domestic cost to a nuclear weapons program.30
Therefore, how do practitioners manage the nuclear age? Various mechanisms are at
play. First, there is a narrative of the nuclear taboo, a longstanding tradition on the non-use of
nuclear weapons since World War II.31 Press, Sagan, and Valentino note that, "If nuclear
weapons are seen as taboo, their use might generate revulsion that could lead to deeper restraint
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in the future. If non-use is merely a tradition, however, breaking it could set a new precedent,
potentially increasing the likelihood that others will use nuclear weapons in the future."32 This is
a slight diversion from realism, and this assumption acknowledges that determining between
these two possible outcomes requires understanding realism, on the one hand, and the process by
which ideas are shaped through discourse, or constructivism, on the other hand.
As aforementioned, global practitioners also manage the nuclear age through various
arms control agreements. Many of these are identified in Chapters 5 and 6. It should be noted
here that, although arms control generally works, with a few hiccups here and there (e.g., the
bilateral suspension of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019 between the
US and Russia), arms control faces a realist backlash, some calling it an illusion that only exists
when there are no insecurities. Colin Gray writes, “the theory and practice of arms control is to
security what the flat-earth postulate was to cosmology: sincerely believed, responsive to some
empirical evidence (the world can look fairly flat), attractive to common sense, but alas,
invalid.”33 In other words, there is a strong possibility that arms control is doomed to failure.
That said, arms control is a known mechanism and pathway towards (or at least in the direction
of) global zero.
It should also be noted that managers in the nuclear age have, up until this point at least,
peacefully ended the Cold War, more or less constructed successful security guarantees to nonnuclear weapons states, developed nuclear weapons free zones, established the IAEA,
established the NPT, and conducted countless nuclear security summits, regardless of outcome.
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On the other hand, as is mentioned in Chapter 2, a peaceful resolution to the Cold War does not
necessarily translate into a peaceful resolution to all conflicts that include the possibility of
nuclear strike. Security guarantees are not set in stone (as Colin Gray would probably agree).
Nuclear weapons free zones do not mean free from fallout or other detrimental global effects of
nuclear war, nor are nuclear weapons free zones endowed with the muscle necessary to enforce
the law. The IAEA and the NPT cannot prevent nuclear war; they can just make it a little less
likely. And nuclear security summits, like the one between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un in
February 2019, are often less-than successful. What this means is that, as is addressed in Chapter
3, managing the nuclear age in the twenty-first century requires a holistic understanding and
approach.
Next, to figure out what we want, we must ask two questions: 1) is disarmament
desirable? This question stems from many of the questions posed above. And 2) is disarmament
feasible? To answer the first question, Schell has previously argued that disarmament is a moral
imperative. Other abolitionists identified in Chapter 5 agree. But whether or not disarmament is
desirable is not the important question. But because some actors say it is desirable, we can
connect this question with feasibility. Wheeler and Booth see this as a necessary connection
because disarmament begins with the policymakers who want disarmament. If disarmament is
desired by decision makers, then disarmament is not feasible.34 They additionally posit that
disarmament is only possible through a process-oriented gradual reduction. In other words, the
idea is to wean states away from nuclear weapons. This weaning requires increasing cooperation.
In 2010 Russian and US presidents Medvedev and Obama put this cooperative, process-oriented
gradual reduction to use, signing the New START treaty. But, as shown by the bilateral
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suspension of the INF Treaty in February 2019, this process can be derailed. This study seeks to
completely eschew the process. (Or at least, it seeks movement from some non-zero number to
zero; whether or not that number is in the thousands or dozens is up to the imaginations of the
reader. In the end, this model tests security stability without nuclear weapons.) Under my
prescription, states will negotiate the terms of a disarmament treaty, choose a date on a calendar,
and then open their doors to the outside world to verify the destruction of warheads, very similar
to the INF Treaty warhead dismantlement inspections. This approach is akin to tearing an
adhesive bandage off of an old wound in one pull. It is likely to be painful, but the pain will be
shorter lived than if drawn out by a gradual process. This requires a small amount of big steps
rather than an unknown number of small steps. With this approach there are fewer areas for
derailment (although skepicism is magnified, which begs for a demonstration of benefit and
reward through, for example, fuzzy cognitive mapping).
Finally, to come full circle, answering what we want requires us to acknowledge the
most difficult aspects of a disarmed world, a disarming world, or even a world merely
considering its nuclear options. Namely, how is verification of compliance strong enough that
uncertainty is manageable? Furthermore, how can the IAEA be strong enough to verify
compliance, but not so strong that the state loses its ability to govern itself? As previously
mentioned, the IAEA must be empowered by the state. If the IAEA becomes more powerful than
the sum of the power granted it by states without mechanisms for rearmament if necessary, it
creates incentives for defection from the disarmament (or non-proliferation) regime. This has
already been addressed above (see re-proliferation capability). For our purposes here, the IAEA
has a first duty to know how many warheads are out there. This complicates the problems in
Chapters 5 and 6 and the “mess” in Chapter 7. These numbers are usually closely guarded
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secrets, and determining the actual number requires substantial reassurances through
transparency. And it requires major baiting of milieu rewards to entice states to be open and
truthful.
A couple paragraphs above, I briefly make the case for ripping the bandage off in a single
movement—going from some non-zero number to zero all at once. One of the reasons for this is
because as nuclear redundancies diminish, numbers matter. Dismantling 1,000 warheads when
you have 10,000 is simple. Dismantling 1,000 when you have 1,500 is more difficult. Going
from 10 to 5 is even more difficult still. Going from 5 or 10 to zero is not unthinkable, but it is
unbelievable. These stages create defection points each round. The great leap to zero
circumvents the potential political crises that will emerge as new institutions are framed, new
conventions are formed, and more potentially doomed-to-fail nuclear summits are held in order
to manage the next small leap to a non-zero number.
Therefore, to turn Colin Gray’s argument on its head and to adopt from John Mueller, the
irrelevance of nuclear weapons narrative suggests that if we get to a point where nuclear
disarmament is possible, not only will it be likely to occur out of mere circumstance, it will be
likely to occur because re-proliferation capability is enough to deter belligerence. The weapons
served their purpose in developing MAD. They are now irrelevant.35 They are unnecessary to
maintain MAD explicitly because of the fact that we cannot put the nuclear genie back in the
bottle. The question now is whether we should put the nuclear genie out to pasture.

35

John E. Mueller, “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar
World,” International Security 13, no. 2 (1988): 56

19
The Model
This study adopts a form of systemic decision-making called Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping,
adapted from Axelrod36 and later Kosko.37 Fuzzy cognitive maps show relations between
concepts as well as the strengths of those relationships. Imagine a hospital with a patient with a
communicable disease as well as a doctor and a nurse. If we are examining this social network in
terms of each actor’s health, the doctor and nurse can positively and strongly increase the
patient’s health by providing various forms of accepted medicine, and the patient can weakly or
moderately decrease the doctor’s and the nurse’s health by transmitting the disease. As this
model stands, the doctor and nurse can neither increase nor decrease the other’s health unless the
patient first transmits the disease to one or the other. Therefore the fuzzy cognitive map also
accounts for changes in time. At timestamp 0, when the patient is admitted, the doctor and
nurse’s health is unaffected; however, at timestamp 1, after the patient has been in the hospital
for a pre-defined time, the doctor and nurse’s health could be affected. And at timestamp 2,
considering one or the other healthcare worker has caught the disease; the newly infected actor
can affect the health of the uninfected actor.
This study incorporates this form of modeling and applies it to the nuclear weapons
problems and “mess.” Its methodology adapts strongly from Patrick T. Hester and Kevin MacG.
Adams38 to create a highly structured representation of the nuclear problems and the constitutive
nuclear “mess.” The problems and the “mess” are created on an online modeling platform called
Mental Modeler, the quantifiable contents of which are imported into an Excel spreadsheet
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containing a macro capable of analyzing the model through a sigmoid transfer function to allow
the model to evolve from one timestamp to the next. Finally, the model is examined by asking
various “what-if” questions. That is, what happens if we make certain predefined changes to the
structure of the “mess”? Do these changes help to solve the problem? Do they make the scenario
worse off for relevant stakeholders?
The modeling also takes place in an international environment that accepts the basic
tenets of political realism. Hans Morgenthau posits that politics behave according to objective
laws of human nature; politics is a response to changes in the measurement of power; the concept
of power is fluid through time; morality is not insignificant, but it is often in contrast with
successful policy; there is no objective good or bad in the laws of nature; and political realism is
the domain of politics, despite its explicit acknowledgement that other schools of thought exist
and matter to their respective subjects.39 Morgenthau acknowledges the existence of international
law, human rights, and other institutions outside the scope of political realism, but he does not
think they matter in the long term. States might temporarily decide to cooperate on a specific
issue, but they are bound by the laws of human nature to defect from the cooperative relationship
as soon as a reasonable opportunity presents itself. To be fair, as is discussed in Chapter 8, this
tenet of political realism does not detract from my argument, but rather it bolsters it.
Furthermore, this research deviates from political realism, despite acknowledging it, by
acknowledging that other institutions indeed matter, if only in the present. It furthermore adds
that states will first accept the laws of human nature, but they can also overcome them through
rational choice in search of goals beyond their national boundaries that bolster their security but
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not at the expense of others’ securities. In this sense, I adopt from Wolfers, E.H. Carr,40 and Ken
Booth,41 who argue that states can accept the balance of power, but will also work towards a
communal view of utopia when possible, if only because it serves a non-selfish benefit to the
state moving towards utopia. Booth explicitly calls for going beyond realism to reach a fuller
empiricism of the study of international relations.42

1.3 Summary of the Study’s Findings
The model I construct in Chapters 5 – 7 is highly complex, containing over 50 movable
parts (and over 150 ways to move them). Although I go to great lengths to explain how each
concept interacts with surrounding concepts, readers without engineering management
backgrounds and a strong interest in social mechanics might find the model chapters dry.
Therefore, a brief summary of the study’s findings is in order, so that the average reader will
understand from the beginning what this highly complex machine is working towards.
In short, ripping the nuclear bandage off quickly (the great leap to zero approach) is
feasible, but this claim comes with several crucial caveats.
First, as demonstrated in late February 2019,43 several ongoing international disputes can
spiral towards crisis, and nuclear deterrence might be the only thing presently restraining nuclear
powers.44 A terroristic suicide car bombing in Kashmir’s Pulwama district by a Pakistani militant
against India’s Central Reserve Police Force spiralled out of control, culminating in Pakistan
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shooting down two Indian military jets over Pakistan’s airspace. India and Pakistan have danced
close to the brink of major militarized international dispute before, even after each state
constituted nuclear deterrents. The quick recovery by March 1, 2019 and the increased
diplomatic urgency surrounding the India-Pakistan 2019 crisis demonstrate two things: 1)
Removing India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent before resolving the ongoing 71-year-old
Kasmir dispute might lead both states to major war to resolve the Kashmir issue. And 2) there is
a strong likelihood that diplomatic urgency is fostered by the nuclear deterrent, rather than
diplomacy undermining nuclear deterrence. Beyond Kashmir there are a half dozen or so
ongoing international geopolitical disputes that require the same treatment. Removing their
respective states’ nuclear deterrents is untenable without resolving their disputes.
Therefore, moving forward from some unknown date on a calendar when nothing
prevents us from trying the great leap to zero, there are feasible things we can do that will make
disarmament feasible and stable. First, nuclear weapons states need strong reassurance that their
natural rights to govern their territory or to move in the international realm are not infringed
beyond a pre-negotiated disarmament treaty. This has the effect of limiting international
organizations’ powers. The IAEA is not empowered beyond the treaty. Second, the states
outlying the NPT must be brought into the international fold, economically and diplomatically.
Particularly, the recognized nuclear powers should acknowledge North Korea and Pakistan as
nuclear powers. This might require an amendment to the NPT, temporarily forgiving past human
rights violations, and bringing these states into the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It certainly requires
dropping sanctions. Third, the recognized nuclear weapons states and the states outlying the NPT
must ceremoniously sign the IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the Additional
Protocol as a measure of good faith. This will activate the IAEA to power commensurate to
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agreed upon provisions in the disarmament treaty. A final crucial point highlights the importance
of replacing security with MAD with a “weaponless deterrence.” Realizing or maintaining the
capability to constitute or reconstitute militarized nuclear forces is, according to the model
developed in the following chapters, the only way to maintain stable and recognizable security.
By working Schell’s “weaponless deterrence” into the provisions of a working disarmament
treaty, we can empower the IAEA through other provisions enough to deter proliferation through
transparency, while limiting the IAEA’s power to stop proliferation. This acknowledges Colin
Gray’s contribution that arms control only works when it can work. This leads to a resultant
conclusion that disarmament will work only when it can work, and the IAEA will have to live
with this.
The above scenario is captured using fuzzy cognitive mapping, ascribing to realist claims
that the possession of nuclear weapons increases security. My model, however, counters the
realist’s position that nuclear weapons best maximizes the security needs of states. The ability to
reconstitute nuclear weapons drives security without nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the fact that
no stateholders—not even nuclear weapons states or even North Korea—are ignoring the nuclear
weapons problem. Rather, historically they have demonstrated sincere eagerness to work towards
resolving this problem. In other words, states recognize and accept that the problem is real and
not merely in the imaginations of anti-war activists.
What accounts for this recognition when nuclear weapons are a perfect demonstration of
state capability? The model I present leaves us with epistemological uncertainty, due to its highly
formalized structure that severs it from meaning. It shows cause and effect but not implication.
Arnold Wolfers may offer some insight (expanded in the final chapter). He argues states have
possession goals and milieu goals. Possession goals are things sought in competition with other
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states. These are egotistical, competetive, and highly political, and they lead to a system of great
competition and an inability to think in terms of the whole. They are merely to look inward
rather than at the social environment. Milieu goals are actions states take to shape the social
environment in which they operate. To a realist the milieu is anarchy, but the milieu is created
through the actions and behaviors of states, rather than created by international structure. By
shaping the milieu, states shape the choices of others. This is not for altruistic purposes, but
rather out of egotistical sociability. That is, socially interacting with the environment serves our
foreign policies. It is to serve our self-interests.45
If we think about our nuclear choices not merely as a realist would—not merely about
how they immediately serve our security needs—we note that alternatives become clearer. Arms
control serves no possession goals for nuclear powers, but it serves to shape the social
environment in which other actors consider their options. This requires some level of selfrestraint and cooperation; it is reasonable to offer self-restraint and cooperation if you expect it
from others. But more important, as the prisoners’ dilemma can attest, mutual cooperation, while
not a dominant strategy or serving to bolster possession goals, self-restraint and cooperation
benefits the self-interest of the actor.46 This study suggests nuclear powers, whether recognized
or not, seek both possession goals and milieu goals. Their concern about the role nuclear
weapons play in the social context, demonstrated by their engagement in resolving the problems,
and the understanding that shaping the social context through self-restraint and increased
cooperation is driven by self-interests rather than altruism, explains why the model converges on
increased security without nuclear weapons than with.
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1.4 Organization of the Study
This study is in eight chapters.
In Chapter 2 I identify relevant literature regarding arms control, disarmament, mutual
assured destruction, and the scientific literature pertaining to the effects of nuclear weapons from
climatological, psychological, and sociological perspectives. This chapter makes the case for
relevancy as well as the urgency of this study.
In Chapter 3 I discuss the background of the modeling technique, the philosophy of fuzzy
cognitive mapping, and the theoretical reasoning behind the study. Of particular note, this
chapter addresses eight error types in logic that should be avoided during various stages in the
modeling (problem structuring, action, and observation). While this study strives to avoid all
error types, it is of particular importance that it avoids modeling the wrong problem (the Type III
error) and solving one problem while making another problem worse (the Type IV error). The
chapter goes on to discuss how problems interact and create a “mess,” which is a problem made
up of other problems and is larger than the sum of its constituent problems. The chapter
therefore, adopting from Hester and Adams, discusses why this study is more than merely trying
to solve a single problem.
Chapter 4 lays out the methodological framework, fuzzy cognitive mapping, as well as
the problem structuring proposed by Hester and Adams. The chapter shows how this study seeks
to model abstractions of the nuclear weapons problems and “mess” within an abstraction of the
real-world system. It furthermore discusses the specifics of the model, including its rationale
behind using the sigmoid transfer function (as opposed to a bivalent or trivalent function) as well
as using a Likert-type scale (as opposed to a truly continuous scale). The chapter also provides
easy-to-follow simulation examples.
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Chapter 5 attempts to model Problem 1, which states that nuclear-armed states are
resistant to disarmament, while significant portions of the world desire a nuclear-free
international system. In doing so it first articulates the problem, providing a background
discussion on disarmament, deterrence, and arms control, as well as political realism. It then
methodologically goes through six problem parameters (who, what, why, where, how, and when)
including qualitative reasoning for each quantitative link between model components. It finally
tests the model’s stability by running a hypothetical test. In this case, it gives the International
Atomic Energy Agency the preponderance of power to solve the problem. Doing so, however,
would commit the Type IV error by taking the decision away from nuclear weapons states. In
this scenario, nuclear weapon states would likely drop out of safeguards agreements and
demonstrate that international governance is less feasible than initially thought.
Chapter 6 attempts to model Problem 2, which states that there is a disagreement as to
how much international governance is necessary to ensure verification of online, peaceful
nuclear programs. It articulates the problem with a discussion on nuclear safeguards and the
theoretical background that makes safeguards agreements possible. It repeats the previous
chapter’s who, what, why, where, how, and when structure, providing link justification. It finally
performs a stability test by ensuring nuclear weapons states’ sovereignty is not affected and that
nuclear security is initially maximized. This solution, too, exposes a Type IV error because
Outlier States are strongly opposed and therefore unlikely to disarm and are unlikely to agree to
future disarmament treaties unless they have a seat at the table.
Therefore, Chapter 7 stacks Problem 1 and Problem 2 on top of each other and
restructures the “mess” to account for the role nuclear weapons play between the problems,
providing link update justifications. It then runs six scenarios to test whether or not nuclear
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weapons can be removed from the system. It finds that nations can disarm given that certain
steps are taken. First, there can be no lasting reduction in nuclear weapons states’ sovereignty.
Second, a disarmament treaty must be limited in its scope and contain a clause for withdrawal.
Third, Outlier States must be engaged. When all three steps are taken, states can begin the
process of disarmament.
Chapter 8 begins by acknowledging the possible Type IV error. That is, we cannot be
certain that we can avoid World War III in a disarmed world. At the very least we cannot be
certain we can avoid war between the US and China if each state loses its deterrent capability.
Therefore, it acknowledges that the present time is not the right time to negotiate to
disarmament. There are certain international realities that must be dealt with before we can avoid
the Type IV error. It then discusses how the ability for former nuclear weapons states to reproliferate might maintain stability in a disarmed world through two ways. First, re-proliferation
will cause states in conflict to de-escalate to avoid suffering a nuclear war. Second, the threat of
proliferation can be used to solve conflicts because the cost of proliferation is high if one wants
to achieve a mutual assured destruction between states. The chapter finally addresses remaining
uncertainties. First, Outlier States cannot be certain they will be rewarded for cooperation.
History has shown that sometimes former rogue states are punished, despite giving up their
nuclear programs. Getting them to trust the major powers will be difficult. Second, it cannot be
certain that negotiations towards disarmament will be in good faith. The DPRK, for example,
might try to misrepresent its preferences in order to get a better—or avoid the worst—outcome.
Lastly, this study addresses and acknowledges variation in outcome by using different simulation
types and attempts to overcome this limitation. Lastly, Chapter 9 summarizes the study and its
findings, offering a discussion about the study’s implications and the future of nuclear weapons.
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CHAPTER 2
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

2.1 The Costs of Nuclear Conflict
Previously the threat of a limited nuclear war, where both sides limit the number of
nuclear warheads used during conflict,47 was thought to most likely occur between India and
Pakistan.48 In 2017 there was heightened reason to suspect the United States and North Korea as
potential candidates due in large part to escalating tensions brought about by the 2017 Korean
Crisis. This chapter sets the stage for the challenges modeled and analyzes in the rest of the study
by examining in detail the literature on nuclear deterrence and its limitations.
The probability of deterrence breaking down between the US and North Korea was
arguably not zero in 2017, and the costs of a nuclear war are sufficiently high to warrant a
serious discussion about the future utility of nuclear arsenals. This chapter demonstrates that
nuclear deterrence can break down in at least four non-mutually exclusive ways. First, two
players suffer from mutual uncertainty. If each side believes it will suffer a first strike, each has
incentive to preempt nuclear war by attacking first. Second, either side might suffer from threat
incredulity. If either side believes the deterrent threat made by the other is unbelievable it can
therefore believe the costs of a second strike are tolerable. Third, conventional wars between
nuclear powers can escalate to nuclear war if either side believes losing is synonymous with
dying. Finally, either side can suffer a nuclear terrorist attack. While the probability of nuclear
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terrorism is low, if an incident occurred there is no return address for retaliation, leaving the
attacked state few options outside retaliating against the state suspected of giving rise to the
nuclear terrorist. Furthermore, it is possible a nuclear terrorist attack can resemble an attack by a
nuclear regime.
The effects of a nuclear war between the US and North Korea (or any other two nucleararmed states) would be catastrophic, affecting the global climate, severely stressing societies,
and pushing individuals to their psychological breaking points. This literature review suggests
the effects of these consequences would likely compel a serious discussion about the future of
deterrence and thus nuclear weapons. On the other hand, if the bulk of the scientific literature
estimates intolerable global consequences following a limited or total nuclear war, then it is
reasonable to suggest disarmament talks can be taken seriously now, rather than following
catastrophe. The evidence presented through the literature provides states and societies the
means by which to have a serious discussion about disarmament. While this project in no way
predicts the outcome of that discussion, it does show that serious discussion can be achieved
without suffering through costly nuclear wars.

2.2 Korean and US Limited Nuclear War
In 2007 George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn reinvigorated the
disarmament conversation because deterrence does not apply to accidental or unauthorized
nuclear weapons use or miscalculation.49 They explicitly allow for the possibility of nuclear war
between the US and North Korea and between nuclear states in general. Particularly as new
proliferation occurs, the system can become less stable. The Donald Trump Administration and
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Kim Jong Un during the Korean Crisis (2017 – present) appeared to be heightening nuclear
tensions and diminishing deterrence stability, forming what could have become a limited nuclear
war. For the purpose of this analysis it is assumed any nuclear war between these regimes will be
limited due to North Korea’s finite stockpile and capabilities, relative to the US.
As of 2014 the United States has roughly 4,650 nuclear weapons either stockpiled or
deployed in addition to another 2,700 weapons awaiting dismantlement.50 This includes landbased intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs), and strategic warheads that can be loaded onto heavy bombers. US warhead yields
range from the 10 ton “Davy Crocket” device to the 15-MT Castle Bravo. Estimates as of July
2017 suggest North Korea has zero deployed nuclear warheads. It is uncertain how many nondeployed, stockpiled weapons North Korea currently possesses;51 however, US estimates suggest
North Korea has as many as 60 warheads.52 NORSTAR seismic testing estimates North Korea’s
largest nuclear test on September 3, 2017 produced a yield of approximately 250-KT.53
Due to the US’s reliance on proportionate response—a guarantee of a second strike
retaliation proportionate to the opposing side’s first strike—and the current lack of evidence of
North Korean weapons larger than 250-KT, this analysis does not believe a limited nuclear war
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would necessarily escalate to megaton-sized weapons. However, any limited nuclear war
between the US and North Korea would be devastating in terms of human casualties.
Nuclear deterrence along those lines of direct human fatalities has held the peace for
decades; however, at least four scenarios show how nuclear war could break out between the
two, escalating each side to at least attempt to use weapons with yields upwards of 250-KT:
mutual uncertainty, non-credible threats, escalation of conventional warfare, and response to
nuclear terrorism.

Mutual Uncertainty
Deterrence can break down if either side believes it will be struck first—what Schelling
calls “reciprocal fear of surprise attack.”54 Schelling illustrates this dilemma with an armed
burglar and an armed homeowner. If both the burglar and homeowner draw their weapons
against each other, then the burglar fears the homeowner will shoot first. The homeowner fears
the burglar will shoot first. Because both sides prefer to live, the fear of the burglar shooting first
makes it necessary for the homeowner to shoot first, and vice versa. Under anarchy, where no
police force can arrest either side for shooting first, constraint cannot be seen as a rational move.
Morrow reemphasizes this, adopting from Schelling. His model suggests if either side believes it
will be struck first, it has incentive to launch a first strike because the costs of receiving a first
strike are greater than the costs of receiving a second strike.55
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If relations between the United States and North Korea had devolved into a nuclear
standoff, Donald Trump may have feared Kim Jong Un was planning to strike first. Kim Jong Un
may have also feared Donald Trump was planning a first strike. Because the costs of receiving a
first strike are potentially higher than receiving a second strike—given both sides have
contingency delivery systems—both sides have incentive to launch a first strike, potentially
curtailing the other side’s retaliatory capabilities. If North Korea believed the Trump
Administration was planning to launch a first strike, North Korea could have launched more
attacks against the US if it strikes first.

Non-credible Threats
During the Cold War deterrence provided stability through the concept of mutual assured
destruction (MAD). Using nuclear weapons against the other was unthinkable because, due to
each side’s second-strike capabilities, “the expectation of retaliation would surely constrain his
hand.”56 On the other hand, asymmetric capabilities can break down deterrence through a
process of major or minor, non-mortal miscalculations that can lead to general or total war, such
as threatening the enemy.57 If one state makes non-credible threats towards the other, each side
might find itself over the brink. Morrow notes that a rational first strike could occur if one side
believes it can take out the other side’s retaliatory capabilities.58 A first strike can be rational if
the opposing side threatens painful retaliation, and the retaliatory threat is be non-credible.
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If North Korea’s retaliatory threats against the US were non-credible, and if Trump
believed he could disarm North Korea by launching a first strike then a first strike becomes more
likely. Given available unclassified information, such an attack would likely see warheads
launched against about a dozen sites, including known launch pads and fissile material
enrichment facilities.59 Nevertheless, there is circumstantial evidence that North Korea, aware
that its launch pads are “JDAM bait,” is using its missile launches from aboveground pads to
distract attention from a covert silo program.60 If undetected silos exist then even 15 or so 1-MT
weapons might be insufficient to disarm North Korea, allowing for a North Korean second-strike
volley. Furthermore, this possibility takes on a familiar and unsettling calculus. If North Korea
believed the US was planning a preemptive strike to take out its first strike capabilities, it has
incentive to use those capabilities before a US first strike. In other words, mutual uncertainty and
non-credible threats accelerates the risk of nuclear war.

Escalation of Conventional Warfare
A minor armed confrontation can escalate to a larger war because it signals that both
sides are risk accepting.61 On the other hand, Kenneth Waltz argues nuclear weapons provide
robust stability, writing that when two nuclear powers engage in conventional warfare, each side
is likely to draw back and offer concessions out of fear of nuclear escalation.62 While the formal
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logic of this argument is sound, concession does not always offer the highest possible reward.
Furthermore, risk accepting behavior can escalate a larger war to nuclear brinkmanship,
particularly given that one side has everything to lose by conceding from the conflict. It is
possible that a given conventional war is a zero sum war, where at least one side has intense
resolve to achieve a specific goal, such as the overthrow of the existing regime. In such a case, if
concessions do not increase the probability of survival, but rather bolster the other side’s goals,
then the potentially willing side becomes unwilling to concede. If the losing side believes death
is inevitable by conceding but has a small chance of survival by going nuclear, then using
nuclear weapons is the more rational move. To illustrate this consider two states. State A and
State B are fighting a conventional war. Both states have nuclear capabilities. State A’s
unmovable goal is to eliminate State B. State B is losing the war. State B can concede, where
death has a probability of 1, or it can launch a nuclear attack against State A, where death has a
probability of less than 1. State B’s best option is to go nuclear, where the probability of survival
is some number greater than zero.
Donald Trump announced during his first prepared address to the United Nations in
September 2017, the US has “no choice but to totally destroy North Korea.”63 This statement is
likely tailored to leave little room for misinterpretation. While it could be mere rhetoric, it is
certainly possible that a minor armed confrontation, such as a Naval and ground-based blockade
of North Korea, can escalate to ship-to-ship and cross-border fighting. Given Trump’s public
position, it is likely such an escalation will serve as a pretext for a larger military campaign.
While a conventional war will likely be painful for both sides, the odds of a North Korean
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victory are low. Even if Kim considers concession, he will have to weigh that option against the
inevitability of a subsequent continued war until he is out of power. The other option is to inflict
extraordinary pain on the United States by going nuclear, which provides a small sliver of hope
that Kim will survive if Trump takes the realist position and decides Korea is “The wrong war, at
the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”64 In this event, the breakdown
of deterrence brings up the possibility of mutual uncertainty and non-credible threats
incentivizing Trump to go nuclear first.

Terrorism as a Pretext for Deterrence Breakdown
Schultz, et al, identifies the “most alarming” risk of unauthorized use—terrorism. Nunn
elaborated in October 2008, arguing, “I’m much more concerned about a terrorist without a
return address that cannot be deterred than I am about deliberate war between nuclear powers.
You can’t deter a group who is willing to commit suicide. We are in a different era. You have to
understand the world has changed.”65 On the other hand, the risk of nuclear terrorism is low,
while a nuclear conflict between the US and North Korea might be somewhat more likely.
Matthew Bunn constructs a mathematical model of the risk of nuclear terrorism. He argues the
probability is low. The terrorist group would first need to acquire the bomb by directly stealing a
weapon, acquiring one from an insider, purchasing one on the black market, or receiving one
from a state. It would then need to transform it into a working bomb (if it receives an unfinished
weapon or materials). It would next need to transport the bomb without detection. Finally it
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would need to decide to actually use the weapon. Each of these scenarios has some level of
probability. When taken together the probability of a terroristic nuclear attack is very low.66
On the other hand, low probability events happen often. People win multimillion-dollar
lotteries and meteorites impact the earth on a regular basis, despite the odds against any given
person winning or any given rock colliding with the earth. In the improbable event that a terrorist
organization acquires a nuclear weapon, nuclear terrorism can break down deterrence in two
ways.
First, a terrorist organization can proliferate through the willing or unwilling help of a
nuclear regime. Nuclear weapons are unlikely to be built by the terror group, leading them to
seek to acquire by theft or from inside or outside agents. Given that the group proliferates and
detonates the device against the US, it is likely US intelligence agencies will attempt to trace the
origins of the weapon back to the country where it was built. If North Korea attempts to sell
nuclear materials on the black market, if a rogue North Korean soldier steals a weapon and sells
it, or if a criminal agent or group is able to steal materials from unsecure caches and sell them,
then the US is likely to punish North Korea, potentially including the use of nuclear retaliation.
Because terrorists do not have a return address, and because of the high emotional response to a
nuclear terrorist attack, it is likely the US will punish North Korea in some way. Donald Trump
might use such an event as pretext to a nuclear attack in hopes of decapitating the North.
Second, nuclear terrorism can break down deterrence because a nuclear terrorist attack
might resemble an attack carried out by a nuclear regime. If a terrorist group proliferates and
charters a fishing vessel to a US military installation on a small island in the western Pacific
Ocean, detonating the weapon would appear suspiciously similar to Kim Jong Un’s threat to
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attack Guam during summer 2017. The initial response, prior to intelligence investigation, would
likely be to retaliate against the most likely aggressor. If the Trump Administration believes it is
under direct nuclear attack by North Korea, it will likely retaliate before the criminal
investigation draws its conclusions.

2.3 Effects of a Limited Nuclear War
Alex Wellerstein’s “NUKEMAP,” hosted by the College of Arts and Letters, Stevens
Institute of Technology, allows users to simulate nuclear detonations anywhere on the planet.
Using two potential candidate cities for nuclear strikes, a single round volley using 150-KT
airburst detonations directed at Pyongyang, North Korea and Honolulu, Hawaii results in an
estimated three quarters of a million direct fatalities, with half a million in Pyongyang. Total
injured exceeds a million. The ionizing radiation ring for such an explosion is 1.35 km2, where
the fatality rate is estimated at 95%.67 These numbers do not account for indirect fatalities
injuries due to panic-induced mass migration or separation from medical treatment. Further,
direct and indirect fatalities during the initial day or so after an attack do not reflect the total
impact of nuclear warfare. Climate changes, social pressures, and psychological pressures create
a perfect storm of human tragedy likely to significantly outlast the nuclear war.

Climate
Throughout the Cold War, where the concept of nuclear war was total rather than limited,
experiments and models gave rise to a secondary, and perhaps more devastating, effect of
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nuclear war. The term “Nuclear Winter” entered the popular lexicon to describe the effects of
nuclear explosions setting fire to large quantities of organic and inorganic compounds, resulting
in millions of tons of black carbon rising to high altitudes and diffusing throughout the
stratosphere where it would block significant portions of sunlight from reaching the ground,
causing global temperatures to drop to sub-freezing levels, even during the summer months.68
Following this, vegetation would die off and agriculture would largely come to an end. While the
theory was not error-proof,69 the bulk of research suggests that more robust modeling overcame
Nuclear Winter’s theoretical uncertainties.70 Following the Cold War the risks of Nuclear Winter
subsided, but some contemporary models suggest even a small nuclear war could have a
devastating impact on the climate.71 While the risk of total nuclear war has decreased following
the end of the Cold War, the concept of limited nuclear war gave rise to the term “Nuclear
Autumn.”
In 2017 Liska, et al, explore the effects of a limited nuclear war on climate change. They
find that a limited nuclear war, during which dozens of small to large nuclear warheads are
exchanged between two or more states, has the potential to cause significant burning of
structures, vegetation, or other organic or polymer-based matter, potentially releasing upwards of
5 million tons of black carbon into the atmosphere. The impacts on the climate would be drastic,
with a resultant impact on human survival. First, agricultural growing seasons could be reduced
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by about a month or a month and a half each year for the next five years. Second, global
temperatures could decrease for the next quarter century. Third, there could be an immediate dip
in global temperatures to a low not observed in a millennium. Fourth, precipitation brought by
Asian monsoons could decrease by 20-80%, which could result in much drier climates in the
Americas, Africa, and Australia, causing, what they call, a “global nuclear drought.” Finally, the
reduction in available food could cause a billion people to die from starvation and increase
violence in acutely affected regions as resources become scarcer.72
Liska, et al, expand upon a model proposed by Toon, et al, in 2007. Toon argues fires
resulting from nuclear explosions in “megacities,” or densely populated urban areas, from a
nuclear exchange consisting of 100 15-KT weapons could release 1 to 5 million tons of black
carbon into the atmosphere. They argue this will cause surface temperatures, rainfall, and the
length of agricultural growing seasons to be greatly affected. The result is severely decreased
agricultural production and subsequent famines lasting over a decade.73 Toon’s model assumes a
large exchange of relatively small (by today’s standards) nuclear weapons. Liska, et al, note
today’s nuclear weapons are usually 6 to 330 times larger than those dropped on Japan and that
“The use of only one 5-MT land-based missile deployed by China could burn an area similar in
size to that of one hundred 15-KT explosions.”74 In other words, increasing yield and decreasing
the number of weapons in a nuclear exchange overcomes Toon’s unlikely scenario.
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The models predicting the effects of nuclear war, limited or otherwise, on the climate are
not perfectly certain. Detractors might argue there have been no catastrophic climate variances
following roughly 2,000 nuclear tests since 1945. On the other hand the bulk of previous nuclear
weapons testing was conducted “in the U.S. Southwest desert, on small tropical islands, at high
altitudes, or underground,”75 where there is little organic material, oxygen, or fuel to burn.
Therefore, previous weapons testing offers little evidence to rebut the claimed effects of nuclear
detonations on the climate, but it also offers little evidence to support the claims. Furthermore,
scientific models simulating the effects of limited or total nuclear wars cannot be verified with
independent evidence for the obvious ethical, logistical, and legal reasons, including that doing
so would violate the provisions of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits all nuclear tests
except those performed under ground.
The lack of independent evidence does not mean the theories of Nuclear Winter or
Nuclear Autumn is merely hypothetical. Robock and Toon seek out analogous evidence through
the study of historical events that released substantial amounts of particles into the atmosphere.
Burned cities, massive volcanic eruptions, large forest fires, and asteroid-earth collisions, such as
the Yucatán Peninsula impact event that caused the extinction of the dinosaurs, can all be
examined. Additionally, they argue the seasonal cycle is a natural simulation of the effects of
reduced solar input.76 A 2017 article in Forbes further states studying the effects of massive
volcanic eruptions that burned sufficient vegetation or structures offers some insight. David
Bressan highlights eruptions in Indonesia, Central America, and Iceland as candidates for
causing the “Little Ice Age” during the 1200s, as well as an eruption in Indonesia in 1815 that
caused the “Year without a Summer” in 1816, which spanned Eastern and Northern America to
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Western Europe.77 The 1815 eruption reddened the American sky, causing May and June frosts
at higher elevations that triggered crop failures, thus reducing food supplies.78
The question is not whether or not nuclear explosions over metropolitan areas will affect
the climate; the question is to what degree will it affect the climate. Robock, et al, modeled the
effects of a regional nuclear war in 2007, finding the subsequent release of fine ash into the
atmosphere cooled the global climate by 1.25 degrees Celsius,79 which is a full degree cooler
than the first year effect of the 1815 eruption on the global climate, with comparable effects on
global temperatures through 1818.80
In summary, previous simulations both during and after the Cold War suggest a nuclear
war, limited or total, will set fire to massive swaths of land. These fires will burn forests,
structures, vegetation, and other organic and inorganic materials. The fires will likely produce
fine black carbon ash that will rise into the atmosphere and block portions of solar rays for
prolonged periods of time, resulting in cooler ground temperatures, shorter growing seasons, and
drier climates, ultimately leading to greatly reduced crop yields lasting years. These affects are a
function of total yield during the nuclear exchange—meaning total nuclear wars will likely lead
to a Nuclear Winters and limited nuclear wars will lead to Nuclear Autumns. The effects on the
climate are furthermore inescapable from social and psychological effects.
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Social Disruptions
A limited nuclear war, while not as deadly as a total nuclear war, will acutely result in
massive human casualties. While the social effects are not as immediately recognizable as global
climate effects, they have potential for global consequences. In 1975 Dr. Richard Garwin
testified before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations and Security
Agreements, suggesting a limited nuclear exchange between the US and the Soviet Union would
result in 16 million American dead.81 The committee found this number to be unacceptable.82
Since 1975 technological innovations have possibly driven this number up, although Toon, et al,
predict the US would suffer 4 million fatalities.83 The number of civilians killed in the blast,
however, is not the whole picture of potential casualties and fatalities. To illustrate the potential
impact, a novelist hypothesized a nuclear detonation over New Delhi in 2008, predicting the
mass movement of millions of people, suffering from burn wounds and other injuries and
seeking medical attention in an environment with essentially zero clean food or potable water.84
Detractors might point to Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the residents’ subsequent failure to
migrate to rebut the claim that human beings will move en masse. On the other hand Japanese
residents did not understand the radiological risks associated with returning to ground zero.
Present-day knowledge of the negative health effects of radiation greatly increases the chances
that mass human migrations will occur.

81

United States, “Effects of Limited Nuclear Warfare Hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms
Control, International Organizations and Security Agreements of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session,” (Washington, D.C.,
September 18, 1975), 6.
82
United States (1975), 1.
83
Toon (2007A), 1224.
84
Amitav Ghosh, Countdown (New Delhi: Pengui Books India, 2008), 80-81.

43
Other potential immediate and long-term effects include disrupting travel and shipping
lanes, causing increased risk of cancer in areas near the explosions, and stymying entire fishing
industries within a hundred miles or more of the affected coasts. Furthermore, the international
community’s trust in the nuclear-armed states will be greatly diminished.
More acutely important for survivors, even a limited nuclear war will result in decreased
food supplies due to climate changes, as identified in the previous section. Food supplies can
also be reduced because fallout will likely settle in farmlands, eradiating crops and livestock.85
This will be especially painful to contemporary survivors of nuclear war that have eschewed
Cold War-era unofficial policies of stockpiling non-perishable food products.86 Economic
structures risk collapse with mass migration and the large-scale destruction of industry, as well
as the inability of banks to collect mortgages and insurance companies unable to cover the costs
necessary to rebuild.87
It is likely some states will fail, particularly weak states or states acutely affected by
nuclear war, plunging their societies into anarchy. With the aforementioned decrease in food
supplies, society may turn to lawlessness because they will not be able to depend upon the state
to provide basic food security. States unable to fulfill this basic role of food guarantor are often
states making the failed state list.88 Economic damages listed previously are likely to incense
political stresses. The state’s difficulty at collecting taxes may create a feedback loop where
distrust of government will further divorce the citizen from the state, leading to more tax-
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collecting difficulties. This feedback loop could affect every aspect of government—its ability to
repair broken water, electric, and communication lines; provide emergency services; treat the
acutely radiated, people suffering related injuries after the explosions, and people suffering
unrelated injuries and illnesses; and provide securities from neighboring states or groups wishing
to exploit the chaos to secure resources for themselves.
In acutely affected regions, a final consequence of nuclear explosions is temporary or
long-term damage to electrical systems, electronics, communication lines, and entire power
grids. Electrical systems that survive initial blasts might be disrupted or taken off line by a blast
effect known as an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). EMPs can cause physical damage to electrical
or electronic systems by shorting capacitors or burning out transistors. Additionally, systems can
suffer temporary disruptions. These disruptions might then disrupt entire power grids and take
them off line, requiring manual labor to restore electricity and communications. EMP strength is
a product of weapon size, number of weapons, and where they are detonated (air bursts produce
smaller EMPs than ground bursts).89 While there is little evidence of EMPs posing health risks to
human beings, social disruptions might be further intensified by long- or short-term power
failures and communications systems malfunctions.
In the case of a nuclear exchange between the United States and North Korea, it can be
hypothesized that the peninsula will be partly uninhabitable. The blasts might kill between
100,000 and 1 million Koreans. Large-scale migration of survivors into China, Japan, and the
South Pacific is likely, including Australia. With a combined population of roughly 75 million, it
is reasonable to assume 10 to 20 percent of the peninsula’s population will migrate—in other
words between 7,500,000 and 15,000,000 migrants. It is possible the international community
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can handle this migrant crisis easier than it could the Middle Eastern migrant crisis of 2015 to
present, due to South Koreans sharing some of the same cultural values of the West and the
North Koreans being seen as innocent victims of an oppressive regime, liberated by the West.
This is unlikely for several reasons. First, can the West share? Due to the aforementioned
decrease in available food resources globally, host nations could feel squeezed as the threat of
starvation increases, particularly in acutely affected states. Second, as the Middle Eastern
migrant crisis demonstrated in Europe, mass migration is correlated with the rise of
nationalism,90 which could be exacerbated by diminishing food supplies. In other words, sharing
will likely be prioritized for in-group nationalities. Third, a shift towards nationalism amid a
massive influx of Korean (and possibly Chinese and Japanese) migrants could potentially fulfill
Samuel P. Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations hypothesis that future conflicts will be between
societies of differing civilizational values.91 That is, a rise of nationalism sparked by diminishing
food supplies and an influx of foreign nationals of differing ethnic and racial backgrounds could
establish identities along ethnic lines, which could inflame racial tensions and increase crime.
In summary, a limited nuclear war will likely cause massive social disruptions, including
mass human migrations either away from irradiated sites or towards food resources; failed states;
and the rise of nationalism and clashes between disparate ethnic or racial groups. Furthermore,
EMP blasts produced by nuclear weapons detonations causing long- or short-term power failures
might exasperate social stresses. In the case of a limited nuclear war between the United States
and North Korea, it can be assumed millions of Koreans will flee the peninsula, exasperating
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tensions and resource struggles. All of these social disruptions will likely be made worse due to
the effects of nuclear explosions on the climate.

Psychological Pressures
Surviving a nuclear war could have severe psychological impacts on human beings. As
demonstrated during the subsequent decades following the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
surviving civilians sensed “personal vulnerability, helplessness, guilt, isolation and fear.”92
Helplessness and vulnerability are exasperated because nuclear attacks are extraordinarily
difficult to defend against. If deterrence breaks down and a limited (or total) nuclear war is
fought between two or more states, survivors have no expectation that deterrence can hold in the
future. The fear of another volley of nuclear explosions will likely fill survivors with intense
anxiety that the state cannot subside, no matter how robust it is in the aftermath. Survivor’s guilt
is another psychological response to witnessing “massive death and suffering,” manifesting in
“the cessation of normal human feelings.”93 Survivor’s guilt develops if survivors of large-scale
tragedies “believe they should not have survived or that they did something wrong by making it
through the traumatic event” because “people overestimate their preexisting, predictive
knowledge of the event.”94 In the event of a nuclear war, survivors might believe they could have
done more to pressure their governments to practice restraint or take disarmament talks seriously.
These feelings might be intensified if the survivor is a citizen of a democratic state and voted for
the leader that gave the order to launch a first strike. This feeling could become so intense that
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the survivor is incapable of social and economic performance.95 On the other hand at least one
anecdotal story from Hiroshima suggests survivor guilt is not universal, calling it an odd concept
because it suggests “the idea that to be alive was a deviation from the norm of death and
desolation.”96
While any reconstruction would depend on uninjured survivors, these citizens might be
suffering from severe psychological trauma that is only made worse by the climatological and
social effects previously listed. The threat of future attacks, time spent in isolation, and dealing
with the dead makes reconstruction more difficult, especially if the survivor re-enters a society
that has fallen apart, is unable to rely on the government for assistance, and has limited access to
life-sustaining resources.97 The psychological stresses from all of these new realities is likely to
deeply impact adult survivors and affect adolescent and young childhood.
Measuring the psychological effects of nuclear war is somewhat hypothetical; however,
evidence exists from two main bodies of knowledge. First, psychological data was gathered from
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Second, there have been numerous large-scale natural and man-made
disasters where psychological responses have been studied.98 Contemporarily, data can be
collected from failed states or collapsed societies, such as Aleppo or Mosul. Other sources of
evidence include the 1990s siege of Sarajevo, the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and the Great
Chinese Famine during the 1950s and early 1960s. While studying these effects are on the
relatively small scale of trauma, patterns of human behavior might emerge that confirm what can
be expected following a disaster at the nuclear magnitude.
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Using the January 2010 magnitude 7.0 earthquake in Haiti as an example, numerous
studies have examined its psychological consequences. For example, one study suggests roughly
37% of respondents experienced post-traumatic stress disorder, roughly 26% suffered
depression, and roughly 13% suffered both.99 Another study suggests these symptoms persisted
at least 4 months following the earthquake.100 Another study suggests children in Haiti,
regardless of distance from the earthquake’s epicenter, were sometimes twice as likely to suffer
from trauma, anxiety, or depression.101 If human psychology works to scale or larger-than-scale
it can reasonably be assumed that the psychological trauma of a limited nuclear war will greatly
surpass trauma from an incredibly destructive earthquake.

2.4 Recovery and International Conversation
Any discussion between nuclear states about test bans, arms control, and disarmament is
usually met with skepticism at best and ridicule at worst, but there is evidence that unlikely
discussions can emerge from human tragedy. Following the US and Soviet Unions’ testing of
thermonuclear weapons, testing accelerated, despite an international effort to reach a universal
partial test ban. It was not until 1954, when the US accidentally irradiated Japanese fishermen
aboard the ironically named Lucky Dragon that test ban talks were taken seriously. The
fishermen were roughly 100 miles away from the 15-MT Castle Bravo nuclear test. Despite their
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distance radiation from the explosion killed one sailor, and the crew suffered from acute
radiation syndrome and severe dermal injuries. This incident was the third time in less than a
decade that the US irradiated Japanese civilians (the first two occurring in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki). This event spurred the international community, led by the Japanese Diet and the
non-aligned movement, to seriously debate the legality of aboveground nuclear testing. Public
opinion across the international community eventually pressured the US and the Soviet Union to
sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty.102
Following a nuclear war there might also be domestic pressures influencing governments
to take disarmament talks seriously. While North Korea and less-than-democratic regimes might
be somewhat immune from the people’s will, surviving democracies might face tremendous
pressure to prevent a recurrence of nuclear exchange. With deterrence no longer a security
guarantor through MAD, the populace might demand assurance that nuclear tragedy never
happens again.103 Among the surviving democratic states, analogous evidence takes several
forms.
First, recent research suggests residing near the scene of a mass shooting makes the threat
of gun violence more profound in the consciousness of the resident. This is coupled then with a
heightened demand that governments take gun control debates seriously.104 In the event of a
nuclear war, limited or otherwise, distance from the epicenter collapses as a variable. In the age
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of ICBMs, strategic bombers, and SLBMs, the “bad guy with a gun” does not need to be lurking
at the dark end of the street; rather, an attack can be initiated from any silo, near or far; any point
in the vast oceans; or any airstrip. The threat of future nuclear wars becomes salient in the minds
of voters because the dark end of the street is quite literally anywhere.
Second, Robert Pape’s work in suicide terrorism research highlights a peculiar strategic
logic of the suicidal terrorist as applied to democracies, and his conclusion is not without merit.
A suicide terrorist can detonate a suicide vest if detected, eliminating the possibility of
deterrence. This coupled with the fact that suicidal terror is difficult to predict or prevent, makes
the threat very real in the minds of voters. Suicide terrorists furthermore have more success
targeting the civilians of democratic regimes because the voting bloc demands security that
might be elusive without bowing to the terror organization.105 Israel, for example, is much more
likely to give into the demands of terrorist groups than an authoritarian regime. Following
nuclear war the voting bloc might demand the regime take disarmament talks seriously because
security is elusive with nuclear weapons.
Third, seemingly improbable events can take place following massive traumatic events.
Following World War II Europe’s political landscape, once dominated by the balance of power,
transformed into one of unity and integration. The traumatic effects of the rise of nationalism
gave way to the emergence of the foundation that would become the European Union.106 The
idea that anarchy could be mitigated was not taken seriously until Europe suffered the immense
cost of non-integration. Furthermore, the risk of future wars compelled the European community
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to integrate West Germany into the European economic fold. In other words, rather than
punishing the vanquished, West Germany was offered a seat at the table for the signing of the
Treaty of Rome. The integration of Europe and subsequent creation of the European Union, as
well as other collective security and intergovernmental agencies, might not have been possible if
not for the mass human tragedy brought by the balance of power. The balance of terror, if it were
to break down, might oblige societies towards the very difficult disarmament conversation.
Totalitarian and less-than-democratic regimes, while less susceptible to internal
pressures, would still suffer many of the same consequences as democratic regimes.
Furthermore, North Korea is likely to suffer more acutely than any other nuclear-armed state,
given the current sociopolitical state of the world. If the state’s primary interest is self-survival,
the newly emerged fact that deterrence can break down is a compelling reason to desire restabilization by disarming. It is not unimaginable that even North Korea would willingly come to
the discussion table if it survives a limited nuclear war.
Should deterrence break down between the US and North Korea or between any two
belligerents (India and Pakistan come to mind), a perfect storm of human tragedy could take
place. First, nuclear weapons would kill potentially millions of civilians and destroy massive
amounts of infrastructure. Second, burned carbon might rise into the atmosphere, decreasing
global temperatures, and leading to shortened growing seasons and lowered agricultural yields.
Third, social systems could be stressed beyond their limits. And finally, individual psychological
pressures could be strained to their breaking points. Due to nuclear weapons affecting global
structures, such as the environment and economies, any nuclear war, including limited, is likely
to have global consequences. This superfecta of tragedy is likely to overcome disarmament
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skepticism and derision. Once societies have recovered, meaningful disarmament talks could
take place in which even totalitarian regimes might participate.

2.5 Discussing Disarmament Now?
Disarmament is a difficult conversation. The fact that there have been no meaningful total
disarmament talks speaks to the robustness of deterrence. On the other hand, there are several
reasons deterrence can break down, which this chapter identifies. Should deterrence fail the
result would be catastrophic, not merely for acutely affected states and societies, but also at the
global level. States, societies, and individuals are likely to demand preventative actions. If
disarmament no longer guarantees security, then nuclear weapons no longer serve their basic
function. This chapter proposes that nuclear disarmament talks are not strictly the domain of the
catastrophic consequences of nuclear war. States and societies can have the conversation without
suffering intense tragedy.
Having this discussion before deterrence breaks down requires at a minimum three
understandings. First, the logic of realist models brings us to the conclusion that nuclear weapons
serve a function—deterrence. Deterrence serves a function—providing security. But realist
models do not ask the questions: Can deterrence exist without nuclear weapons? Can security
exist without deterrence? These questions are addressed in the Chapter 8, but for now, the
questions should serve as a reminder that security is not limited by what simply works. Because
systems can fail societies would be better to seek what works best.
Second, serious conversations about disarmament require robust models and simulations
in many branches of science, psychology, and sociology. Decision makers would need access to
those models and their methodologies, including impartial teams that can explain the findings of
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models outside the leadership’s expertise. In other words, in order to have a serious discussion,
leaders would need to understand and accept the evidences from several fields of research. They
should furthermore be encouraged to challenge the results with future replication models.
Transparency at all scientific levels should serve as a trust building exercise.
Finally, detractors might fear cheating. Any serious disarmament discussion should
confront the potential for cheating. Acton and Perkovich suggest using the threat of cheating to
deter cheating. That is, if the best payout either side can receive is for both sides to cooperate and
the worst is for both sides to defect, then the threat of retaliatory cheating should compel the
other side to cooperate.107 This does little to suggest how states can get to global zero, but it
helps allay fears once zero has been reached.108
With these three understandings at the table, and with the acceptance that nuclear war,
limited or total, is unacceptable, disarmament negotiations can take place. If states generally
prefer not fighting nuclear wars to the alternative, then it is in those states’ best interests to have
the difficult disarmament discussion now rather than later. The evidences and models within a
multidisciplinary scope serve as the foundation on which to begin the discussion.109

2.6 Summary
This chapter asks the questions: How can deterrence break down? What would a nuclear
war look like in the modern day? And can decision makers take nuclear disarmament talks
seriously? This chapter examines four non-mutually exclusive models of deterrence failure: First,
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mutual uncertainty pressures either side to strike first out of fear that they will receive a first
strike. Second, non-credible threats can serve to encourage the stronger side to take out nuclear
weapons sites to prevent itself from suffering an attack. Third, deterrence can break down by
means of either side escalating conventional war, particularly if the war is zero sum. Finally,
nuclear terrorism can lead to nuclear war due to either the attacked country retaliating against the
host nation, or because nuclear terrorism can resemble a nuclear military attack. In other words,
realist models of deterrence and stability are not necessarily as robust as they appear on the
outside. These models are applied to the current crisis between North Korea and the United
States.
This chapter next looks to the existing literature in atmospheric sciences, sociology, and
psychology, determining a convergence of catastrophe should nuclear war take place. Models in
various fields, using analogous evidence in some cases, suggest the worst-case scenarios even
with a limited nuclear confrontation.
Finally, this chapter suggests that despite the difficulties surrounding disarmament talks,
having a serious discussion is not unthinkable. Furthermore, simply understanding how painful a
nuclear war would be at the global level can incentivize states and societies to have the
discussion without first suffering through a nuclear war. It proposes that the international
community could and should have the discussion now. If deterrence breaks down nuclear
weapons lose all meaning above their military value. If deterrence can break down, then by what
means do nuclear weapons have meaning now? The remainder of the dissertation uses fuzzy
cognitive mapping models to explore the various scenarios of nuclear disarmament or not.
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CHAPTER 3
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
This chapter discusses the background, philosophy of the methodology, and theoretical
reasoning behind the study.

3.1 Structuring the Nuclear Disarmament Problem
This research draws heavily on systemic decision-making work by Patrick T. Hester and
Kevin MacG. Adams. Their work in Systemic Decision Making: Fundamentals for Addressing
Problems and Messes tackles complexity and how to think about problems and messes
systemically. They call their approach “discipline-agnostic,” arguing their methodology can be
applied across fields, from business to the politics of science. International relations, as a subset
of political science, which is itself a subset of the social sciences, is rife with complex problems
that, at face value, appear to be impossible for human beings to solve. From multinational
conflict to refugee crises, there is no shortage of complex problems facing the globe. Perhaps one
of the most complex problems humans face is: What do we do about nuclear weapons?
As will be addressed in the second part of this literature review, nuclear weapons pose a
dilemma; nuclear weapons provide security through deterrence, but nuclear weapons are so
destructive that their use would shatter security. These are weapons of mass destruction, but a
single total nuclear war would be so destructive that a better designation might be weapons of
mass extinction. In other words a dialectic between security with deterrence and insecurity with
deterrence emerges. The very thing that keeps states safe might be the thing that ultimately and
utterly destroys states. Therefore, careful thought is necessary.
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This chapter is divided into five subsections. First, the Think, Act, and Observe (TAO)
approach is identified. This method is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Second, systems errors are
discussed. Third, problems and messes are reviewed. Fourth, this research will discuss systemic
thinking. Finally, fuzzy cognitive mapping, as a primary component of this research’s
methodology, is discussed. Fuzzy cognitive mapping is a methodology for modeling complex
systems and is particularly useful in social problems.

Figure 3.1: Think, Act, Observe Approach (adapted from Hester and Adams)

Systems Errors
Hester and Adams provide a structured way to model problems big and small. It begins
with a generalized way of understanding problems called the TAO approach, or Think, Act, and
Observe.110 When a problem presents itself practitioners will approach the problem in three
steps. First, think about the problem. Second, act to try to solve the problem. Third, observe the
action’s outcome. After observation the Think phase reinitiates to understand whether the
problem was solved. While in the real-world problems might be approached in less-than linear
ways, this approach will serve as an approach to rational decision making, where decision
makers have interest in the problem and its outcomes. The dialectic between security with
deterrence and insecurity with deterrence is an enormous problem, and action should only be
taken after careful consideration of the problem itself, devoid of systemic errors. Reasoning
110
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about this problem provides many opportunities to make one or more systems errors,111 which
could have catastrophic consequences. In Chapter 8 I will discuss feasible Type IV errors
resultant from the model I build in Chapters 5 – 7. A list of these error types as identified by
Hester and Adams is below. This list is not in sequential order because each error type is
associated with a particular step in their TAO approach. The Type III error is typically associated
with the Think step. Types IV, V, and VIII are associated with the Act step. Types I, II, and VI
are associated with the Observe step. And Type VII is a collection of error types from any or all
of the Think, Act, and Observe steps.
Type III Error (γ): This error type is associated with the Think step in the TAO approach.
Mosteller defined the Type III error in 1948, identifying it as “correctly rejecting the null
hypothesis for the wrong reason.”112 Mitroff calls it the “error associated with solving the wrong
problem precisely.”113 This occurs when improper thought has been dedicated to the problem.
For the purpose of this research, an example might be solving the nuclear weapons problem by
creating an agency of international atomic scientists to administer and house all nuclear weapons
without governmental oversight, but finding out afterwards that it has not solved the proliferation
problem, leading to several proliferations and re-proliferations to guarantee states’ security
needs.
Mitroff identifies five common causes for committing the Type III error. They include
selecting the wrong stakeholders; limiting problem-solving options; incorrectly formulating the
problem; narrowly defining the scope of the problem; and focusing on a specific part, the wrong
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part, or missing connections between parts of the problem.114 Avoiding the Type III error is
crucial, and once the correct problem has been thought about, decision makers can move onto the
Act phase, which can lead to many other error types.115
Type IV Error (δ): This error type is associated with the Act step in the TAO approach.
The Type IV error occurs when a problem is solved correctly, but the effects of solving it are
worse than the original problem. Marascuilo and Levin call this “the incorrect interpretation of a
correctly rejected hypothesis.”116 Marascuilo and Levin use the example of “a physician's correct
diagnosis of an ailment followed by the prescription of a wrong medicine.”117 Colloquially: “The
cure is worse than the disease.” For the purpose of this research, one could imagine a solution to
the nuclear weapons problem being a monolithic world government, or a Leviathan,118 that
collapses sovereignty and imposes order over nations. While in such a system nuclear weapons
have zero utility, the system would be so unrecognizable that it could only be accomplished
through force and brutality against holdouts.
Adams and Hester argue that correctly curing the disease is instrumental.119 As
suggested, the international system following the Act step must be recognizable. Action must be
taken within the system; the Leviathan would be to create a new, unrecognizable system that few
would endorse.
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Type V Error (ε): This error type is also associated with the Act step in the TAO
approach. The Type V error occurs when a problem is correctly identified but no action is taken
due to the erroneous belief that the problem will solve itself or go away on its own.120 Competing
stakeholders’ inability to agree on the appropriate course of action or fear of committing the
Type IV error could accentuate risk of the Type V error.121 The problem is that “many problems
require intervention in order to be addressed and simply wishing for a problem to disappear on
its own will not make it go away. There is substantial risk in not acting when action is called
for.”122 Using a car as an analogy again, a driver notices a clicking sound when making turns.
Rather than spending money at the mechanic’s shop for a diagnosis and potential solution, the
driver opts to ignore the sound. A few months later the constant-velocity joint malfunctions,
breaking the front axle, rendering the car inoperable. A small problem has become catastrophic
because it was ignored.
The purpose of this project is to think systematically through the nuclear weapons
problem, ideally in a way that will identify viable solutions, and thereby help the world avoid
Type V errors.
Type VIII Errors (η): This error type is also associated with the Act step in the TAO
approach. Type VIII errors occur when a correctly decided upon action is incorrectly acted upon.
Hester and Adams note this is in contrast to willful violations of directed action, such as
sabotage. Rather, they are the result of simple human mistakes.123 For example, in 2013 the LacMégantic derailment in Nantes, Quebec was caused when an engineer parked a train carrying
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crude oil on an incline and then improperly tested the handbrake system. The engineer knew the
correct brake system test procedure, and intended to apply it, but failed to carry out all necessary
steps.
Once types IV, V, and VIII errors have been reasonably avoided, decision makers can act
and begin the Observation phase of the TAO approach.
Type I (α) and Type II (β) Errors: These error types are associated with the Observe step
in the TAO approach and were first formulated by Neyman and Pearson in 1928.124 Type I errors
occur by rejecting the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis’ condition is true (the false
positive). A man walking alone in the woods at night can illustrate this. He hears the rustling of
leaves and decides to turn around and go home in case there is an animal or person seeking to do
him harm. In this case wind or a harmless rodent made the noise. The US committed a Type I
error when it invaded Iraq partially on the incorrect belief that Saddam Hussein was
manufacturing weapons of mass destruction
Type II errors occur by failing to reject the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis’
actual condition is false (the false negative). Using the same analogy as above, the man hears the
rustling of leaves and decides it must be the wind or a harmless rodent, when the actual condition
is a brown bear seeking to eliminate a potential threat to its cubs. With nuclear weapons the US
could make a Type II error if it assumes North Korea’s nuclear arsenal cannot survive a first
strike attack but turns out to be wrong.
Type I and II errors are committed due to adaptive bias. Reason is a product of human
evolution, where humans are more likely to reason adaptively than rationally. Haselton and Buss
posit that false positives and false negatives occur when reasoning the alternative is costly.
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Furthermore, false negatives are more costly than false positives.125 This creates a propensity for
the Type I error, the false positive, a phenomenon explained in social psychology as the error
management theory. This theory suggests that if the costs of false negatives outweigh the costs of
false positives, then there should be a bias towards false positives.126 With this in mind, it is
reasonable to assume the man walking through the woods is more likely to commit the Type I
error than a Type II error.
Type VI Error (θ): This error type is also associated with the Observe step in the TAO
approach. Holland summarizes Type VI errors: “Correlation does not imply causation…”127 In
the TAO approach after action has been taken, practitioners might deduce that A caused B;
however, the actual condition might be that B caused A, C might be a contributing factor to A or
B, or the relationship between A and B could be a coincidence.128 That is, causation is not as
simple as decision makers might assume. For example, if two students spend the night before an
exam cramming, and if both students receive a high grade on their exam, then it is possible to
note a correlation between cramming the night before a test and receiving high grades; however,
this does not mean that cramming causes high grades. In international politics there is certainly a
negative correlation between mutual assured destruction and the number of wars fought between
superpowers. On the other hand this does not mean that nuclear weapons cause superpowers to
keep the peace. There is only one Cold War available for observation, and establishing causation
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would require many more Cold War observations or the impossible option to experiment by
randomly assigning nuclear weapons to some superpower rivalries but not others.
Type VII Error (ζ): The Type VII error is a system of errors, where types I-VI and VIII
errors “compound to create a larger, more complex problem than originally encountered.”129 The
consequences of Type VII errors include no longer being able to recognize the original problem,
difficulty diagnosing the problem, decreased problem-solving resources or desire to solve the
problem, difficulty identifying the solution, and decreased capability to solve the problem.130 The
initial problem can become so complex with improper formulation, wrong action, and faulty
observation that problem solving enters the realm of chaos. This is a worst-case scenario that
should be practitioners’ largest concern.131
Hester and Adams offer some guidance. Categorizing error types according to the TAO
approach, practitioners can come better prepared. Type III errors are associated with thinking. In
order to avoid making this error, the problem and its parameters must be carefully considered.
Type IV, V, and VIII errors are associated with acting. Avoiding these errors means acting
correctly and when warranted, correctly carrying out the action decided upon, and choosing the
appropriate course of action. Type I, II, and VI errors are associated with observation. To avoid
these errors practitioners should consciously consider each error type, using available statistical
tools and careful consideration of the evidence.132
Table 3.1 below is an illustration of the potential for making systems errors and a system
of errors. Country A feels threatened by Country B’s expanded military capabilities. Country B
might or might not have malicious intent behind its expanded capabilities. Regardless, Country
129
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Table 3.1 Nuclear Proliferation Problem Example (adapted from Hester and Adams).133
TAO Stage
Think
Act
Observe

Think
Act

Observe

Think
Act
Observe

Etc.

133

Situation Description
Country A feels its security is threatened because
Country B has expanded its military capabilities.
Country A creates an advisory board of nuclear
physicists and engineers.
The board listens to Country A's concerns and
collects information from other scientists and
engineers.
Based on the information collected from the leader
and other sources, the board reasons about possible
steps moving forward. The board recommends
building centrifuges to enrich uranium and other
materials.
Country A invests in uranium enrichment facilities.
The international community observes Country A's
uranium enrichment activities and imposes sanctions
because it does not approve of nuclear proliferation
to solve international disputes.
Given the reduced flow of capital to fund
proliferation, the board (not wanting to lose their
jobs) recommends Country A find alternative
funding through black market deals with criminal
enterprises.
Country A engages with criminal enterprises to enter
black markets.
With new capital flows Country A observes it can
continue its uranium enrichment activities.
Country A continues to think, act, and observe.
Meanwhile the original problem might go away
(Country B's military capabilities might no longer
pose a threat to Country A), but the danger of
recurrence continues. Thus, Country A continues to
devote resources to nuclear proliferation and might
eventually successfully test a nuclear weapon. The
international community continues to respond to
Country A’s proliferation attempts.

Hester and Adams, 13.

Potential
Errors
Type III
Types IV, V,
VIII
Types I, II,
VI

Type III
Types IV, V,
VIII

Types I, II,
VI

Type III
Types IV, V,
VIII
Types I, II,
VI

Types I-VIII
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A spends resources creating a nuclear advisory board without properly thinking about Country
B’s intent. If country A made a Type III system error, then the problem can spiral out of control
to make a system of errors.
The above example does not necessarily reflect reality. Some states proliferate for
reasons other than the balance of power. Others might abandon their weapons program to avoid
sanctions or because the nuclear taboo imposes other costs on proliferators.
A major part of the focus of this research is to solve the nuclear weapons problem
without committing a Type III error. That is, successfully solving this problem begins by
analyzing the original problem formulation. Thinking about nuclear weapons systemically will
help formulate the correct problem. In the above example, the formulated problem was that
Country A’s security was threatened by Country B. Using realist logic it is easy to see how
nuclear weapons have value, but if nuclear weapons solve the wrong problem precisely then
what is an alternative problem? By formulating the correct problem the practitioner can then act,
making sure that they act correctly and act when warranted. It is at this stage that we observe.
Hester and Adams propose a probability function to determine the likelihood that the
problem was correctly formulated.134 There is a probability that any given error type is
committed in each respective step in the TOA approach.

𝑃 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚
= 1−[ 1−𝑃 𝛾

134

Hester and Adams, 13.

1 − (𝑃 𝛿 + 𝑃 𝜀 + 𝑃(𝜂)) 1 − 𝑃 𝛼 + 𝑃 𝛽 + 𝑃 𝜃

]
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In laymen terms, the probability that the correct problem was formulated shrinks drastically if
any systems error types are committed. As each Think, Act, and Observe step is repeated, the
probability of a correct problem can become quite small. This reinforces the need to more
carefully consider the underlying problem(s) behind why countries proliferate and presently
refuse to disarm.
At the extreme end of error consequences, deterrence breakdown could imply that the
initial problem was incorrectly formulated, deterrence was incorrectly implemented, or
deterrence was incorrectly assumed to cause security, rather than being merely correlated with
security. A correct candidate problem might be: Country A and Country B have a dispute over
Resource X. Despite whether or not a Type III error was made in the initial Think step, finding
out requires observation. The major takeaway is that formulating the correct problem is of the
utmost importance. Correctly inferring from observation is reliant on getting the problem right.

Problems and Messes
In 1967 Charles West Churchman referenced Horst Rittel as the author of the phrase
“wicked problem.” A wicked problem, he writes, is a “class of social system problems which are
ill-formulated, where the information is confusing, where there are many clients and decision
makers with conflicting values, and where the ramifications in the whole system are thoroughly
confusing.”135 Rittel and Webber expanded on the idea of the wicked problem in 1973, adding
they cannot be definitively formulated, lack a recognizable end point (unlike a game of chess,
where both players recognize when the game is over), are ideologically driven, produce butterfly
effect consequences over long periods of time, and cannot be solved by trial and error; but rather
135
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a single attempt.136 In the systems age, discussed below, wicked problems might have
stakeholders with divergent interests and perspectives, conditions that change rapidly, and
difficulties that disrupt viable paths forward.137
In order to formulate the problem correctly several steps should be taken. First, nuclear
weapons are not part of a “machine age” problem. Instead, the problem exists in a “systems age.”
Whereas machine age problems are simple, systems age problems are complex.138 In other
words, disarmament is not as simple as physically dismantling nuclear weapons; rather, the
ability for human agents to dismantle nuclear weapons requires a more holistic treatment of the
complex system in which they exist. Agency drives complex systems; therefore, human beings
must be included in full problem formulation.139
Bringing humans in creates a paradox. While humans are essential parts of the system,
and because humans have many different perspectives about reality, it is not necessarily true that
a researcher can understand each perspective, yet understanding perspectives is necessary in the
systems age. Bohr, therefore, proposes the principle of complementarity: “Two different
perspectives or models about a system will reveal truths regarding the system that are neither
entirely independent nor entirely compatible.”140 In other words, in agency-driven problems
there are no universal realties; therefore, solving them requires some level of contextual
understanding.
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where n ≠∞, and a perspective about the problem is a function of the number (i) of perspectives
(Pi).141
In other words, as the number of observed perspectives increases, our understanding
increases. Perfect understanding, however, is essentially impossible, particularly because there
are potentially 7.7 billion stakeholders affected by the existence or potential elimination of
nuclear weapons at any given time, each with varying levels of capability, influence, and
legitimacy. Increasing the value of contextual understanding of the major stakeholders is an
essential and basic element to this research, but care should be taken to avoid raising the fidelity
too much by bringing in extraneous variation (such as differences between state leaders,
government types, etc.), which violates basic tenets of realist though (discussed later).
Interestingly, the human perspective paradox increases a study’s validity, both in terms of
scientific robustness and philosophical meaning. For example, the disparity between the
perspectives of nuclear weapons proponents and abolitionists at the extremes offers this study the
ability to collect more information that either confirms or disconfirms its hypotheses, meaning
that hypotheses can better stand up to scientific scrutiny.142 Mitroff and Linstone expound a
scientific appreciation for multiple perspectives. They write, “everything interacts with
everything,” and that systemic thinking requires “the widest possible array of disciplines,
professions, and branches of knowledge—capturing distinctly different paradigms of

141
142

Hester and Adams, 22-23.
Hester and Adams, 24.

68
thought…”143 Mitroff and Linstone thus capture the nuclear weapons dialectic, a la Plato and
Aristotle at Raphael’s School of Athens. Divergent perspectives create theses and antitheses
seeking synthesis. Jumping from the dialectic, divergent perspectives are central to Thomas
Kuhn’s Scientific Revolutions, where anomalies in normal science give way to revolutionary
science.144 That is, realist models of nuclear proliferation and balance of power, as discussed
later, face anomalies in the form of disparate perspectives about nuclear weapons’ threat and
utility. Balance of power is normal science, while contrasting perspectives inhabit revolutionary
science in the minds of abolitionists. I can reasonably hypothesize that synthesis between the two
paradigms is possible.
Therefore, Hester and Adams propose a holistic approach to addressing wicked problems
or “messes” in the systems age, where hard and soft approaches are combined. They write, “A
hard system perspective includes notions such as objectivity, unitary viewpoints, and quantitative
assessment; while a soft systems perspective evokes subjectivity, pluralistic perspectives, and
qualitative assessments.”145 That is, the hard approach is technical and suited for machine age
problems, such as systemic pressures under anarchy, while the soft approach captures socially
constructed realities and human factors and is better suited for systems age “messes”. The
holistic approach therefore requires the identification of the problem this research attempts to
solve as well as its constituent problems.
Gerald Smith identifies a problem’s three main criteria: First, a gap exists between the
present and desired states of the world. Second, closing that gap is difficult. Third, solving the
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problem, or closing the gap, is desirable for at least one actor.146 Sage adds a fourth criterion: At
least one stakeholder views the problem as solvable.147 Pidd adds that problems in the social
context have no single correct answer; rather, answers are conditional on how the problem solver
perceives it.148 With multiple, equally valid perceptions of the problem and its solution, Pidd
adds that the optimal, or even an acceptable, solution requires some level of expertise and
ingenuity.149
Additionally, problems have owners. Problem ownership is reflected in Smith’s third
criterion for problem identification. Beyond merely wanting to see the problem solved, problem
owners are willing to dedicate resources to solving the problem. Hester and Adams note that
ownership does not necessarily mean the owner has the authority to allocate resources.150 For
example, a wealthy A-list celebrity might have the resources necessary and the willingness to
host a nuclear weapons summit at his estate; however, he does not have the authority to compel
state leaders (decision makers) to attend.
Problems do not necessarily exist in a vacuum. Systems of problems can exist. A system
of problems is referred to throughout this text as a “mess.” A “mess” is a system of problems
“with multiple stakeholders who may hold quite different views on what is feasible and
desirable.”151 Moreover, stakeholders might disagree on the mess’ contours, meaning “both the
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problem formulation and methods to address it are potentially in conflict.”152 Mess articulation,
therefore, can be difficult, as opposed to the problem’s articulation. James Greeno captures this
difficulty: “When a problem has an indefinite goal, the problem solver cannot know what the
solution state will be like until it is achieved—or at least until some progress has been made” and
“Indefinite goals seem to be an important factor in producing the weakness of structure in many
ill-structured problems.”153 This differentiates messes from problems because problems’ goals
can be succinctly stated. Without a succinct desired end state, there can be no practical, empirical
solution, and generalized solutions cannot be empirical.154 Newell, et al, demonstrate this:

I want to take my son to nursery school. What’s the difference between what I
have and what I want? One of distance. What changes distance? My automobile.
My automobile won’t work. What’s needed to make it work? A new battery.
What has new batteries? An auto repair shop. I want the auto repair shop to put in
a new battery; but the shop doesn’t know I need one. What is the difficulty? One
of communication. What allows communication? A telephone…And so on.155

That is, in Newell’s anecdote, he cannot articulate the solution to his situation succinctly. While
driving to the nursery school is a succinct solution to one problem of his mess,156 it does not
solve the communication problem. Likewise, using the telephone to call the automobile repair
shop does not get his son to nursery school. In this case using the phone to call the repair shop is
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merely a single step Newell can take to get him closer to his desired state, dropping his son off at
the nursery school.
The decision to pick up the phone to ring the repair shop was one of many possible
solutions to the immediate communication problem. Newell could have walked to the repair
shop. These two solutions make up his problem space, which “may include several intermediate
steps which each move your current state some amount closer to your desired end state.”157
With the definitions of problems and messes made clear, I now turn to the final part of
this subsection: structuring problems.
Because this research wishes to avoid making a Type III Error at the beginning, or
“solving the wrong problem precisely,” I must discuss structuring problems. This is important
because it helps develop a holistic understanding of the proposed mess. Problem structuring
methods “help a series of divergent stakeholders to understand the complex problem they face
before attempting to resolve it…”158 That is, it helps stakeholders understand the actual problem.
The goal is to break a mess down into its constituent problems. But Pidd points out that
this does not imply the problems are separate.159 That is, a mess is made up of individual
problems. For example, a war is a mess. It is made up of several problems (e.g., there is a
disparity between states over rights to some resource, there is no consensus as to how the conflict
should be resolved, there might be domestic anti-war movements pressuring governments
participating in the war, etc.). All the mess’ component problems are linked and are not isolated.
Using problem-structuring methods, therefore, can help address issues, such as “multiple actors,
differing perspectives, partially conflicting interests, significant intangibles, [and] perplexing
157
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uncertainties.”160 This does not imply that problem-structuring methods make the process simple.
It remains no easy feat.
Hester and Adams propose that problem structuring requires an appreciation of the
problem’s “underlying purpose of its associated system.”161 What are the stakeholders’ true
concerns? Who are the decision makers and the problem’s owners? What are the structural forces
behind the problem? What triggers those forces? Blanchard suggests “Defining the problem is
sometimes the most difficult part of the process, particularly if one is in a rush to ‘get going.’”162
The problems might be extraordinarily large; Mitroff suggests it might be better to define the
contours of the problem outside the researcher’s comfort zone in order to make sure the
researcher has fully captured the problem.163 The bottom line: If the problem is large, the
structured problem should be large enough to capture the entire problem.

Thinking Systemically
Holistic thinking in the systems age traces its roots to the early 20th century; however, it
came to prominence during the late 1930s and early 1940s, when complex technical and political
problems during WWII required more than simple mechanical solutions. The joint American and
British field was called Operations Research (OR). OR has no precise definition, and many
definitions overlap. Charles Kittel was first to define it. He writes, “Operational Research is a
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scientific method of providing executive departments with a quantitative basis for decisions.”164
Despite its lack of coherent definition, and despite Kittel’s vague definition, what it does is more
or less definable. It employs methods from various fields of research, such as mathematics,
chemistry, engineering, physics, psychology, management, economics, and social sciences. It
seeks to apply scientific methods, using quantitative analysis to support managerial decisions.
Saul Gass has a good summary of the history of OR and discusses the evolution of OR during
WWII from first being used to develop antiaircraft guns and submarine hunting systems to its
subsequent expansion into business and industry.165
While Gass’ article is somewhat optimistic about the future of OR,166 Hester and Adams
argue that as complexity increases, particularly by bringing in many different viewpoints, the
need for new approaches increases.167 As the Type III error warns, this reinforces the need to do
the “right problem” before doing the “problem right.”168 In other words, research must avoid the
Type III error before it can hope to solve the problem. Hester and Adams refer to this as hard OR
(doing the problem right) and soft OR (doing the right problem), and with increased complexity
comes increased need to be doing both the right problem and the problem right.169
Doing the right problem, as Mitroff previously points out, means capturing all the parts of
the problem, even if it means bringing in things beyond the visible edges of the problem. Hester
and Adams expand, demonstrating that a mess is made of constituent problems, but the
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constituent problems might not make up the entire mess. Assume a mess (M1) is made of five
problems (P1, P2, … P5). However, solving the mess is not the summation of solving the
constituent problems:170

𝑀! = f(𝑃! , 𝑃! , … 𝑃! ) ≠

𝑃!

It is here where viewing the mess as a system with interacting component parts becomes
necessary because the interaction between the problems adds to the mess’ condition. The
behavior of the mess is greater than the sum of its parts. Ackoff summarizes this reality:

Problems are elements abstracted from messes; therefore, problems are to messes
what atoms are to planets. There is an important systems principle, familiar to all
of you, that applies to messes and problems: that the sum of the optimal solutions
to each component problem considered separately is not an optimal solution to the
mess. This follows from the fact that the behavior of the mess depends more on
how the solutions to its component problems interact than on how they act
independently of each other.171

It is therefore true that handling the mess does not mean optimizing each problem. Hester
and Adams propose satisficing, or “acceptable compromises.” This means it is an unfortunate
reality that finding the best solution is often not possible. Rather, they point out, the goal of
systemic thinking is “to resolve or increase our understanding of a mess…”172 For instance,
while this might upset the Global Zero Movement if the reality is that the system is stable, and

170

Hester and Adams, 42.
Russell L. Ackoff, “Optimization + Objectivity = Opt Out,” European Journal of Operational
Research 1, no. 1 (1977): 4-5.
172
Hester and Adams, 43.
171

75
nothing can be done to abolish nuclear weapons, finding equilibrium in the present state helps us
avoid making the Type IV error, or destabilizing the system with an inappropriate intervention.
It is also true that inherent in a mess, given the divergence of perspectives, is the
necessity to treat the system as pluralistic (divergent viewpoints where compromise is possible)
or coercive (divergent viewpoints were compromise is not possible).173 This is due to the
subjectivity of the system. While objective systems have unitary actors (convergent viewpoints),
messes are subjective social interactions where an optimized solution that satisfies everyone is
not possible.
Finally, Hester and Adams propose a multimethodology for systemic decision-making.174
That is, they borrow four processes that structure complex problems from Millet and Gogan:
groping, structuring, adjusting, and unstructuring.175 Groping is taking incremental steps to
impose structure on highly ambiguous problems. Structuring occurs when the state changes from
unstructured to structured. Adjusting is adding or removing constraints incrementally, while
maintaining a high level of structure. Unstructuring involves changing the state from structured
to unstructured. Millet and Gogan caution that these steps do not necessarily, and indeed rarely,
occur linearly. They may “cycle through a complex sequence of groping, structuring, adjusting
and unstructuring before resolution is achieved.”176
From the structuring phase, it is also rarely a linear procession from structuring to the
Thinking, Acting, and Observing, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Instead, as shown in Figure 3.2,

173

Hester and Adams, 48.
Hester and Adams, 48.
175
I. Millet and J. L. Gogan. “A Dialectical Framework for Problem Structuring and Information
Technology,” The Journal of the Operational Research Society 57, no. 4 (2006): 435.
176
Millet and Gogan, 435.
174

76
practitioners follow a nonlinear process where steps occur out of sequence, where feedback
occurs.177

Figure 3.2: Systemic decision making flow chart (adapted from Hester and Adams [p. 50])

3.2 Summary
Solving the nuclear weapons problem requires more than what traditional international
relations theory can offer. This chapter outlines the philosophical approach to the methodology
that is explained in the next chapter. As a practitioner carefully thinks about the problem, he or
she should attempt to avoid the Type III error. One cannot solve a problem easily if they are
trying to solve the wrong problem. Other error types are identified, and avoiding them,
particularly the Type IV error, which could result in nuclear catastrophe, further complicates the
methodology.
Further, this chapter highlights that the nuclear weapons problem is not merely a single
problem; rather, it is a system of interacting problems, or a “mess.” Solving each of the “mess’”
constituent problems individually does not necessarily resolve the “mess,” but might instead
commit a Type IV error. Therefore, care should be taken to structure and think about the mess in
a way that captures problem interaction in order to avoid the Type IV error.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
Drawing from Hester and Adam’s Structure-TAO approach, this project is a
combination of modeling real-world problems (a system) as well as various simulations
within the proposed real-world system (see Figure 4.1).178 That is, this project seeks to
model and experiment with an abstraction of the real-world system in which the nuclear
weapons problems exist. To accomplish this, this project uses fuzzy cognitive mapping.

4.1 Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping

Figure 4.1 Modeling in Systemic Decision Making

Fuzzy cognitive mapping (FCM) is adapted from Robert Axelrod’s cognitive mapping,
which is a graphical representation of a system’s elements as points or nodes, which have causal
links between them (represented as arrows or links).179 In Axelrod’s modeling, nodes can
increase, decrease, or have no effect on other nodes. This trivalent logic, where positive
relationships take on a value of 1, negative relationships take on a value of -1, and no
178
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relationship is represented by 0, can be illustrated with the following model and matrix (Figure
4.2 and Table 4.1):

Figure 4.2: Cognitive Map Example

Table 4.1: Cognitive Map Example Matrix
C1
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5

C2
0
-1
0
1
0

C3
0
0
0
0
1

C4
-1
1
0
0
0

C5
0
0
0
0
0

1
0
-1
0
0

This is a set of strict causal relationships between components. C1 decreases C3 and
increases C5; C5 increases C2, and so on. This form of modeling captures the direction of the
relationship but not the strength. Therefore, Bart Kosko overcomes some of the limits in
assigning causality by allowing “hazy degrees of causality between hazy causal objects
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(concepts).”180 That is, he addresses relationships that can influence a receiver component “a
little bit” or “a lot” by some number defined on [-1, 1].181 Figure 4.3 and Table 4.2 illustrates
this.

Figure 4.3: Fuzzy Cognitive Map Example

Table 4.2: Fuzzy Cognitive Map Example Matrix
C1
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5

180
181
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C2
0
-0.5
0
0.5
0

C3
0
0
0
0
1

C4
-0.25
0.75
0
0
0

C5
0
0
0
0
0

0.75
0
0.25
0
0
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The benefits of using the FCM are that they visually represent the real world, allow
simulation, and can be qualitatively assessed. Furthermore, unlike Multiple Criteria Decision
Making,182 FCM allows for feedback loops and “can suggest alternatives through exploratory
analysis,” and unlike systems dynamics, FCMs can rely on situations where data is lacking.183
Hester and Adams work through the mathematical underpinnings of FCM modeling,
where, “FCMs evolve over time … and can be analyzed relative to this evolution.”184 In their
example, they show three nodes, A, B, and C.185 The weight of the influence, or the matrix, of B
or C on A is represented by W.

Figure 4.4: FCM Weights Example

In Figure 4.4, the state of A at step t + 1 is a function of At and W:
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Where “f is known as a transfer function used to evolve the FCM from one timestamp to
the next.”186 In short, by altering one or more independent variables, the dependent variables take
on values from timestamp to timestamp as a result of their initial value and the weights affecting
the component. To illustrate this effect, consider a car driving in a straight line at a constant
speed. If you want to know where the car is, figure out where the car started and how fast it was
traveling. Its starting point and its speed determine its present location. To round out this
analogy, the combustion engine is a suitable transfer function f, even though non-combustion
propulsion is also available.
Tsadiras says the most common forms of f are binary, trivalent, and sigmoid.187 Using the
binary function allows movement along the edges of 0 and 1. He adds, “Binary FCMs are
suitable for highly qualitative problems where only representation of increase or stability of a
concept is required.”188 The trivalent function allows variables to take on -1, 0, or 1 values,
where qualitative problems require a representation of decrease, stability, or increase. The
sigmoid function allows continuous movement between -1 and 1, inclusively. This captures
qualitative or quantitative problems, “where representation of a degree of increase, a degree of
decrease, or stability of a concept is required and strategic planning scenarios are going to be
introduced.”189 This is demonstrated in the following equation.
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where 𝜆 represents a user-defined constant value for the sigmoid function’s slope. For the
purpose of this research, the sigmoid function is the most suitable. Bueno and Salmeron suggest
a 𝜆 value of 5 as this value “provides a good degree of normalization…” while a value of 10
closer resembles a trivalent function, and a value of 1 or 2 is close to linear.190
In this project, the above formula for the sigmoid transfer function is applied using an
Excel macro developed by Patrick Hester (UNC Ashville)191. To aid comprehension of the
results and the logic they reflect, the next few paragraphs contain a step-by-step description of
how it works.
First, recall that all λ takes on a value of 5. Each value of x is the result of λ on the
movement from timestamp 0 to 1, and so on. Therefore each value of e depends on the
relationship between nodes according to the effect of λ at each timestamp. The following simple
simulation illustrates the methodology. Three components, A, B, and C, are in a relationship,
where A decreases B and increases C, B increases A and C, and C decreases A and increases C.
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Figure 4.5: FCM Example

Table 4.3: FCM Example Matrix
A
B
C

A
0
1
-0.25

B
-1
0
0.5

C
1
1
0

In this scenario, I set C to an initial value of 1, apply the sigmoid transfer function, set λ
to 5, and run the simulation for 20 timestamps. Therefore, C represents a non-permanent change
within this hypothetical simple scenario.
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Figure 4.6: FCM Example Scenario 1 Results

In this scenario two things are apparent. First, this simulation never reaches equilibrium.
There is periodic behavior, placing it within the complex domain.192 Second, initially setting C to
1 causes an immediate and dramatic decrease in A and an even more dramatic increase in B.
Starting at about timestamp 5, a recurring pattern emerges, where B increases, followed by an
increase in A and a simultaneous decrease in B, followed by an increase in C and a simultaneous
decrease in A, and finally a decrease in C. in this scenario, setting C to 1 initially indicates that
there would be cyclical behavior.

192
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The cyclical behavior follows from the logic of the causal relationships identified in the
map. A high initial value of C exerts a causal effect on both A and B, pulling both up. However,
for A this is dampened by the negative effect of B on A. As the relationship between these causal
factors settles into a periodic cycle, we see a repeated pattern in which equilibrium is elusive.
A second example scenario is run where B is clamped to 1. Equilibrium in this second
scenario is reached immediately, showing a maximum increase in all three nodes.

Figure 4.7: FCM Example Scenario 2 Results

Finally, FCMs are dynamic and deterministic. They are dynamic in that behavior changes
over time. They are deterministic in that initial values determine output. With the continuous
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FCM (sigmoid function), there are potentially infinite end states, meaning continuous FCMs can
show chaotic results.193

4.2 Problem Structuring
Jetter and Kok propose a six-step framework for FCM mapping. This includes: 1) Project
objectives and information needs clarification, 2) knowledge elicitation plans, 3) knowledge
capture, 4) FCM calibration, 5) FCM testing, and 6) interpretation and use of model.194
The first step is the problem articulation.195 Sterman argues this is the most important
step in modeling the problem.196 Useful models, while representing the real world, are models of
the problem, not the system.197 The reason I model the problem and not the system is because the
model’s purpose is to address a problem in a simplified way that exists in a real-world system.198
This harkens back to avoiding the Type III error. Wooley and Pidd argue the importance of
problem structuring, writing, “the process of arriving at a sufficient understanding of the
components of a particular problem to proceed to some sort of useful operational research
work.”199 In other words, problem structuring helps uncover the actual problem rather than
relying on initial assumptions about the problem. This step also necessitates some accounting for
time (i.e., on what time scale does the model operate?).200
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Step two addresses sources of knowledge. Jetter and Kok identify three: the modeler,
experts via survey, and from documents (e.g., scientific journals, reports, and newspaper
sources). They furthermore note these methods can be combined.201 This allows for expert
participation in both knowledge elicitation and ensuring the problem is properly structured to
help avoid making the Type III error.202 These open sources are identified in subsequent
chapters.
Step three is the actual collection of knowledge. Hester and Adams note that experts and
stakeholders should note this is a causal and not a correlation map.203 Additionally, once
causation (e.g. “a change in A causes a change in B”) is identified between concepts, the proper
weights can be assigned to the causal link. This is accomplished using a Likert-type scale where
weights are qualified rather than absolute.

Table 4.4: Sample Weight Scale (Adapted from Likert)204
Qualitative rating
Very strong
positive
Strong positive
Medium positive
Weak positive
No effect
Weak negative
Medium negative
Strong negative
Very strong
negative

201

Associated weight
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
-0.25
-0.5
-0.75
-1

Jetter and Kok, 49.
Hester and Adams, 113.
203
Hester and Adams, 114.
204
Rensis Likert, “A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes,” Archives of Psychology 22,
no. 140 (1932): 55.
202

88
This helps for two reasons. First, it generalizes the model so that experts, stakeholders, and
observers can better understand cause and effect. Second, it simplifies the potentially infinite
values the weights can take, as identified in the discussion about the sigmoid function.
Participants will not need to argue over the exact weight, but rather a limited number of qualified
weights.
The fourth step is calibrating the FCM once it has been constructed in step three. This
allows the modeler to see if the simulation behaves as expected. The fifth step is testing. Sterman
notes this is not validation in the strictest sense because “All models are wrong, so no models are
valid or verifiable in the sense of understanding the truth.” He adds, “The question facing clients
and modelers is never whether a model is true but whether it is useful.”205 Therefore, the goal is
simply to test whether or not it acts as expected. Hester and Adams note this is ultimately
subjective.206 In the subsequent problems this stability test is performed without claiming to
solve the problem.
The sixth step is the exploration of the model’s parameters. Hester and Adams refer to
this as “speculative, what-if scenarios.”207 For example, the modeler can ask what would happen
if a concept were clamped to a specific value. That is, the modeler can “play God” with feasible
system changes. Clamping “is not a one-time impulse …, but a change that lasts over extended
periods of time.”208 This can be illustrated with the following example: In a fictitious model of
the disarmament problem, the researcher can clamp the value of the authority of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to +1. When running the scenario, linked concepts will affect
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each other depending on direction and weight of the links; however, at each step in the
simulation, the IAEA’s authority will not be undermined by changes to the system. In this
hypothetical scenario, if all states surrendered sovereignty over nuclear weapons to the IAEA,
then, depending on how the rest of the model’s parameters were set up, the value of nuclear
weapons might collapse to zero.
Finally, FCMs can be constructed by hand, in spreadsheets, in Photoshop, or in
computational modeling and simulation software, such as Gephi,209 or Mental Modeler. Mental
Modeler is a FCM analysis tool that allows researchers the ability to explore environmental,
social, or other issues. It utilizes user-defined components within a system, user-defined
relationships between components, and user-run “what if” scenarios. Users can then determine
how the system as a whole is affected by feasible tweaks to specific variables within the
system.210
Applying FCM to this research, after examining two related problems that upset efforts
towards global nuclear disarmament, I recreate the parameters of these real-world problems. This
process requires several steps. First, I identify each problem’s stakeholders and stakeholder
goals. Stakeholders are groups with vested interest in the outcome of the problem. This includes
states, civilian firms, nonprofit organizations, religious groups, and others. Power to control the
outcome of the problems’ solutions is not spread equally, nor does one stakeholder hold an
absolute monopoly of power. This step is represented by “Who?” The second step is to clearly
identify and articulate the problems and to break them down into their basic elements. This
includes identifying the problems’ objective narratives, objective hierarchy networks, and the
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means-ends networks. This step is represented by “What?” The third step identifies substantive
information, or the motivational forces behind the problems and actions. This step is represented
by “Why?” The fourth step is to refine the problem by identifying the context and problem
boundaries. This step is represented by “Where?” The fifth step is to identify the mechanisms by
which stakeholders can move from the current state (the problem) to an idealized state (a
solution). This step is represented by “How?” The final step is to assess the appropriate
timeframe for problem interaction. This step is represented by “When?” Before progressing to
the final stage of modeling, in order to test problem stability, hypothetical scenarios are run that
do not necessarily indicate a viable path towards synthesis; rather, this stage is merely to ensure
there is no chaotic behavior. Once the problems have been constructed using these six steps, the
model progresses by merging the two problems together and restructuring to ensure nuclear
weapons interact with the problems as they would in the real world. This final structuring creates
the “mess,” or the complex interaction between problems. Components and links are color coded
according to the following scheme illustrated in Figure 4.8.

Figure 4.8: FCM Color Code
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This simulation is deterministic. It utilizes cause and effect to determine the outcome
along [-1, 1]. Incorporating the Likert-type Scale for outcome, final variable states of -1 indicate
a maximum decrease. For example, in a hypothetical if maximizing cooperation causes
sovereignty to take on a final value of -1, then maximizing cooperation decreases sovereignty to
the maximum degree. Negative values other than -1 are scored according the Likert-type Scale.
Final variable states of 1 indicate a maximum increase. Final variable states of 0 indicate no
change. In other words, 0 indicates the status quo.
Using the FCM framework, I identify the problems’ elements as noted above and apply
the Likert-type Scale to show interaction and weights between nodes. I accomplish this using
Mental Modeler, an online FCM tool, described above. I run several “what if” scenarios using
Hester’s PC-based Excel scenario tool that allows users to design scenarios using the following
criteria: transfer type from one timestamp to the next (identified above as binary, trivalent, and
sigmoid), the specification of λ (which is set to 5, according to the explanation above by Bueno
and Salmeron), the number of timestamps to run (ranging from 1 to ∞), and the independent
variables. Because I am using the Likert-type Scale to indicate the weight of node links, I am
using the sigmoid transfer function.
Independent variation is further controlled by two mechanisms. First, the user can choose
an initial value for a variable to take along [-1, 1]. This simulates a one-time change in value. For
example, the signing of an international agreement maximizes cooperation for a single
timestamp only; in other words, cooperation once does not compel further cooperation within the
model. Signing one treaty does not mean all future treaties are signed. Take note that setting the
initial value of an independent variable means it will revert to a dependent variable following the
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first timestamp. The second way the user can control independent variation is to “clamp” the
value of a variable to a number along [-1, 1], as noted earlier. For example, a successful
disarmament treaty will not replace sovereignty with something else. Therefore, it could be
useful to clamp sovereignty to zero. Unless otherwise indicated by setting initial values or
clamping independent variables, all dependent variables will begin at timestamp 0 with an initial
value of 0. In other words, 0 is the status quo that varies according to weights within the model
and user-defined, feasible changes.

4.3 Summary
This chapter outlines fuzzy cognitive mapping methodology as well as its mathematical
underpinnings. It then creates an example model and runs various scenarios in order to illustrate
how problem resolution can be attempted using fuzzy cognitive mapping. Finally, it addresses
problem structuring and how to apply fuzzy cognitive mapping to the problems identified in the
following chapters.
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CHAPTER 5
PROBLEM 1
Nuclear-armed states are resistant to disarmament, while significant portions of the world desire
a nuclear-free international system.

5.1 Problem 1 Articulation
Ultimately, the disarmament problem is one with no formal solution. To illustrate this
problem, Lewis F. Richardson’s arms race model211 reveals that, by diminishing positive
numbered nuclear redundancies, arms races cannot be worked backwards to reach zero. Rather,
models can only approach zero. On the other hand, the model is likely to stop at 1 per side; if the
referent object is a warhead, then there is no such thing as a partial warhead, for the purpose of
disarmament. Therefore, at best, arms control proponents can only mathematically work back to
a non-zero whole number.212 This is also illustrated by Fry’s model, where—in uncomplicated
terms—State A’s military spending SA is a function of State B’s military spending SB:

𝑆! = 𝑓(𝑆! )

In Fry’s arms race, each side’s military spending is determined by the other side’s
military spending in an effort to reach capability equilibrium. Neither side desires being less
battlefield-ready than their respective adversary. Financial transactions for weapons, however,
are not crucial, but Fry’s model shows the realist logic that should prevent disarmament. To put
211
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this in more relevant terms, “great powers always counter the weapons of other great powers,
usually by imitating those who have introduced new weapons,”213 and the fact that one bomb
exists means that two bombs must exist at a minimum.
Therefore, this modeling does not attempt to show how nuclear redundancies can
diminish to zero; rather, it tries to synthesize international realities and desired end states, where
nuclear weapons no longer serve deterrence functions, and where, to borrow from John Mueller,
nuclear weapons are essentially irrelevant. Mueller argues that Cold War relative peace has
created a pattern where it is now assumed major war is not within the set of potential future
outcomes; therefore, mutual assured destruction (MAD) and nuclear weapon utility has atrophied
out of boredom.214 At this point, disarmament becomes possible. Mueller’s optimism during the
waning Cold War years has not born fruit, but that does not imply that his conclusion is
incorrect. Rather, it might simply mean his conclusion needs some tweaking to account for
changes in the international system since 1988. Therefore, this project will attempt to account for
present-day structural theories, particularly those that gave rise to Mueller’s unfulfilled
prophesy—namely realism.
Given presently understood physics, chemistry, and technological capabilities, there is a
limit to balancing where equilibrium is certain—MAD. Nuclear weapons’ destructiveness
signals to adversaries the state’s capabilities in no uncertain terms. There is no more perfect
weapon for reaching equilibrium than the atomic weapon.
There is a caveat that must be addressed, however. The ultimate weapon in this regard
can only order the international environment given that two adversaries have weapon systems
that can survive a first strike. For the purpose of Problem 1, MAD through symmetry stabilizes
213
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the system because no side can survive a nuclear war, and the threat of nuclear war diminishes
incentives to engage in even conventional wars, out of the fear of escalation. Furthermore,
Brodie sums up the relationship between second-strike capabilities and security: “Stability is
achieved when each nation believes that the strategic advantage of striking first is overshadowed
by the tremendous cost of doing so.”215 The ability to return fire is crucial in this calculus.
Schelling agrees that stability and equilibrium are reached given two variables: First, both sides
must be able to obliterate the other, and second, both sides’ retaliatory capabilities must be
strong enough to survive a first strike.216 In the age of nuclear triads, where second-strike
capabilities are guaranteed through land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
strategic bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), realist theory suggests
equilibrium has been reached between much of the nuclear-armed world.217 MAD’s stability is
so compelling that some scholars prescribe more proliferation to prevent any future wars.218
Both Brodie and Schelling explain stability in a bipolar world (i.e., the Cold War) in
terms of absolute symmetry. The balance of power (BOP) must account for proliferation
decisions in addition to the maintenance of nuclear weapons programs. That is, if State A
proliferates, and if State B does not balance, the states are in an asymmetrical relationship and
are thus not in equilibrium. If State B does not have security guarantees by another nuclear
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power, then State A may pose an existential threat to State B. Erickson adds that without such
guarantees, State B is willing to suffer proliferation costs to bring it back into equilibrium.219
Waltz argues that gradual proliferation occurs because the ability to annihilate the other
offers deterrence and peace assurance.220 Schelling agrees, arguing that even limited wars are
unlikely because small wars can escalate to major wars, and major wars can escalate to nuclear
wars.221 In this sense if two sides come to the brink of even a limited war, both sides have more
to gain by conceding than they do by moving forward with war, especially if potential gains from
winning the war are minor. Waltz further argues that even if great powers do come to militarized
conflict the war will be limited because neither side can gain advantage over the other without
risking nuclear war.222
Steven Pinker—not writing explicitly about nuclear deterrence and proliferation—
highlights deterrence succinctly. He writes,

"A credible deterrence policy can remove a competitor's incentive to invade for
gain, since the cost imposed on him by retaliation would cancel out the
anticipated spoils. And it removes his incentive to invade from fear, because of
your commitment not to strike first and, more importantly, because of your
reduced incentive to strike first, since deterrence reduces the need for
preemption."223
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In addition to Waltz’s argument that “More may be better,” de Mesquita and Riker
support this conclusion, writing, “Once half the nations in the system have nuclear weapons, the
number of possible nuclear attacks diminishes, going to zero when all countries have sufficient
capabilities to deter their relevant adversaries.”224 Mearsheimer furthermore makes blanket,
normative arguments for horizontal proliferation,225 as well as individual arguments that Ukraine
and Japan should enjoy nuclear deterrents.226 Sagan calls this approach “proliferation positive.”
Although critical of “proliferation positive” approaches, Sagan notes that it “flows easily from
the logic of rational deterrence theory.”227
Taking this to its resultant conclusion, even non-proliferated states with robust security
guarantees by nuclear-armed states should be expected to proliferate on a long enough timeline.
Because under realism alliances can change, states under nuclear umbrellas cannot be certain
their guarantees will last; therefore, these states have incentive to proliferate to maximize their
future expected payoff.228
Hymans sums up the realist position:

[A]dopting the realist vision of international relations inexorably leads to the
conclusion that all states that can go nuclear, should go nuclear—and the sooner,
the better. If they have not done so yet, it is simply a matter of time before they
do. The core realist prediction about proliferation is that some event will
224
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inevitably come along—sooner rather than later—that finally causes the dam to
break and the world to go nuclear.229
Not all who accept realist logic agree with its prescriptive argument, which opens up one
contentious point in Problem 1. Reiss agrees that proliferation will happen, but he disagrees that
it should. He writes, “in ways both fast and slow, we may very soon be approaching a nuclear
‘tipping point,’ where many countries may decide to acquire nuclear arsenals on short notice,
thereby triggering a proliferation epidemic,”230 adding, that the US should take a leading role in
preventing proliferation.231
Additionally, Sagan’s debate with Waltz offers some critiques of realists’ “proliferation
positive” arguments, adding an “alternative theory of the consequences of nuclear
proliferation.”232 Sagan, a proponent of realism as formal logic but a defector from its normative
conclusions, makes two broad critiques of horizontal proliferation. First, militaries, as essential
and powerful components of the state, have shared preconceptions, rigid customs, and insular
interests that could lead military leaders towards and beyond the nuclear brink. Second, many
future proliferators might lack adequate civilian control over the military. Juntas are less likely to
fear domestic unrest or coup, and are therefore more likely to eschew civilian concerns.233 He
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furthermore argues that military culture and reputational pressures “to protect oneself” have
prompted some military nuclear accidents.234
This research adopts realist logic in the same way that Sagan adopts it. Nuclear weapons
pose enormous risk to the international system, despite their utility in promoting or maintaining
non-belligerent relations. This form of realism accepts realism’s underlying logic but also
acknowledges that it cannot ignore other states’ and non-state actors’ existential concerns vis-àvis the hazards of nuclear weapons by accidental or designed detonation. Nuclear abolitionists,235
although holding a fraction of the vote held by nuclear states, still get a vote in Problem 1’s
resolution. Abolitionists’ fears are implicitly articulated throughout this text; however, the
driving problem in this “mess” is the tension between nuclear weapons states’ desire for
deterrence and abolitionists’ desire for disarmament.
Abolitionists make several arguments for disarmament. First, the fate of the world should
not be left up to the whims of a handful of states in conflict.236 That is, a war between two great
powers might not abide by sovereign borders, and nuclear war will affect non-belligerent states
at the global level, as discussed in Chapter 2. Therefore, it is the responsibility, they argue, of
nuclear weapons states to take disarmament negotiations seriously. Because of the risk to nonnuclear states, and despite a lack of power over nuclear weapons states, members of the non-
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aligned movement feel or have felt it is their duty and their right to take ownership of the
problem.237, 238
Second, some actors see the possession of nuclear weapons through a lens of injustice.
That is, nuclear weapons are an expression of primal strength that perpetuates inequality among
nations.239 In this sense these actors see nuclear weapons as an obstacle to issues of global
justice. Dependence on the status quo means that perceptions of injustice are ignored. For
example, boots on the ground during an annexation of a deterrent-less state’s territory by a
superpower means no other superpower can enact justice on behalf of the victim state.
Diplomacy might not persuade the aggressor to back down if its deterrent capabilities give it no
reason to back down, and deterrence means military action is unwise. It is therefore reasonable
for small states to call for abolition along these lines.
Third, Wheeler argues the deterrent assumption of realism is not a permanent fixture in
international order. Rather order is a function of trust building.240 This complements the second
argument. Expressly, reliance on deterrence diminishes the utility for nuclear-armed states to
engage in trust-building exercises. Here, Wheeler appears to be taking the “utopian realism”
approach, which accepts the balance of power but argues that norms change through an iterative
process whereby states seek to mitigate anarchy by slowly evolving towards some nondescript
goal of global peace. In other words, conflict might not be a rational choice in a future global
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community of communities.241 Neither Wheeler nor Booth takes the position that international
politics has reached an endpoint where conflict is unacceptable; rather, they take issue with
realist arguments that disarmament is a “fictional utopia,” and they argue that human agency and
free will give decision makers the ability to change the system for a better. Therefore, a world
without nuclear weapons is not unthinkable, and it is a world for which nuclear weapon states
should work through an iterative process of gradual disarmament.242
Fourth, Müller envisions a stable world without nuclear weapons. That is, a future state
of global zero will most likely reflect cultural norms that make nuclear possession untenable. He
sees this future very clearly as evidenced by today. Our abhorrence of nuclear weapons and fear
of their effects today reside in a space also occupied by stability through deterrence. But through
a social process already in motion, the weight of our abhorrence and fear, as well as the nuclear
neglect and disinterest, will continuously reduce nuclear weapons’ roles to an ever-diminishing
speck until they no longer serve any useful purpose. Because this is a likely outcome on a long
enough timeline, Müller writes, it is important to continue working towards this end goal.243
The last arguments from abolitionists include the assertion that possessing nuclear
weapons is inherently immoral, that they are unable to place trust in irrational leaders following
the realist assumptions of deterrence, that there is a high risk of nuclear accidents, and, quite
simply, that the costs of building and maintaining nuclear weapons is exorbitant.244 One way to
phrase this is if moral arguments and extraordinary risks will not persuade states to give up their
241
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nuclear arsenals, then perhaps the best argument is that nuclear weapons programs hit states
where it hurts the most—their wallets.245
These divergent arguments—with realists and nuclear weapons states on the one hand
and abolitionists on the other—exposes a dialectic, which is the fundamental basis of the
problem. Although some actors have significantly more power than other actors, both powerful
and less-powerful actors are presently engaged in a conversation about the utility of possessing
nuclear weapons. Neither camp desires to back down, which means the problem cannot be
solved simply, but nevertheless they are willing to participate in the discussion. In other words, it
appears satisficing is possible. Therefore, in the following sections the problem’s stakeholders,
components, boundaries, operating means, and timing are identified, discussed, and modeled
using Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping.

5.2 Problem 1: Who?
Central to the nuclear weapons “mess” and its constituent problems are stakeholders.
These are actors that have some level of influence over behavior, whether strong, weak or in
between, and have interest in the outcome of decisions. Pokras adds that “Effective problem
solving ensures that all necessary stakeholder viewpoints are considered or represented during
discussions. The best insurance to finding the right solution and guaranteeing buy-in to its
implementation is to widen the view of a problem at the beginning.”246 With the proliferation
problem, there are certainly going to be divergent viewpoints, but, as will be demonstrated
245

On the other hand, the role economics plays in decisions to proliferate or not do not appear to
be decisive. See Erwin Häckel, “Towards non-nuclear security: costs, benefits, requisites,” in
Security Without Nuclear Weapons: Different Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Security, ed. Regina
Cowen Karp (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 78.
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below, these different viewpoints’ inclusion in the model is necessary. If the needs of some
stakeholders are overlooked, these stakeholders can simply walk away from the discussion. If a
nuclear-armed state walks away, then there is no hope for the pro-disarmament camp.
This section has six steps. First, identify stakeholders. Second, classify stakeholders.
Third, evaluate stakeholder attitudes. Fourth, map out stakeholders. Fifth, identify stakeholder
engagement priorities. Sixth, develop a stakeholder management plan.247
Identify Stakeholders
Because nuclear weapons pose global threats, there are—at the time of this writing—
potentially 7.5 billion stakeholders. Even scientists on long-term assignment aboard the
International Space Station or at the Amundsen–Scott South Pole Station have some level of
interest in nuclear weapons, but they have little power to change the system. In other words, the
list of stakeholders can be quite long. For the purpose of this research, however, stakeholders
will include actors with some noticeable power to make changes to the system. Table 5.1
identifies seven groups of stakeholders as relevant to the mess and its constituent problems.
Each stakeholder has various wants. These are identified in Table 5.2. For the purpose of
this research, wants will be pared down to the ultimate goal; secondary and tertiary goals will
become self-evident and will be included in the model during later modeling. Ultimately, nuclear
weapons serve states’ security goals, if only under different names (e.g., deterrence for the US,
grandeur for France). Other stakeholder wants vary accordingly.
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Table 5.1: Problem 1 Stakeholders
Stakeholder
1. NWs states
2. Production
Firms

3. International
verification and
compliance
agencies
4. NGOs and
activists
5. Media
6. NPT states

7. Religious
leaders

Description
Nuclear-armed states as unitary actors
In the case of the US these are three private US for-profit corporations
that build, house, and manage US nuclear warheads. These include
AECOM and Betchtel, BWX Technologies, and Honeywell. Beyond
the US, these include component manufacturers, raw materials
extractors, etc. These production firms are furthermore influenced by
stockholders.
These are international organizations that encourage peaceful use of
nuclear materials, administer safeguards to ensure compliance, and
work to prevent nuclear proliferation (for example, the IAEA).
These are groups of civilians that actively promote nonproliferation
and disarmament (examples include ICAN, Greenpeace, etc.).
These are groups or individuals that spread information through
various communication methods (e.g., television, radio, print, social
media).
These are signatory states in good standing in accordance with the
NPT, which includes most recognized states not previously identified
as nuclear weapons states248 and major UN voting blocs, such as the
non-aligned movement249.
These are influential individuals of various faiths that can sway public
opinion from the pulpit.

The nuclear-armed states above all require some form of security, and they believe
nuclear weapons serve that goal. While the US and, to a lesser extent, the UK view security
through a deterrent lens against Russia, during the Cold War the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons
program was not necessarily developed for traditional deterrence, but rather to balance against
coercive US foreign policy.250 France, while even less concerned about deterring Russia, views
its nuclear weapons program as a means by which to ensure its territorial integrity and, more
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At the time of writing, South Sudan is the only non-signatory and non-nuclear weapons state.
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Table 5.2: Problem 1 Stakeholder Wants
Stakeholder
NWs states
Production Firms
International
verification
and
compliance
agencies
NGOs and activists
Media
NPT states
Religious leaders

Want
Security
Maximize profits
Abolition

Abolition
Stories that sell
Abolition
Abolition251

importantly for the French, a means by which to maximize its position as a world power.252
Israel, on the other hand, completely views its nuclear weapons program as a mechanism for
deterring conventional war and Arab proliferation, in addition to being the ultimate guarantor of
its survival.253 In very much the same vein, the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program serves to
ensure its very existence. The lesson from the Korean War is that the North’s international
legitimacy is not certain. Because of this, The DPRK’s official position is that of deterrence
against the US and Asian forces, and it views thermonuclear devices and ICBMs as guarantors of
Kim’s survival.254 Pakistan and India, while adversarial, do not share the same existential threat
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Most religious leaders call for abolition; however, some, as identified in the following text, do
not call for abolition and might even call for nuclear attack.
252
Klaus Schubert, “France,” in Security with Nuclear Weapons?: Different Perspectives on
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Nuclear weapons’ ultimate role are to provide Israel with a “Samson option,” where, rather
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American Foreign Policy, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1991), 137-138.
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While writing this in spring and summer 2018, significant positive events occurred between
the DPRK, the ROK, and the US that might change this model’s calculus. Continued monitoring
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that The DPRK and Israel face. Pakistan and India seek to balance against each other (India’s
calculus is more complex, including a “threat of a USA-Pakistan-China axis”255). The creation of
Pakistan and India exposed contested territorial divisions and has resulted in armed combat to
settle these divisions. Nuclear weapons, therefore, seek to prevent territorial loss on either side of
the borders.
Although holding varying degrees of power and capability, nuclear weapons states are
viewed in this literature through a realist lens. Keohane does not necessarily subscribe to realism,
but he succinctly defines states as structural realists see them:

[S]tates [are] unitary rational actors, carefully calculating costs of alternative
courses of action and seeking to maximize their expected utility, although doing
so under the conditions of uncertainty and without necessarily having sufficient
information about alternatives or resources to conduct a full review of all possible
courses of action.256
The word “unitary” here is a key defining term. Anarchy implies the sameness of states;257
therefore, there is no need to differentiate all nine nuclear weapons states as individual units of
analysis. For the purpose of abiding by the foundational tenets of realism, the only necessary
distinction between states is whether or not they possess nuclear weapons. How or why they
proliferated or not is only of secondary or tertiary concern. Once nuclear weapons come into
possession, the weapons between states share a common goal: Security. This point is crucial and
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must be driven home. Because unilateral disarmament in no way maximizes expected utility and
instead undermines security needs, there is no difference between the goals of the US and those
of the DPRK or any other state. On the other hand, this research does not discount very real and
perceptible differences between states in terms of power and capability. These distinctions,
however, are more suited for Problem 2.
As identified earlier, the US is possibly the only state that privatizes the construction,
housing, maintenance, and management of its nuclear arsenal. In this text these organizations are
referred to as production firms. AECOM and Bechtel (NYSE:ACM), an engineering firm, holds
contracts to two of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) nuclear stockpile
laboratories. Honeywell Federal Manufacturing and Technologies (NYSE:HON) manages the
third NNSA laboratory. BWX Technologies (NYSE:BWXT) holds a contract for nuclear
weapons component manufacturing. These corporations seek to maximize their profits, may or
may not be publicly traded, and answer to a set of shareholders (or profit-seekers in cases where
there is no public sale of stocks) that, in turn, seek to maximize profits. Other states’, although
not as explicit as the US also employ some kind of civilian labor upstream and downstream of
finished nuclear warheads.
International verification and compliance agencies are intergovernmental organizations
that seek to ensure that member states of the UN are good stewards of nuclear energy programs
in accordance with the NPT. Ultimately, these organizations seek abolition,258 but other
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As will be discussed later, NPT Article VI calls for the eventual global elimination of nuclear
weapons and for nuclear weapon states to take steps towards abolition in “good faith.” United
Nations, Office of Public Information, Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
United Nations, Office of Public Information, United Nations Publication OPI/372 (New York,
1969).
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secondary or tertiary goals are more at the forefront of their work, due to secondary and tertiary
goals being easier to reach. For example, the IAEA’s mission is to

Accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and
prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance
provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in
such a way as to further any military purpose.259
The IAEA, situated in Vienna, Austria, operates through member states. The US, for example,
supports the IAEA through the Department of Energy, and support is provided through various
national laboratories, one of which states on its website, “The IAEA faces many challenges such
as essentially flat budgets, increasing work load as more nuclear facilities come on-line, greater
reliance on safeguards information and advanced technologies, and increased effort to detect
undeclared nuclear activities and procurement networks.”260 In other words, international
verification and compliance agencies depend on the state for mission resources, and their ability
to ensure compliance is diminished as more nuclear energy reactors, uranium enrichment
facilities, and fissile materials sites are constructed, and clandestine programs are created.
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and activists are groups or individuals that
collectively advocate for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. While these groups are
represented as a single unit with a unified stance against nuclear weapons, the text must reflect
other divergent goals. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) takes no
position against peaceful nuclear energy programs; however, Greenpeace, an abolitionist,
environmental group that protested nuclear testing due to its degradation of the environment,
259
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believes “Nuclear power is part of the poblem,” due to the risk of nuclear reactor meltdown.261
Still, because this research focuses on the primary goal, these divergences will be identified only
when necessary.
The Media is a collective group of reporters that seeks to find stories that sell. These
include legitimate journalists reporting through television, radio, newspapers, or social media.
This group also includes hobby journalists that report through social media, blog posts, or
Internet videos. Many in this latter group do not get paid for their efforts; however, they “sell”
their stories for clicks or to build their Internet profile.
For the purpose of this research NPT states are defined as non-nuclear weapons states
that are in good standing with the NPT and seek to uphold the NPT’s three pillar mission: nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear technologies. This includes most of
Europe, all of South America, all of Africa (except South Sudan), much of Asia, and all of
Oceania. NPT states make up a major voting bloc in the UN; however, the normative values of
the NPT do not necessarily translate to NPT states voting behaviors. While 190 states are
member to the NPT, including a handful of nuclear-armed states, only 122 states voted in favor
of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Most of the rest of NPT states failed to cast
a vote. The Netherlands, while a party to the NPT, cast a no vote. For the purpose of this project,
NPT states are abolitionists. Variance from this position will be identified when and if
necessary.262
Religious leaders include figures, such as the Pope, the Dalai Lama, and charismatic
Jewish, Islamic, and spiritual leaders. This list also includes leaders such as Billy Graham (d.
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2018), Deepak Chopra, Thich Nhat Hanh, Sri Sri Ravi Shankar, and L. Ron Hubbard (d. 1986),
whose writings presently influence social beliefs and behaviors (despite whether or not those
figures are presently living). Here, religious leaders stand against weapons that can usher in
Armageddon. They are abolitionists because that is the dominant position. However, some
religious leaders endorse using nuclear weapons. For example, during summer 2017 after US
President Donald Trump called for “fire and fury” against the DPRK, Trump’s friend and
Evangelical Southern Baptist pastor Robert Jeffress said Donald Trump had been given divine
sanction to kill DPRK leader Kim Jong Un using any means necessary. Speaking to the
Washington Post, he suggested this God-ordained green light included using nuclear weapons
against North Korea.263 Because religious leaders can influence voters, and because voters can
influence policy in more democratic states, religious leaders have some level of power within the
model, even if it is modest.

Stakeholder Classification
For the purpose of this model, stakeholders are imbued with certain attributes: Power
(Pi), legitimacy (Li), urgency (Ui), and prominence. Power is an actor’s ability to get another
actor to do something that they would not otherwise do.264 In this sense power is relative. States
certainly have more power than non-states in this model. Ultimately, without extreme coercion,
states cannot be compelled to give up their weapons programs. Legitimacy is the view that a
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given stakeholder’s actions “are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, definitions.”265 Once again, states hold dominant
legitimacy. An exception to this rule might be the DPRK, which the international community
feels has violated norms against proliferation; this is not reflected in Problem 1, but Outlier
States, such as the DPRK, are modeled into Problem 2 and the “Mess.” Urgency is the “degree to
which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention.”266 In this model these attributes fall on a
binary range. Either stakeholders possess these attributes, or they do not. Finally, prominence is
the average of the respective stakeholder’s attributes

𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒! = 𝑃! + 𝐿! + 𝑈! /3

and “represents a relative level of importance of each stakeholder to a given problem.”267
Stakeholders can be placed into one of eight different classes depending on prominence.
They can be further placed into one of four stakeholder classifications. These are identified in
Table 5.3.
Latent stakeholders have the least prominence and are the least important in the system.
Expectant stakeholders are secondary actors in the system because they exhibit two attributes.
Finally, definitive are primary actors because they exhibit all three traits. For this research, Table
5.4 shows this model’s stakeholders and their attributes, class, and classification.268
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Table 5.3: Stakeholder Classes and Classifications269
Class
Dormant
Discretionary
Demanding
Dominant
Dangerous
Dependent
Definitive
Nonstakeholder

Description
Powerful, not legitimate, not urgent
Legitimate, not powerful, not urgent
Urgent, not powerful, not legitimate
Powerful, legitimate, not urgent
Powerful, urgent, not legitimate
Legitimate, urgent, not powerful
Powerful, legitimate, urgent
Not powerful, not legitimate, not urgent

Classification
Latent
Latent
Latent
Expectant
Expectant
Expectant
Definitive
Undefined

Table 5.4: Problem 1 Stakeholder Classification
Stakeholders
NWs states
Production
Firms
Stockholders
International
verification
and
compliance
agencies
NGOs
and
activists
Media
NPT states
Religious
leaders

Power
1
0

Legitimacy
1
1

Urgency
0
1

Prominence
0.67
0.67

Class
Expectant
Expectant

Classification
Dominant
Demanding

0
1

1
1

0
1

0.33
1.00

Latent
Definitive

Discretionary
Definitive

0

1

1

0.67

Expectant

Demanding

0
0
0

1
1
1

0
1
0

0.33
0.67
0.33

Latent
Expectant
Latent

Discretionary
Demanding
Discretionary

Stakeholder Attitude Evaluation
Before determining strategies for each stakeholder, stakeholder attitudes must be
evaluated. Stakeholder potential for threat and cooperation determines strategies. Adapting from
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Savage, et al, stakeholders with mixed attitudes have both high potential for threat and
cooperation. High potential for cooperation and low potential for threat indicates supportive
attitudes. Low potential for cooperation and high potential for threat suggests non-supportive
attitudes. Both low potential for threat and cooperation indicates marginal attitudes. Savage, et
al, then add the strategies are defined as thus: collaborate with mixed stakeholders, involve
supportive stakeholders, defend against non-supportive stakeholders, and monitor marginal
stakeholders.270 Table 5.5 shows this model’s stakeholder attitudes and strategies. Support is
determined through a simple Cooperate minus Threat calculation.

Table 5.5: Problem 1 Stakeholder Attitudes and Strategies
Stakeholders
NWs states

Threat

Production Firms
International verification
and compliance agencies
NGOs and activists
Media
NPT states
Religious leaders

Cooperate Support Attitude
1
1
0 Mixed
Non1
0
-1 supportive

Strategy
Collaborate

0
0
0
0
1

Involve
Involve
Monitor
Involve
Collaborate

1
1
0
1
1

1
1
0
1
0

Supportive
Supportive
Marginal
Supportive
Mixed

Defend

FCM for Stakeholder Objectives
Figure 5.1 shows this model’s initial FCM with stakeholders and objectives.
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Figure 5.1: Problem 1 FCM Who

Stakeholder Management Plan
At this point in the modeling, the objective is to develop a stakeholder management plan.
This plan allows practitioners and stakeholders an opportunity to determine how resources and
effort should be distributed in order to maintain stakeholder support. Table 5.6 shows the
stakeholder management plan from previous steps in the modeling, in addition to stakeholder
engagement priorities. Table 5.6 combines stakeholder wants, strategies, and metrics from Table
5.5. Stakeholder engagement priority is set by arranging metrics. The metrics are summarized
with qualifying justification in Table 5.7. Nodes and weighted links from the FCM model
determine Activity and Popularity for each stakeholder. Activity is set by OutDegree in
descending order. Popularity is set by InDegree in descending order. Priority is set by Activity in
ascending order and then Popularity in descending order (to break ties).
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Table 5.6: Problem 1 Stakeholder Management Plan
Stakeholder

Strategy

InDeg OutDeg

Activity

Popularity

Maintain
Nuclear
Weapons
NPT States:
Abolition
Int'l
Verification:
Abolition
NGOs:
Abolition
Stories that
Sell
Religious
Leaders:
Abolition
Maximize
Profits

Collaborate

2

3.5

4.582576

3.464102

Engagement
Priority
1

Involve

2

3.25

4.031129

3.162278

2

Involve

2.25

3

3.872983

3

3

Involve

2.75

2

3.162278

3.708099

4

Monitor

2.5

1.75

2.95804

3.535534

5

Collaborate

2.75

1.5

2.44949

3.708099

6

Defend

1

0.25

0.5

1

7

Table 5.7: Problem 1 Who Qualitative Link Justification
Sender
Component

Receiver
Component

Link

NW
States: Production
1
Nuclear
Firms: Maximize
Weapons
Profits
NW
States: Int'l Verification: -0.5
Nuclear
Abolition
Weapons
NW
States: NGOs: Abolition
Nuclear
Weapons
NW
States: Stories that Sell
Nuclear
Weapons

-0.5
0.5

Reasoning
NWS provide production contracts to various
firms.
By desiring nuclear weapons NWS moderately
decrease the IAEA's mission in 2 ways: 1) it
blocks the IAEA's ability to enforce NPT Article
VI, 2) they use voluntary offer agreements, which
restrict what the IAEA can do.
NWS moderately decrease NGOs' ability to
operate, but NGOs will continue their missions,
despite hurdles.
States moderately increase the media's ability to
sell stories. It does not graduate to strong because
the media might find more profitable stories,
depending on circumstances.
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NW
States:
Nuclear
Weapons
NW
States:
Nuclear
Weapons
Production
Firms:
Maximize
Profits

NPT
States: -0.5
Abolition

NWS moderately decrease NPT states' mission,
but the NPT also focuses on non-NWS.

Religious
-0.5
Leaders:
Abolition
NW
States: 0.25
Nuclear
Weapons

NWS moderately decrease Religious Leaders, but
these leaders continue their work.

Int'l
Verification:
Abolition

NW
States: -0.5
Nuclear
Weapons

This link is moderate because, while NWS can
simply ignore the IAEA if they choose, they do
not choose to ignore them. This relationship
changes as NWS goal changes.

Int'l
Verification:
Abolition
Int'l
Verification:
Abolition

NGOs: Abolition

0.75

IAEA communications and data strongly help the
NGO mission.

Stories that Sell

0.5

IAEA communications help the media sell stories
moderately. The media can also choose to run
other stories.

Int'l
Verification:
Abolition
Int'l
Verification:
Abolition

NPT
States: 0.75
Abolition

The IAEA directly assists the NPT states.

Religious
Leaders:
Abolition

NGOs:
Abolition

NW
States: -0.25
Nuclear
Weapons
Int'l Verification: 0.25
Abolition

This relationship is moderate. While the IAEA
has the power to do what Religious Leaders hope,
Religious Leaders ultimately cannot do those
things.
NGOs can lobby governments, but this
relationship is weak; governments can simply
ignore them.
NGOs can supply the IAEA with information, but
this information is a small part of the information
the IAEA collects.

NGOs:
Abolition
NGOs:
Abolition
NGOs:
Abolition

Stories that Sell

NGOs:
Abolition

Religious
Leaders:
Abolition

0.5

0.5

NPT
States: 0.25
Abolition
0.75

Firms can lobby the government to continue
production orders; however, this link is weak
because the state can do as it pleases, and it does
not need Production Firms' blessings.

NGOs moderately increase the Media's ability to
sell stories, but the media can ignore them.
NGOs can lobby governments, but this
relationship is weak; governments can simply
ignore them.
NGOs and Religious Leaders often work together
for a common cause.
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Stories that Sell

NWs
States: -0.25
Nuclear
Weapons

Stories that Sell

Int'l Verification: 0.5
Abolition
NGOs: Abolition 0.25

Stories that Sell
Stories that Sell

NPT
States: 0.25
Abolition

Stories that Sell

The Media can sell more stories by reporting on
negative things about governments, but this
relationship is weak because there are many
stories in the day.
The Media can report on IAEA inspection results
or comments from the Board of Governors.
The media can help NGOs, but NGOs also
receive help from much larger organizations.
See above.

Religious
0.5
Leaders:
Abolition
NPT
States: NWs
States: 0.5
Abolition
Nuclear
Weapons
NPT
States: Int'l Verification: 1
Abolition
Abolition

Religious leaders often use the media.

NPT
States: NGOs: Abolition
Abolition

NPT States often work with NGOs.

0.75

NPT
States: Religious
0.5
Abolition
Leaders:
Abolition
Religious
NWs
States: -0.25
Leaders:
Nuclear
Abolition
Weapons
Religious
Leaders:
Abolition
Religious
Leaders:
Abolition
Religious
Leaders:
Abolition

NGOs: Abolition

0.5

Stories that Sell

0.5

NPT
States: 0.25
Abolition

The non-nuclear norm moderately affects NWS
behaviors.
NPT States make up a super majority of the
IAEA.

NPT States often work with Religious Leaders,
but religious leaders do not have huge amounts of
resources.
Religious Leaders can sway the minds of some
voters, but not in less-than-democratic states, and
not to a massive degree, especially when national
security is on the line.
Religious Leaders can give a moral authority to
NGOs.
Religious leaders can
statements to the press.

make

authoritative

This relationship is weak because states can
operate independently from the church.

Summary
This model is largely consistent with realist assumptions of states as primary drivers of
international politics hold. On the other hand, international verification and compliance agencies,
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NPT states, and NGOs must not be discounted. Involvement from abolitionist stakeholders and
collaboration with nuclear weapons states are crucial actions that can synthesize the disarmament
antitheses. Decision makers should monitor the media to look for signs that they have taken a
supportive or non-supportive position. Finally, religious leaders should be consulted for
collaboration because they can influence state leaders and, importantly for democracies,
constituents. Religious leaders can communicate with their flock that disarmament is the moral
option. However, they do have the potential to defect from their abolitionist position. This
stakeholder analysis should be continuously monitored for changes.
Before moving on another stakeholder must be identified. The view that all nuclear
weapons states are functionally similar is certainly contentious, and this research acknowledges
that—although even the DPRK has the capacity for cooperation with the US—states are not
wedded to cooperation. Even cooperative states have the potential for defection. Therefore, in
Problem 2, Outlier States (the DPRK, India, Israel, and Pakistan) are identified as a distinct
actor. This stakeholder mimics nuclear weapons states but behaves differently in key areas that
are identified in Problem 2. For the purpose of avoiding redundancies that alter model behavior,
this stakeholder does not interact with Problem 1’s other components until Problems 1 and 2 are
combined to form the final “mess.”

5.3 Problem 1: What?
Understanding the “What” of the mess’ constituent problems is to break the problem
down into its basic elements.271 In the previous section this research identified stakeholders and
their goals and how the pursuit of those goals affects the goals of other stakeholders in the
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system. It did not reveal, however, the anatomy of the problems. Therefore, this section seeks to
capture the problems’ objective narratives, apply a fundamental objective hierarchy and a meansends network, and update the FCM to address the problems’ constituent parts.

Problem 1 Objective Narrative
Problem articulation relies on the foundation that nuclear-armed states’ are the primary
stakeholders, and their primary collective goal is to simply possess nuclear weapons. Their
problem is that there is a continuing debate in the international community between nuclearhaves and actors that want to approach global zero. At the Conference on Disarmament, an
international forum tasked with negotiating to global zero, in 2018 U.N. Secretary-General
Antonio Guterres argues, “Countries persist in clinging to the fallacious idea that nuclear arms
make the world safer … At the global level, we must work towards forging a new momentum on
eliminating nuclear weapons.”272 The US, France, and China expressed critical warnings that the
international system’s future is too uncertain to pursue disarmament negotiations at the present
time. On the other hand, nuclear-armed states are actively participating at the forum. The
Conference on Disarmament includes ambassadors from every nuclear-armed state, including the
DPRK. In other words, nuclear-armed states have not chosen to simply ignore the problem; they
are actively contributing to the debate. Furthermore, there is some evidence as of March 2018
that even North Korea is willing to negotiate for abolition. Kim Jong Un met with South Korean
envoys to discuss dismantling the North’s nuclear weapons program and that the North is willing
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to disarm if its security needs are met.273 In June he met with US President Trump to discuss this
further. In other words, at face value the DPRK does not see this as a problem of possession, but
rather security. If the decisions were out of states’ controls, these states, particularly the DPRK
and Israel, would be left with uncertain security in an environment they perceive as hostile. In
other words, nuclear weapons serve a purpose: Defense. And defense serves a purpose: Security.
It is from this position that the objective narrative begins.
Nuclear weapons states collectively aim to balance their security needs with the demands
of a highly interconnected international community. If it focuses solely on its security needs it
violates norms against proliferation, which affects its access to international goods, trade, or
decision-making forums. For example, there is a weak but apparent link between being in good
standing with the NPT and IAEA membership. Article VI of the NPT requires nuclear weapons
states to take good faith steps towards disarmament. The DPRK left the IAEA in 1994 after its
withdrawal from the NPT raised concerns with the IAEA’s board of governors. But if the nuclear
weapons states focus primarily on the demands of the international community, it undermines its
primary goal of possessing nuclear weapons. It can be established, therefore, that nuclear
weapons states’ fundamental objective is to balance security in the international system with its
reputation.274 Various mechanisms can achieve this goal, which are addressed in the fundamental
objectives hierarchy and means-ends network.
Examining the other stakeholders’ preferences reveals another justification for focusing
on nuclear weapons states as the prioritized stakeholder. From the perspective of international

273

Choe Sang-Hun and Mark Landler, “North Korea Signals Willingness to ‘Denuclearize,’
South Says,” The Washington Post, March 6, 2018,
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verification and compliance agencies, NPT states, and NGOs, these fundamental goals are
reasonable. NPT states, for example, desire regional security. If nuclear weapons states lost
deterrence, many states with security guarantees from nuclear weapons states might fear either
defection from those guarantees or spillover from regional conflicts. That is, they seek to avoid
making a Type IV error, or making their situations worse. Additionally, due to the high
interconnectedness of the planet, non-nuclear weapons states benefit from trade with nuclear
weapons states. They support nuclear weapons states’ secondary aim of having access to
international markets and other goods.

Problem 1 Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy
This research identifies two fundamental objectives in the dialectic between nuclear
weapons and disarmament: Maximize defense and maximize reputation (which increases access
to various benefits). Maximizing defensive abilities can be broken down to include a balanced
strategy (military capability and avoiding making unnecessary threatening behaviors275),
diplomacy, and economic power. Maximizing reputation is broken down into ethical behaviors,
following norms, and soft power.276 Collectively, these goals are referred to as maximize
security. These are illustrated in Figure 5.2. The goal of nuclear weapons states can be updated
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from simply possessing nuclear weapons to maximizing security, which, as mentioned, is a
combination of high levels of defense and high levels of reputation.

Figure 5.2: Problem 1 Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy

Problem 1 Means-Ends Network
The means-ends network, while similar to the fundamental objectives hierarchy, captures
more cause and effect. That is, the point is to ask how do or can we achieve our fundamental
objectives,277 or, in case, how is security maximized? Maximizing security includes both
defensive capabilities and reputation. Furthermore, maximizing defensive capability is a means
by which to maximize reputation (e.g., avoiding war with neighbors means following certain
norms), and maximizing reputation is a means by which to maximize defense.
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Maximizing defense means having adequate military capabilities (this presently includes both
nuclear and conventional weapons, for the nuclear weapon state), avoiding unnecessarily
threatening postures, having diplomatic relations with others, and increasing economic power
through international investments and return on investment gains (i.e., economic partnerships
decrease the effects of military threat). Maximizing reputation means properly responding to
violations of international norms, treating citizens properly, practicing self-restraint, being
transparent, conforming to internationally acceptable forms of behavior, and obtaining desired
outcomes through simply attracting others to the state’s brand. This is illustrated in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3: Problem 1 Means-Ends Network
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Problem 1 What FCM
Applying the means-ends network and nuclear weapons states’ updated problem
statement to Problem 1’s FCM shows emergence of new links between who and what. Of
particular note, the causal link between nuclear weapons states’ goal and international
verification agencies’ goal is updated from negative to positive. This is because nuclear weapons
states ultimate goal is security. The IAEA works in ways that increase states’ security.
Additionally, other links are broken. Religious leaders goal of disarmament and the media’s goal
of selling stories no longer affects nuclear weapons states’ goal of maximizing security. The rest
of the updates are noted in Table 5.8, and the updated FCM is shown in Figure 5.4.

Figure 5.4: Problem 1 FCM What

Table 5.8: Problem 1 What Qualitative Link Justification
Sender
Component

Receiver
Component

Link

Reasoning

Reputation

Security

0.75

Reputation strongly increases security because the
risk of war declines as states become more
reputable to their neighbors.
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Reputation

Defense

0.5

Forming half of this positive feedback loop,
reputation moderately increases defense by
decreasing the risk of conflict.

Defense

Security

0.75

Defense

Reputation

0.5

Military
Capability

Defense

1

Strong defenses strongly increase security by
increasing the opponent's attack cost.
Forming half of this positive feedback loop,
defense moderately increases reputation because
strong defense decreases risk of conflict, and
lower conflict increases the state's reputation as a
member in good standing of the international
community.
Military capability is a very strong component of
defense.

Diplomacy

Defense

0.75

Diplomatic relations strongly increase defense by
making conflict less likely.

ROI Gains

Defense

0.5

Nuclear
Weapons
Conventional
Weapons

Military
Capability
Military
Capability

1

Returns on investment increase defense
moderately by adding to available military funds.
This relationship is self-explanatory.

1

This relationship is self-explanatory.

International
Investments

Defense

0.5

International investments increase defense by
making conflict less likely278

Avoid Threats

Defense

0.5

Avoiding actions that can be perceived as
threatening increases defense by making conflict
less likely.
Properly responding to norm violations strongly
increases reputation by signaling to the
international community that the responder abides
by international social norms.
By restraining oneself from behavior deemed
deviant, reputation as a member in good standing
with the international community increases.

Proper Response Reputation

0.75

Self-Restraint

Reputation

0.5

Proper
Treatment
Citizens

Reputation

0.25

Reputation

0.5

Conformity

278

of

This relationship is weak because international
reputation is more concerned with international
behavior; however, human rights violations can
have a negative impact.
Conforming to international norms moderately
increases reputation.

Phillip G. Cerny, Rethinking World Politics: A Theory of Transnational Neopluralism, Kindle
Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), Kindle Locations 3343-3346.
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Transparency

Reputation

1

Attraction

Reputation

0.75

Transparency very strongly increases reputation
by diminishing uncertainty about intentions.
Being attractive strongly increases reputation.

5.4 Problem 1: Why?
The first section identified and analyzed nine stakeholders and developed a stakeholder
management plan. The second section decomposed the mess’ constituent problems into
component parts. This section tackles substantive information: motivation analysis, motivation
models, and motivation feedback. That is, this research is now looking at the motivating forces—
the premises and purposes—behind events and actions. In the Structure, Think, Act, and Observe
model from Chapter 3, this would fall under Structure, Restructure. The revised model follows
from this restructuring.
As identified in the first section, the primary actors in Problem 1 are nuclear weapons
states, and nuclear weapons states’ fundamental goal in Problem 1 is security (remembering that
nuclear weapons serve a function, defense, and defense serves a function, security). Another way
of stating this is nuclear weapons’ primary goal in a hostile world is Maslow’s proposed second
hierarchical need: Safety.279 Primarily attention is paid to relationships between other stakeholder
objectives, looking for feedback loops. Then necessary modifications to the FCM are made.
These updates are explained in Table 5.9 and shown in Figure 5.5.
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Table 5.9: Problem 1 Why Qualitative Link Justification
Sender
Component
Military
Capability

Receiver
Component
Maximize
Profits

Link

Reasoning

0.75

Production firms' profits increase strongly as
military capability increases because the
production firms are awarded military contracts.

Military
Capability

Stories that Sell

0.75

The media enjoys reporting on increased military
capability.

Military
Capability
Diplomacy

Defense

1

Diplomacy
Diplomacy
Avoid Threats

Stories that Sell
0.5
NPT
States: 0.5
Abolition
Stories that Sell
-1

Military capability is a very strong component of
defense.
As an international body, the IAEA functions
diplomatically. In acting diplomatically, NWS
uphold the IAEA's mission.
Diplomatic behavior is often reported in the news.
NPT States utilize diplomacy to further their
goals.
With no threatening behavior to report on, the
media is less likely to sell stories.

Attraction

Stories that Sell

Int'l Verification: 0.5
Abolition

Figure 5.5: Problem 1 FCM Why

0.5

Attractive stories increase the media's ability to
sell stories (for example, cinema and new music
coming from the state)
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5.5 Problem 1: Where?
When speaking in terms of “where,” this research is tackling two things: the context of
the problem and the boundaries. Context is “the circumstances, factors, conditions, values, and
patterns that surround messes and problems” and the boundaries are “the representations we use
that provide lines of demarcation between messes and problems and the surrounding
environment.”280 “Where” does not refer to geographical or physical locations. This section
allows the research to be refined in a way that decreases complexity, providing an improved
understanding of the problem.
Focusing on the prioritized stakeholders, nuclear weapons states, this research adapts
from Ulrich281 to generate a boundary critique. This force-field diagram is an assessment of what
is and what ought to be in the model.282 First, identify the sources of motivation. Whose interests
are served versus whose should be served? What are and should be the consequences? How can
what is and should be be considered an improvement based on consequences? Second, identify
the sources of power. Who is and should be the decision maker? What resources do and should
that decision maker control? What decisions are and should be outside the decision maker’s
control? Third, identify the sources of knowledge. Who are and should be considered the
experts? What is and should be considered a source of knowledge? Who does and should
guarantee improvement? Finally, identify the sources of legitimacy. Who are and should be the
legitimate stakeholders? Where does and should legitimacy lie? How is and should improvement
be viewed?
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Problem 1 Boundary Articulation
The sources of motivation are examined. First, the clients are all stakeholders with formal
recognition. This model should serve the interests of at a minimum both nuclear weapons states
and NPT states. Second, the purpose is security. The measure of improvement is whether or not
various stakeholder goals reduce uncertainty. For example, joining the IAEA reduces
uncertainty, which is shown in the following game:

Table 5.10: IAEA and reduction of uncertainty
1 JOIN
1 DEFECT

2 JOIN
1, 1
0, 0

2 DEFECT
0, 0
0, 0

In the game profit comes from joining because both players must join and make their systems
verifiable. Reducing uncertainty by examining another state’s materials means making one’s
materials verifiable. 1 represents profit, while 0 represents the status quo.
Next, the sources of power are assessed. First, nuclear weapons states are the primary
decision makers within this problem. No other stakeholder—not even non-nuclear weapons
states—can compel disarmament. However, because nuclear weapons can destabilize the system
or, if used, intensely burden all states, the decision-making should be a collective effort. Second,
decision makers should control resources identified in the means-ends network to maximize
reputation. Third, as previously specified, the system cannot be made worse. The outcome
cannot be a cause of major instability. Therefore, while states can control overt instabilityinducing conditions (e.g., compellence through war), decision makers should not be able to
control these conditions.
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The next step is to identify sources of power. First, because the IAEA answers directly to
the General Assembly and, if need be, the Security Council of the United Nations, and because
the United Nations is explicitly a sub-stakeholder part of the international verification and
compliance stakeholder, these agencies, along with states (nuclear and non-nuclear), should be
considered the primary experts. Second, there are several documents that should provide
guidance for knowledge experts. Several of these are identified in Table 5.11. These include
treaties, declarations, and statements on morality. Third, the guarantor of success should be an
international body, such as the United Nations, where improvement is determined through
consensus.

Table 5.11: Problem 1 Sources of Knowledge
Document
Type
Treaty on the Non- Treaty
Proliferation
of
Nuclear
Weapons
(NPT), Article VI283

Description
Article VI states “Each of the Parties to the Treaty
undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,
and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control.”
Legality of the Threat International International Court of Justice opinion that concludes
or Use of Nuclear legal
there is not legal reason to prohibit states from possessing
284
Weapons
opinion
nuclear weapons; however, it required states abide by
NPT Article VI. All members, including the permanent
members of the Security Council, voted to pursue the
requirements set forth in NPT Article VI.
United
Nations Treaty
Article 51 upholds UN member states’ right to self- and
Charter, Chapter 7,
collective defense and requires states invoking this right
Article 51285
to submit to the jurisdiction of the UN Security Council.
Treaties under IAEA Various
These are agreements, conventions, and protocols on
283
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Auspices286
The Challenge of
Peace: God's Promise
and Our Response287
Resolution
On
Multilateral
Arms
Control288
The Talmud
Scientific books and
journals

various organizational, nuclear safety and security,
liability, technical cooperation, and scientific and
technical areas under IAEA jurisdiction.
Catholic
This document tackles the moral implications of nuclear
declaration
deterrence and makes the case for disarmament through a
Christian lens.
Southern
This document supports arms reductions and the
Baptist
reallocation of resources from nuclear research to human
Resolution
needs.
Jewish holy Shavuot 35b forbids nations from conducting war that
text
kills more than one-out-of-six people.289
Various
These provide decision makers with the physical,
existential, meteorological, psychological, social, and
economic effects of nuclear war.

The final step is to examine the sources of legitimacy. First, states are the primary
legitimate stakeholders. However, intergovernmental agencies, being made up of sovereign
states, should share some of the legitimacy. Second, states should be the emancipatory
stakeholders. Intergovernmental agencies shall not replace sovereignty. Lastly, improvement
shall be determined as reconciliation between states’ security and international security.

Problem 1 Context Articulation
Context is the noticeable and important elements of the problem: the circumstances,
factors, conditions, values, and patterns that create new nodes of influence in the model.290 The
circumstances of the international system structure behaviors. For this problem, these include
international agreements, such as Article VI of the NPT. Article VI requires nuclear weapons
286
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states to make progress towards disarmament in good faith. Other requirements are included in
Table 5.11 above.
Factors are invariable realities. Because this research avoids the Hobbesian solution to
this problem, the circumstances operate in a factor of anarchy. Within an anarchical system
uncertainty prevails as a second unavoidable factor. While states and intergovernmental agencies
can work to mitigate the effects of anarchy and uncertainty, it is not possible to reduce these
factors to negligible levels in the foreseeable future. Nuclear weapons states therefore accept the
nuclear risk in hopes of managing uncertainty.
The conditions refer to the current state of the world that influences the outcome of the
model. These include the risk of nuclear terrorism and the risk of human error. Conditions can
change without notice; therefore, these must be continuously monitored. For example, a major,
non-nuclear war between superpowers is a potential factor that could disrupt the present-day’s
model output. While real, the threat of war, accident, or terrorism is not—at this moment—
modeled as actual wars, accidents, or attacks.
Values are strongly held beliefs that shape behavior. This includes nonproliferation,
disarmament, and no first use or first strike policies. For example, behavioral norms pressure
states to not violate the provisions of the NPT. While states not in good standing with the NPT
can ignore Article VI (the DPRK and Israel, for example), these states cannot avoid the social
stigma that comes with being in bad standing.
Finally, patterns are generally acceptable, structurally perceived, and recurring behaviors
in the international system. The effects of conflict and cooperation are relatively predictable and
either mitigate or exasperate the effects of anarchy and uncertainty. Conflict is likely to reduce
certainty and increase the perception of the anarchical structure of the system. Cooperation is
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likely to reduce uncertainty, particularly if managed by intergovernmental agencies, and mitigate
the structural forces of anarchy.

Table 5.12: Problem 1 Context Articulation
Category
Circumstances
Factors
Conditions
Values
Patterns

Elements
International agreements
Anarchy, uncertainty
Risk of nuclear terrorism, human error
Behavioral norms
Conflict, cooperation

There are several competing elements within this problem. International agreements, the
risk of nuclear terrorism, behavioral norms, and the potential for cooperation drive this problem
towards resolution; however, anarchy, uncertainty, and the potential for conflict serve as
roadblocks.

Force Field Diagram
The force field diagram combines new elements from the context and boundary
articulations. This seeks to analyze what is and what ought to be. Ultimately, this is a problem of
uncertainty, which prevents abolitionist groups and nuclear weapons states from finding a
mutually beneficial resolution to this problem. This is reflected in Table 5.13.
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Table 5.13: Problem 1 Force Field Diagram
Driving
Force

Strength Strength
as-is
oughtto-be
International 0.5
1
Agreements

Risk
of 0.25
Nuclear
Terrorism
Behavioral
0.5
Norms
Cooperation 0.5

1291

1
1

Problem

Restraining
force

Present State:
States operate
under anarchy
and uncertainty,
which decreases
security.

Uncertainty -1

-0.25

Anarchy

-1

-0.25

Conflict

-1

-0.25

Idealized State:
They should
abide by UN
Charter Article
51 and work
closer with
international
verification and
compliance
agencies that
have significant
power to reduce
uncertainty.

Strength
as-is

Strength
ought-to-be

Proposed Ought-to-Be Changes
Nuclear-armed states should embrace cooperation as a means by which to reduce
uncertainty and increase security. This inevitably means states should work closer with
international verification and compliance agencies, abiding by international norms, and abiding
by existing international agreements. The risk of nuclear terrorism is another reality that can
greatly reduce states’ security; however, the probability for non-state actor proliferation is low.

291

That is, the risk of terrorism should be a driving force; this change in no way implies terrorists
should have more power.
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Table 5.14: Problem 1 Where Qualitative Link Justification
Sender
Component
International
Agreements
International
Agreements
International
Agreements

Receiver
Link
Component
Int'l
0.75
Verification:
Abolition
NPT
States: 0.75
Abolition
Reputation

Risk of Nuclear Defense
Terrorism and
Human Error
Behavioral
Norms

0.75
-0.25

Reasoning
Existing international agreements strongly
increase the IAEA's ability to perform its mission.
Existing international agreements strongly
increase the NPT States' ability to perform their
mission.
Existing international agreements signal to the
world that signatory states are in good
international standing.
These are inherent risks, but their probability is
low.

Int'l
0.5
Verification:
Abolition
NPT
States: 0.5
Abolition

Presently, nonproliferation is the norm, but it is
not universal.

Behavioral
Norms

Reputation

0.5

Abiding by Behavioral Norms moderately
increases Reputation. This relationship does not
graduate to strong because other things (like
attraction) also increase reputation.

Cooperation

Int'l
Verification:
Abolition

0.75

Cooperation strongly increases the IAEA's
mission because cooperative behavior is the
cornerstone of the IAEA Charter.

Cooperation

NPT
States: 0.75
Abolition

Cooperation between NPT states forms the
nonproliferation regime.

Cooperation
Cooperation
Anarchy

Reputation
Defense
Int'l
Verification:
Abolition
NPT
States:
Abolition

0.5
0.5
-0.5

Cooperation moderately increases reputation.
Cooperation decreases the likelihood of conflict.
Anarchy is a structural force that mitigates the
IAEA's ability to function.

-0.5

Anarchy

Defense

-0.25

Anarchy decreases the likelihood that the
nonproliferation regime will survive on a long
enough timeline.
Anarchy weakly decreases Defense by creating a
system where conflict is possible.

Conflict

Int'l
Verification:
Abolition

-0.25

Behavioral
Norms

Anarchy

Presently, nonproliferation is the norm, but it is
not universal.

Militarized international disputes are rare, but
when they occur they have a small potential for
incentivizing proliferation.
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Conflict

NPT
States: -0.25
Abolition

Militarized international disputes are rare, but
when they occur they have a small potential for
incentivizing proliferation.

Conflict

Reputation

-0.5

Conflict

Defense

-0.75

Uncertainty

Int'l
-0.5
Verification:
Abolition
NPT
States: -0.75
Abolition

Conflicts between states moderately reduce those
states' reputations because those states have
violated a norm against militarized international
disputes.
Using defensive capabilities and having those
capabilities attacked strongly reduces defensive
capability.
This psychological pressure incentivizes defection
but only moderately.

Uncertainty

This psychological pressure strongly undermines
the
NPTs
mission
by
disincentivizing
nonproliferation.
Uncertainty weakly increases defensive capability
by incentivizing weapon production.

Uncertainty

Defense

0.25

Religious
Leaders:
Abolition
Stories that Sell

Behavioral
Norms

0.5

Religious leaders have a moderate ability to
define morality within a society.

Self-Restraint

0.5

The media can report on deviant behavior, which
pressures states to practice restraint.

Stories that Sell

0.5

The media can report on deviant behavior, which
pressures states to treat citizens properly.

Stories that Sell

Proper
Treatment
Citizens
Conformity

0.5

The media can report on deviant behavior, which
pressures states to conform.

Stories that Sell

Attraction

0.75

The media is a driving force behind attraction.

of
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Figure 5.6: Problem 1 FCM Where

5.6 Problem 1: How?
Now that the problem is beginning to take on significant structure, this research can turn
to the specific means by which the international system can reach its goals. That is, what are the
mechanisms by which the international system can move from its present state—disagreement
over the role nuclear weapons play—and the desired state—a world without nuclear weapons
that maintains states’ security needs? Amarel calls these mechanisms “a set of relevant moves
that can be applied from a state to obtain a new state.”292 Hester and Adams note there are three
mechanism categories: Human mechanisms, abstract mechanisms, and physical mechanisms,
which are further broken down into nine unique mechanisms that do not work alone, but rather in
concert with one another.293 Human mechanisms include human capital and knowledge, skills,
and abilities. Abstract mechanisms include methods and information. Physical mechanisms
include material, money, time, equipment, and facilities.
292
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Based on the previous section’s force field diagram, the preferred state is one where
nuclear weapons states make better use of verification agencies and UN Charter Article 51 to
mitigate the restraining forces. Transitioning from the present state of the world, where anarchy
is more of an ordering mechanism than verification, is to transition from less ordered to more
ordered in accordance with Booth’s “utopian realism.” Hester and Adams propose a Cynefin
framework to move from un-order to order.294 This includes five domains of order and un-order.
Disorder exists at the center. Surrounding this domain begins on the ordered side—simple
(known-knowns) and complicated (known-unknowns)—and traverses into un-order—complex
(unknown-knowns) and chaotic (unknown-unknowns).

Problem 1 Cynefin Analysis
Problem 1 appears relatively ordered, placing it in the complicated domain. That is, there
does not appear to be unknown elements of complexity and chaos. However, there are still the
known-unknowns, such as uncertainty under anarchy. This stems from a lack of verifiable
information, even under the purview of safeguards and verification. Hedging is still a possibility,
and outright cheating is certainly not beyond the realm of possibilities. Therefore, stakeholders’
objectives should apply the appropriate mechanisms, which includes various human, abstract,
and physical nodes. These mechanisms describe the means by which one can transform the
problematic situation as presented above into a state that is more desirable.295
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Hester and Adams, 242.
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Problem 1 Mechanism Analysis
Most noticeably, gaining information from nuclear weapons and nuclear energy states
requires significant human capital and money. However, on the abstract side, as the world
approaches global zero, significant verification improvements must be developed to ensure
proper safeguards of nuclear components as well as automatic short lead-in times for reproliferation. Safeguard improvements include beginning accountancy at the refining process,
safeguards for potentially weaponizable isotopes, increased inspection frequency, safeguards to
detect small material diversions, increased violation detection systems, better violation reporting,
and establishing a good track record of violation identification.296 Short lead-in times for reproliferation discourages re-proliferation by giving states the ability to retaliate against new
proliferations or re-proliferations. In short, it gives previous nuclear weapons states the option to
build nuclear weapons in short order.297 This helps stabilize the system in two ways: 1) it
encourages nuclear weapons states to sign international agreements to disarm by giving them the
option to hedge or defect later, and 2) it makes hedging or defecting costly. Therefore the
mechanisms include safeguard improvements and re-proliferation capabilities.

Table 5.15: Problem 1 How Qualitative Link Justification
Sender
Component

Receiver
Component

Link

Reasoning

Re-Proliferation
Capabilities

Transparency

0.5

Re-Proliferation Capabilities must be open in
order to achieve proliferation deterrence, but this
relationship is not perfect.

Re-Proliferation
Capabilities

International
Agreements

0.5

Re-Proliferation Capabilities moderately increase
the chances of successful International
Agreements by providing signatory states with
assurances.

296
297

Perkovich and Acton, 73-74.
Perkovich and Acton, 102.
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Re-Proliferation
Capabilities

Uncertainty

-0.5

Re-Proliferation
Capabilities
moderately
decrease uncertainty by offering assurances that
proliferation will beget proliferation.

Safeguards
Improvements

Transparency

0.75

Safeguards
Improvements

International
Agreements

0.5

Safeguards
Improvements

Risk of Nuclear -0.75
Terrorism
and
Human Error

This relationship is strong. A unit increase in
improvement greatly increases the international
community's ability to monitor nuclear programs
worldwide. This is exemplified by the functional
differences between the CSA and the AP, which
allows complementary accesses with little to no
notice.
This relationship is moderate because improving
safeguards reinforces the normative structure of
the international agreements to which they are
assigned. This relationship is not perfect,
however, because future developments might
privilege sovereign constraints.
Regular monitoring strongly reduces the risk of
inadvertent use or misuse of nuclear materials.

Safeguards
Improvements

Cooperation

0.5

Safeguards Improvements moderately increase
Cooperation by reinforcing norms.

Safeguards
Improvements

Uncertainty

-0.75

Improving
safeguards
strongly
reduces
uncertainty by increasing the ability to detect
diversion or other illicit activities.
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Figure 5.7: Problem 1 FCM How

5.7 Problem 1: When?
The final step in Hester and Adam’s FCM technique is to assess when intervention is
appropriate. To determine the appropriate time Hester and Adams attempt to determine “if any
option exists for intervention in our system that provides a larger benefit than its associated
cost,”298 using an inequality where max

!"#"$%&
!"#$

≥ 1. That is, what is the actual cost of an

intervention compared to the benefit of intervening? In the system constructed for Problem 1,
can the cost of finding a synthesis between nuclear weapons states and the abolition movement
be justified given the potential payout? If the system in which this problem exists is too mature
(e.g., if the present system of states is expected to be replaced in the foreseeable future) then the
inequality is not met; however, if it is assumed the system is not too mature and requires nearterm intervention then, by definition, the inequality is met.
It is unlikely the present-day system of states under anarchy is going to be replaced by
some other ordering mechanism in the near term. Further, other stakeholders, such as verification
298

Hester and Adams, 257.
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agencies, are unlikely to disappear in short order. Finally, a world where security is maximized
and where the threat of nuclear war, attack, or accident is erased is a world that benefits all
stakeholders. Therefore, max

!"#"$%&
!"#$

≥ 1 can reasonably be assumed. In other words, the

problem warrants some form of intervention.
The problem appears fairly stable. There are few, if any, unknown-unknowns that might
add chaotic elements to the problem. If the inequality is met, and if the system is stable, then the
correct course of action, as identified in Figure 5.8, is to act to achieve objectives.

Figure 5.8: Courses of Action (Adapted from Hester and Adams)299

Hester and Adams’ technique then provides a framework for determining timescale. They
require that all concepts operate on the same timescale, and proscribe increasing or decreasing
weights depending on changes in time.300 In this problem there is no definitive time horizon.

299
300

Hester and Adams, 268.
Hester and Adams, 270.
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System evolution will continue, and no differences in timescale exist between nodes. Because
the timescale is immediate and ongoing, no changes to the FCM are necessary.

Problem 1: Intervention Timing
Finally, referring back to Figure 5.8, this project concludes that max

!"#"$%&
!"#$

≥ 1. The

system is stable and operating on a standardized timeline. The next step is to determine how the
status quo should appear. Therefore, a few scenarios are run.
The first step in intervention is to calculate popularity and activity. This will provide a list of
ranked concepts to investigate. Table 5.16 shows popularity, activity, and whether or not
changing these variables is feasible. Popularity is a measure of the weights going into a concept
set in descending order from highest popularity to lowest. Activity is a measure of the weights
coming out of a concept set in descending order from highest activity to lowest. Measuring the
activity rank in ascending order and popularity rank in descending order sets the engagement
priority.

Table 5.16: Problem 1 Popularity, Activity, and Feasibility
Concept

Activity

Popularity
6.873864
4.769696
0

Engagement
Priority
1
2
3

Change
Feasible?
N
Y
Y

Stories that Sell
Security
Safeguards
Improvements
NPT
States:
Abolition
Int'l
Verification:
Abolition
Cooperation
NGOs:

6
4.582576
4.031129
4.031129

8.485281

4

Y

3.872983

8.124038

5

Y

3.162278
3.162278

0.707107
3.708099

6
7

N
Y
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Abolition
Diplomacy
Military
Capability
Conflict
Religious
Leaders:
Abolition
International
Agreements
Re-Proliferation
Capabilities
Behavioral
Norms
Uncertainty
Anarchy
Avoid Threats
Attraction
Defense
Reputation
Nuclear
Weapons
Conventional
Weapons
Transparency
Proper
Response
ROI Gains
International
Investments
Self-Restraint
Conformity
Proper
Treatment
of
Citizens
Risk of Nuclear
Terrorism and
Human Error
Maximize
Profits

3
2.738613

0
2

8
9

Y
Y

2.645751
2.645751

0
3.708099

10
11

N
Y

2.598076

1.414214

12

Y

2.12132

0

13

Y

2.12132

0.707107

14

N

2.12132
1.936492
1.732051
1.581139
1.581139
1.581139
1

1.581139
0
0
0.866025
7.952987
8.455767
0

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

N
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y

1

0

22

Y

1
0.866025

1.581139
0

23
24

Y
Y

0.707107
0.707107

0
0

25
26

N
Y

0.707107
0.707107
0.5

0.707107
0.707107
0.707107

27
28
29

Y
N
Y

0.5

0.866025

30

N

0.5

1.870829

31

N
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For the first scenario, international compliance and verification agencies are clamped at
0.25. This simulates a small increase in adherence to IAEA safeguards. All remaining nodes will
begin at zero. Zero in this simulation represents no change from the status quo. A change in +1
represents a maximum increase, and a change in -1 represents a maximum decrease.
The following simulation utilizes a sigmoid transfer function, applies a lambda of 5,301
and runs for 50 iterations (to allow sufficient time for hidden chaotic behavior to emerge;
however, the results will be truncated at the twelfth timestamp to reflect where equilibrium is
achieved). The results are shown in Figure 5.9.

301

Lambda used here is a constant for function slope. Smaller lambda values (𝜆 ≤ 1)
approximate linear functions, large lambda values (𝜆 ≥ 10) approximate discrete functions, and
lambda values around 5 represent a good “degree of fuzzification.” Elpiniki I. Papageorgiou,
Fuzzy Cognitive Maps for Applied Sciences and Engineering: From Fundamentals to Extensions
and Learning Algorithms (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 180-181.
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Figure 5.9: Problem 1 Stability Analysis: International Verification

At timestamp 0 the IAEA’s goal of International Verification is clamped at a minor
increase. By timestamp 1 this results in a moderate increase in Nuclear Weapons States’
Security, as well as moderate to significant increases in NGOs, the Media, NPT States, and
Religious Leaders’ goals. Self-Restrain, Proper Treatment of Citizens, Conformity, Attraction,
and Behavioral Norms all experience a permanent maximum increase.
These changes, particularly Abolition goals, result in a maximum decrease of Security by
timestamp 2. On the other hand, NGOs, the Media, NPT States, and Religious Leaders
experience a maximum increase in their goals, which remain maximized through the end of the
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simulation. Self-Restrain, Proper Treatment of Citizens, Conformity, Attraction, and Behavioral
Norms all experience a permanent maximum increase.
Timestamp 3 shows continued maximum reductions in Security. Additionally, Production
Firms’ profits experience a dramatic decline, due to Security reductions. Reputation is
permanently maximized. The only significant change in timestamp 4 is the increased demand for
Defense.
By timestamp 5 increased Defense has led to increased Security, and by timestamp 6
these have led to a permanent maximization of Profits. Finally, by timestamp 7 equilibrium is
reached, were all stakeholders benefit from the new arrangement with the IAEA.
This scenario reached a stable end state, and the situation is complicated. All stakeholders
benefit from increased cooperation with the IAEA. Of particular note, nuclear weapons states’
security is maximized. On the other hand, anarchy and uncertainty have not been mitigated.
Therefore, if the nuclear weapons states believe in the future that compliance is compulsory,
these states can and may simply withdraw from IAEA membership and, if disarmed, rebuild
nuclear weapons. Furthermore, this risks a Type IV error because these states might distrust the
efficacy of existing or future international agreements if other states begin withdrawing from the
NPT or the IAEA Charter. This risk of Type IV error is heightened during the early stages of the
simulation when Security is greatly reduced. During this period, the risk of conflict or war is
amplified.
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Table 5.17: Problem 1 Stability Analysis End States
Component

End
State
Security
0.99965
Maximize Profits
0.999909
Int'l Verification: Abolition
0.25
NGOs: Abolition
0.999986
Stories that Sell
1
NPT States: Abolition
0.999819
Religious Leaders: Abolition
0.999998
Reputation
1
Defense
0.986614
Military Capability
0
Diplomacy
0
ROI Gains
0
Nuclear Weapons
0
Conventional Weapons
0
International Investments
0
Avoid Threats
0
Proper Response
0
Self-Restraint
0.986614
Proper Treatment of Citizens
0.986614
Conformity
0.986614
Transparency
0
Attraction
0.998894
International Agreements
0
Risk of Nuclear Terrorism and 0
Human Error
Behavioral Norms
0.986614
Cooperation
0
Anarchy
0
Conflict
0
Uncertainty
0
Re-Proliferation Capabilities
0
Safeguards Improvements
0

The preceding simulation is not necessarily a solution to the mess; rather, it exists to
determine whether or not the system is stable enough to warrant action. This solution might
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cause a Type IV error. For example, nuclear weapons states’ goal of security is strongly
improved by forcing transparency on nations; however, it might undermine Problem 2 by taking
the question of sovereignty away from states; therefore, the following chapters will build more
complexity to the mess, allowing further analysis. Although movement is towards acting to
achieve goals, more understanding of the mess is necessary before a discussion on actual action
is possible.

5.8 Summary
This chapter tackles the divergence between nuclear weapons states and other actors that
seek to abolish nuclear weapons. It first seeks to understand stakeholder goals and how those
goals interact with other stakeholder goals. It then finds that, by abstracting nuclear weapons
states’ goal of possessing nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons states’ goal can be updated to
maximize security. From this, numerous additional nodes are identified that form the edges of the
problem, thus creating the problem in systemic terms. Finally, it is established that the system is
not too mature for intervention and that it is stable enough to warrant intervention, and that it is
stable enough to make intervention possible.
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CHAPTER 6
PROBLEM 2
There is a disagreement as to how much international governance is necessary to ensure
verification of online, peaceful nuclear programs.

6.1 Problem 2 Articulation
Recognizing the potential threat nuclear technology poses on a global scale, particularly
the prospect of rapid proliferation, the IAEA was established in 1957. The IAEA’s mission is to
ensure the safety and promotion of peaceful nuclear technologies while further ensuring nuclear
materials302 are not diverted to weapons programs. While membership in the IAEA is high, and
while even nuclear-armed states have signed agreements with the intergovernmental
organization, even to the extent of agreeing to make good faith progress towards upholding the
disarmament provisions of NPT Article VI, compliance is not universal. As will be discussed
below, many states fall under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the Additional
Protocol (AP), while the Permanent Five members of the Security Council—China, France, the
UK, the US, and Russia (from here on referred to as P5)—have voluntary offer agreements—
meaning, these states decide what the IAEA does and does not have jurisdiction over.
Furthermore, some states fall completely outside IAEA and NPT jurisdiction. In other words,
cooperation with the IAEA ranges from zero to a number below 100 percent.
Here, a dialectic takes shape. Recognizing that universal IAEA jurisdiction cannot be
compelled on the P5 or any state wishing to merely withdraw from IAEA jurisdiction, the IAEA
has to balance global security needs with the security needs of individual states. If the IAEA and
302

“Nuclear materials” refer explicitly to Uranium, Plutonium, and Thorium. Non-fissile
radiological materials fall outside the scope of IAEA safeguards.
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the NPT wish to prevent proliferation or promote international equality, they must give states the
legal authority to proliferate because binding agreements that permanently prevent proliferation
are unlikely to be signed and, therefore, undermine the non-proliferation regime. That is,
carrying a big stick is not an attractive way to promote the nonproliferation brand. Therefore, the
IAEA cannot demand every member state have strict obligations. The legal authority to
withdraw from the NPT is expressly provided in Article X.
Adding further complication to this problem is the inherent dialectic within the nuclear
weapons states, a reality that complicates the problem’s realist foundation. In summary, these
states have the potential to both threaten and cooperate with the nonproliferation regime and the
IAEA’s mission. For example, while the UK has the highest levels of transparency among the P5
states, France and China have almost no transparency of their weapons program.303 Additionally,
even within international agreements sit complicated realities that undermine the
nonproliferation regime and the IAEA. For example, the bilateral Strategic Offensive Reductions
Treaty (SORT) between the US and the Russian Federation, which sought to reduce both sides’
nuclear arsenals by 50% by 2012, did not mention exactly how many weapons were to be
eliminated, and it did “not require the destruction of these weapons, [did] not include tactical
nuclear weapons and [did] not have any verification provisions. Additionally, the process is
neither irreversible, not transparent.”304 The 2011 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New
START)—at face value—attempts to overcome many of the verification limits set forth by
SORT; however, it implicitly feeds into this problem because its verification depends on each
state’s own intelligence services rather than intergovernmental oversight. The New START’s
303

Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, “Nuclear Proliferation,” in Security Studies: An Introduction, ed.
Paul D. Williams (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008): 367.
304
“Nonproliferation and Disarmament Go Hand in Hand” International Herald Tribune,
September 22, 2004, quoted in Sidhu, 367.
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national technical means of verification (NTM) are—as the name implies—technical rather than
legal. Furthermore, while being a key provision in New START for the US and the Russian
Federation, NTM uses universal intelligence techniques that can gather information on nonparties to the treaty, reducing non-party states’ cooperative option.
The nonproliferation regime is a large voting bloc of states that adhere primarily to the
NPT, in addition to several historical and current treaties and other tools that either implicitly or
explicitly seek the total abolition of nuclear weapons. These are identified in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Nonproliferation Regime Tools
Year
1963

1972

Active? Treaty/Regime
Yes
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, abbreviated as Partial Test
Ban Treaty (PTBT)
Yes
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
No
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Agreement (SALT I)
No
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT)

1974

Yes

Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)

1979

No

1988

Yes305

1994

No

1996

No

2000

No

2003

No

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Agreement (SALT II)
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty (INF Treaty)
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START I)
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT)
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START II)
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
(SORT)

1970
1972

305

Purpose
Limitation of nuclear weapons
testing
Nonproliferation and disarmament
Arms control
Limitation of anti-ballistic missile
(ABM) systems
Explosive yields limitation on
testing
Arms control
Arms control and disarmament
Arms control
Limitation of nuclear weapons
testing
Arms control
Strategic nuclear disarmament

At the time of writing the treaty is active; however, in October 2018, the US made clear its
intention to withdraw from the treaty.
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2011

Yes

2017

No

NA

No

NA

No

1974

Yes

1987

Yes

1957

Yes

NA

Varies

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New
START)
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons, also known as the Nuclear
Weapon Ban Treaty (NWBT)
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START III)
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR)
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA)
Nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ)

Strategic nuclear disarmament
Disarmament
Prohibition of militarized fissile
material production
Arms control
Nonproliferation and fissile
material export control
Nonproliferation and missile
technology export control
Nonproliferation and disarmament
Nonproliferation and prohibition
on testing and deployment

While many of these tools are toothless, they represent a growing consensus in the international
community that nuclear weapons are outside acceptable international standards of decency. The
nonproliferation norm is largely a product of non-realist recognition of nuclear weapons’
destructive capability. Essentially, deterrence does not play into the nonproliferation regime’s
calculus; rather, the utilization of these tools comes from the normative position that using
nuclear weapons is unacceptable.306 As Lüthi pointed out in the previous chapter, this norm is so
pervasive that NPT states view it as their moral obligation to participate in the dialectic between
nuclear weapons states and international verification agencies.307
Presently, the IAEA operates between severely limited and approaching total jurisdiction
within willing member states. Outside this spectrum the IAEA has no jurisdiction. For example,

306
307

Tannenwald, 433.
Lüthi, 98.
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it has no authority to verify the safety and non-militarized use of nuclear materials in North
Korea.308
According to the IAEA’s “Safeguards and verification” website and sub-websites,
accessed June 2018.309 IAEA safeguards evolve alongside technological improvements and the
commissioning or decommissioning of facilities, which increase the number of individual
verifications of materials. As of 2015 the IAEA has safeguard plans in effect for 181 states (and
Taiwan) with APs in place for 127 states (and Taiwan), consisting of over 1,200 facilities. The
AP covers enough nuclear materials to build about 200,000 nuclear weapons. To verify this
quantity of materials, in 2015 the IAEA conducted over 2,000 in-field inspections, over 600
verifications of design information, and over 60 complementary facility accesses, generating
almost 800,000 reports and totaling over 13,000 calendar days’ worth of work. This work
requires a staff of almost 900 employees (including about 90 contractors) and an annual budget
(in 2015 rates) of about €175,000,000. In 2014 the IAEA retained 89.5% of its pledged
payments.310
IAEA safeguards are set up to ensure safe and peaceful use of nuclear components,
systems, and materials. They are tools to verify states’ legal obligations and go through an
annual cycle311 consisting of four processes. First, safeguard-relevant information is collected
and verified for consistency. Second, a safeguards approach is developed. Third, the IAEA
conducts the evaluation to identify potential inconsistencies. Finally, the IAEA draws up its
308

Although, it can be argued that the IAEA maintains its authority because the DPRK’s
withdrawal did not completely abide by the provisions of NPT Article X.
309
“Safeguards and verification,” International Atomic Energy Agency, last modified February
2018, https://www.iaea.org/topics/safeguards-and-verification.
310
Yukiya Amano, Technical Cooperation: Report for 2014 (Vienna: International Atomic
Energy Agency, 2015),
https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC59/GC59InfDocuments/English/gc59inf-3_en.pdf.
311
This annual cycle is captured in the when section.
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safeguards conclusions. After this cycle is complete the IAEA releases its report to the UN
General Assembly, and, if necessary, the Security Council, as well as a version to the general
public.
In order to collect and verify information, the IAEA relies on three primary methods:
state-provided information, self-collected information, and information received via other means,
such as through third parties or open sources (represented in the how section). Over 170—or the
majority of—agreements between states and the IAEA are Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreements (CSA), meaning these states agree to allow relatively robust verification of their
nuclear energy programs.312 In these states any anomalies with their self-reported information
can be dealt with through legal measures. The P5 fall under voluntary offer safeguards
agreements, which means these states can decide without IAEA input which facilities can be
monitored. Three nuclear weapons states not party to the NPT—Israel, India, and Pakistan—
have item-specific agreements with the IAEA, often only on imported materials. 127 countries
have signed the Additional Protocol, a development seen as necessary to strengthen the IAEA’s
ability to ensure materials are not diverted to weapons programs.313 The IAEA deemed this
necessary after safeguards failures in Iraq and North Korea during the early 1990s.
To develop a safeguards approach, the IAEA looks at state-specific systems, capabilities,
and materials and attempts to determine any viable avenues for using these items to develop
weapons, an approach referenced later, called the acquisition pathway analysis (APA). These are
usually technical in nature and require technical expertise.
312

It needs to be noted here that “comprehensive” does not mean the IAEA holds a monopoly
over the individual state’s nuclear program. Defection is possible even under the CSA. For
example, a state could sign the CSA, declare sites, and merely maintain clandestine sites away
from IAEA scrutiny, which was the method Iraq used prior to the Persian Gulf War.
313
The P5 each have APs in place; however, the AP does not provide the IAEA with CSA-like
authority in the P5 states. A description of how the AP works is provided in the how section.
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To develop a safeguards and verification plan, the IAEA builds off the individual
safeguards approach, using a variety of tools for in-field and off-site inspections and analyses.
These include bookkeeping similar to the banking industry, environmental sample analyses,
destructive or non-destructive assays of nuclear materials,314 and containment and surveillance
techniques, among others. Combined, these efforts help build a “continuity of knowledge” over
the state’s nuclear materials. Furthermore, these techniques provide some measure of detection
of undeclared materials, facilities, or operations because anomalies in the continuity of
knowledge emerge.
Finally, each year the Board of Governors releases its Safeguards Implementation Report,
a detailed analysis and conclusions drawn from information collected from safeguard plans. The
conclusions drawn are state-specific and vary according to the state’s individual safeguard
agreement. These are detailed in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2: IAEA Safeguard Conclusions (quoted in their entirety)315
Safeguards
Conclusion Type
Agreement Type
CSA
with
• If the IAEA's Secretariat has completed all evaluations and found
Additional
no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from
Protocol
peaceful activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material
or activities for the State as a whole, the Secretariat concludes that
all nuclear material remained in peaceful nuclear activities; and
• If the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared
nuclear material from peaceful activities, but evaluations regarding
the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities remained
ongoing, the Secretariat concludes, on that basis, that declared
nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.
CSA
without
• If the IAEA's Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of
314

These are radiation measurement techniques. Destructive assays destroy the sample but
provide results with much higher confidence.
315
“Drawing safeguards conclusions,” International Atomic Energy Agency, last modified 2017,
https://www.iaea.org/topics/drawing-safeguards-conclusions.
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Additional
Protocol
Under
ItemSpecific Safeguard
Agreement

•

Voluntary
Safeguard
Agreement

•

Offer

No Agreement

•

declared nuclear material from peaceful activities the Secretariat
concludes that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful
nuclear activities.
If the IAEA's Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of
nuclear material or of misuse of the facilities or other items to
which safeguards had been applied, the Secretariat concludes that
nuclear material facilities and other items to which safeguards had
been applied remained in peaceful activities.
If the IAEA's Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of
nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied, the
Secretariat concludes that nuclear material to which safeguards
had been applied in selected facilities was not withdrawn from
safeguards, except as provided for in the agreements, and remained
in peaceful activities.
For States with no safeguards agreements in force, the IAEA
Secretariat cannot draw any safeguards conclusions.

Additionally, the IAEA has other agendas for preventing malicious nuclear programs. For
example, it provides states with radiological detection capabilities and training to identify illicit
movement of radiological materials across their borders. When a state’s safeguards and detection
equipment needs updating the IAEA provides member states with necessary upgrades.
These techniques exemplify the problem. The IAEA could operate with guaranteed
efficiency in a world where the IAEA was a Hobbesian and monolithic agency with perfect
jurisdiction over all member states. In reality the P5 and other nuclear weapons states can simply
deny the IAEA access to materials or systems they do not wish the IAEA to see. Indeed, all
member states can simply withdraw from the IAEA, reducing its jurisdiction to zero. Not
desiring defection from the regime, the IAEA must balance the needs of its mission with member
states’ individual needs under legal sovereignty. In other words, how much cooperation with the
IAEA is necessary to maximize international nuclear safeguards and governance, and how much
are states willing to cooperate? To illustrate this problem, the 2011 nuclear incident at the
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Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant sparked a debate about how much jurisdiction the IAEA
should have over nuclear materials. While all parties, including the Japanese Diet, desire stronger
safeguards to mitigate the risk of another event like the one at Fukushima, some states wish to
nationalize, rather than internationalize, jurisdiction over nuclear reactors,316 meaning
cooperation has not been maximized.

Table 6.3: Problem 2 Stakeholders
Stakeholder
NWs states
International
verification
and
compliance agencies
NGOs and activists
Media
NPT states

Religious leaders
Outlier States

316

Description
Nuclear-armed states as unitary actors, comprising the P5.
These are international organizations that encourage peaceful use of
nuclear materials, administer safeguards to ensure compliance, and work
to prevent nuclear proliferation (for example, the IAEA).
These are groups of civilians that actively promote nonproliferation and
disarmament (examples include ICAN, Greenpeace, etc.).
These are groups or individuals that spread information through various
communication methods (e.g., television, radio, print, social media).
These are signatory states in good standing in accordance with the NPT,
which includes most recognized states not previously identified as
nuclear weapons states317 and major UN voting blocs, such as the nonaligned movement318.
These are influential individuals of various faiths that can sway public
opinion from the pulpit.
These are the four remaining nuclear-armed states, including the DPRK,
India, Israel,319 and Pakistan.

For an in-depth discussion on the debate see Norbert Pelzer, “Safer Nuclear Energy through a
Higher Degree of Internationalisation?: International Involvement versus National
Sovereignty,” Nuclear Law Bulletin, no. 1 (2013): 43-88.
317
At the time of writing, South Sudan is the only non-signatory and non-nuclear weapons state.
318
Excluding Pakistan, India, and North Korea (as members of NAM), as well as China (as an
observer state). These are nuclear weapons states.
319
Little is known about Israel’s nuclear weapons program. Israel might fall under the Nuclear
Weapons States category.
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6.2 Problem 2: Who?
In this section the same methodology applies from Problem 1. Stakeholders in the mess
and its constituent problems are identified in Table 6.3. Table 6.4 identifies stakeholder wants.

Table 6.4: Problem 2 Stakeholder Wants
Stakeholder
NWs states
International
verification
and
compliance
agencies
NGOs and activists
Media
NPT states
Outlier states

Want
Maximize sovereignty
Maximize cooperation

Oversight
Stories that sell
Participation
Prestige320

Each nuclear-armed state has two broad verifiable components: nuclear weapons and
other nuclear material programs. While on the one hand they want to maximize their sovereignty,
they also have interest in other states’ increased cooperation in verification and compliance. For
the purpose of this section, NPT states are inherently compliant321 and seek nuclear equality
among states (disarmament and the right to technology). The NPT states therefore seek serving
as directors or deputy directors general, in policymaking, in oversight, in legal, in technical, and
in other services, including onsite inspection teams. NGOs desire oversight. The media maintains
its desire to find stories that sell. International verification and compliance organizations want to

320

In this sense, Outlier States are asserting that the international community cannot tell it what
to do and that they desire to be seen as equal to the nuclear powers.
321
Some states cannot be compliant in the real world system; however, their present situation
precludes them from participating. Syria, for example, is presently out of good standing with the
IAEA, but Syria does not have the resources to take part in the IAEA’s mission.
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maximize their ability to verify compliance. The IAEA’s mission, for example, is to ensure the
peaceful civil use of atomic materials. In order to accomplish this, states must cooperate with
inspectors. Production firms, religious leaders, and the environment are excluded from this
section; however, their role is not null; they take on a minor level of ownership along the edges
of Problem 2 (for the Environment, their role becomes clearer later). Finally, a new stakeholder
must be introduced; Outlier States are states that possess nuclear weapons, are largely inactive
(they tend to ignore the problem), demonstrate potential to threat, and fall under less-thanaverage IAEA jurisdiction. These states include India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. While
this project seeks to follow realist tenets as much as possible, outlier states cannot be ignored,
and this project therefore continues to adopt the “realist plus” position, as exemplified by Sagan,
where less-secure states face higher threat for losing control of nuclear arsenals.322

Table 6.5: Problem 2 Stakeholder Classification
Stakeholders
NWs States
International
verification
and
compliance
agencies
NGOs
and
activists
Media
NPT states
Outlier states

322

Power
1
1

Legitimacy
1
1

Urgency
1
1

Prominence
1.00
1.00

Class
Definitive
Definitive

0

1

1

0.67

Dependent Expectant

0
1
1

1
1
1

0
1
0

0.33
1.00
0.67

Latent
Definitive
Dominant

Sagan and Waltz, 49.

Classification
Definitive
Definitive

Discretionary
Definitive
Expectant
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Table 6.6: Problem 2 Stakeholder Attitudes and Strategies
Stakeholders
NWs States
International
verification
compliance agencies
NGOs and activists
Media
NPT states
Outlier states

Threat
1
and 0

Figure 6.1: Problem 2 FCM Who

0
0
0
1

Cooperate Support Attitude
Strategy
1
0
Mixed
Collaborate
1
1
Supportive Involve
1
0
1
1

1
0
1
0

Supportive
Marginal
Supportive
Mixed

Involve
Monitor
Involve
Collaborate

162
Stakeholder Management Plan
Table 6.7: Problem 2 Stakeholder Management Plan
Concept

Strategy

InDeg

OutDeg Activity

Cooperation
Equality
Oversight
Sovereignty
Stories that
Sell
Outlier
States

Involve
Involve
Involve
Collaborate
Monitor

1.5
1.25
1.75
1.25
2.75

3
2.5
1.5
1.25
1

3.872983
3.535534
2.738613
2.236068
2

Popularity Engagement
Priority
2.44949
1
1.936492
2
2.645751
3
2.236068
4
3.708099
5

1

1

2.645751

Collaborate 1.75

6

Table 6.8: Problem 2 Who Qualitative Link Justification
Sender
Component
Sovereignty

Receiver
Link
Component
Nuclear
-0.25
Security

Sovereignty

Oversight

Sovereignty

Stories that 0.25
Sell

-0.25

Reasoning
NWS do not relinquish sovereignty by merely signing
IAEA agreements (hence IAEA Charter Article XVIII
and NPT Article X); however, this negative relationship
between states seeking sovereignty and the IAEA's goal
of securitizing global nuclear programs is weak because
member states, even NWS, are generally willing to
participate and contribute.
NGOs are less able to function because states can simply
ignore them; however, this relationship is weak because
states and publics tend to work with them. It is only
when national security becomes the issue that NGOs'
goal of oversight is weakened.
Anything the state does for national security purposes is
generally a news worthy event; however, this
relationship is weak because the media reports on a wide
range of topics.
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Sovereignty

Outlier
States

-0.5

NWS national security goals moderately reduce Outlier
States' goal of prestige because of sanctions or other
actions that treat Outlier States as pariahs. This
relationship does not graduate to 'strong' because the
behavior is not universal. Israel's NWs program has not
been heavily scrutinized, and the US amended its law to
allow civil nuclear trade with India.

Nuclear
Security

Sovereignty

-0.5

The IAEA moderately diminishes NWS sovereignty by
design; however, it cannot impose order over states
(they can simply withdraw).

Nuclear
Security

Oversight

0.75

Much of what NGOs do requires access to unclassified
state-level information. The IAEA, through its
inspections and communications, makes much of this
information available for public scrutiny.

Nuclear
Security

Stories that 0.5
Sell

Nuclear
Security

Equality

0.75

Nuclear
Security

Outlier
States

-0.5

Oversight

Sovereignty

-0.25

Oversight

Nuclear
Security

0.25

Oversight

Stories that 0.5
Sell

The IAEA moderately increases the media's goal
through public communications. This relationship is
larger than NWS ability to increase the media's goal
because the IAEA is purposely communicating with an
international audience.
This relationship is strong because the IAEA collates
and redistributes technology and knowledge to
developing nations that desire to build non-militarized
nuclear programs.
The IAEA moderately diminishes Outlier States goal of
prestige by communicating its inability to confirm
activities. Further, the IAEA's mission is according to
the NPT, which no Outlier State has signed, violating
international norms.
NGOs diminish NWS ability to function as desired by
involving itself in politics and pressuring states and
constituents. This relationship is weak because even
democratic states can simply ignore them.
NGOs can supplement small portions of the IAEA's
mission by acting as a surrogate between the IAEA and
states (political pressure to take the IAEA seriously) and
involving itself as nuclear watchdogs. This relationship
is weak because NGOs do not have large resources.
This is a moderate relationship because NGOs generally
depend on the media to disseminate their message;
however, the relationship is not strong due to the media's
ability to decide what to report
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Oversight

Equality

0.25

NGOs can support NPT states' goal of equality by
publicly stating their support or actively working with
developing states; however, this relationship is weak due
to limited budgets.

Oversight

Outlier
States

-0.25

This relationship is similar to the relationship between
NGOs and NPT states, but it is a negative relationship.

Stories
Sell

that Sovereignty

-0.25

The media can sway how NWS interact by publicizing
domestic and international behaviors to domestic and
international audiences; however, this relationship is
weak because much of political maneuvering happens
behind closed doors.

Stories
Sell

that Nuclear
Security

0.25

The media plays a small role in the IAEA's mission by
acting as a conduit between the IAEA and audiences.

Stories
Sell

that Oversight

0.25

The media plays a small role in NGOs' mission by
providing information to the NGOs and by transferring
NGOs' messages to audiences.

Stories
Sell

that Equality

0.25

The media tends to support NPT states; however, this
relationship is weak because it can ignore NPT states,
depending on news stories of the day.

Stories
Sell

that Outlier
States

0

This relationship is null because the media equally
reports on positive and negative information about the
states.
NPT states place pressure on NWS to promote equality;
however, ultimately, NWS cannot be compelled.
This relationship is strong because ultimately the IAEA
cannot function without a preponderance of international
support, which, as the largest voting bloc, the NPT states
provide.

Equality

Sovereignty

-0.25

Equality

Nuclear
Security

0.75

Equality

Oversight

0.5

Equality

Stories that 0.5
Sell

Equality

Outlier
States

-0.5

This relationship is moderate because NPT states can
provide information to NGOs and support NGO
missions.
This relationship is moderate because NPT states'
activities provide a wealth of stories to the media. It is
not strong because the media can report on other matters
at its discretion.
This negative relationship is moderate because NPT
states create a norm that Outlier States violate by not
fully participating in the NPT and the IAEA; however,
Outlier States are not strongly diminished by failing to
participate.
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Outlier States Stories that 1
Sell

Regardless of whether or not the stories are positive or
negative, Outlier States are regularly in the headlines
(e.g. no matter what the story is about, the media enjoys
reporting on the DPRK).

Problem 2 Stakeholder Management
The results are counterintuitive, as will be seen below. Generally, especially given realist
logic, state interests should precede non-states’ or intergovernmental agencies’ interests. These
results suggest international verification and compliance agencies are very active and are facing
low external stakeholder pressure. Their interests take precedence to states’ interests. As
supportive stakeholders these agencies, NPT states, and NGOs involvement should be
prioritized. Media should be monitored for stories that will increase support from non-supportive
states. States, including Outlier States, must be involved because involvement creates a sense of
urgency and increases future cooperation toward resolving the nuclear weapons dialectic.

6.3 Problem 2: What?

Problem 2 Objective Narrative
Recalling that international verification and compliance agencies are the prioritized
stakeholders, the problem is that there is debate about how much cooperation is necessary to be
in good standing with the agencies. The IAEA, whose authority to verify compliance comes
through Article III of the NPT, does not have the power to compel compliance beyond publicly
exposing uncooperative behavior. Furthermore, as identified in Problem 1, running afoul of the
NPT (such as North Korea defecting) merely runs the risk of sanctions, while regaining total
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nuclear sovereignty if IAEA membership is withdrawn. Therefore, the IAEA needs to find a
universally acceptable balance between zero verification and total verification.
International verification and compliance agencies’ primary goal, as identified in the
previous section, is to maximize cooperation with the NPT states and IAEA member states and
that they are in compliance with safeguard provisions of the NPT that prevent peaceful nuclear
materials from being diverted to non-peaceful nuclear programs. Alternately, the IAEA seeks to
balance objectives to promote peaceful nuclear programs and prevent proliferation. Taken
together these goals can be called, for the purpose of this project, nuclear security.

Problem 2 Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy
As identified above, international verification and compliance agencies’ primary goal is
nuclear security, which is the promotion of peaceful nuclear energy programs; such as energy,
medical, agricultural, and other programs; and the prevention of military uses of nuclear
technology (often called “dual use”). The fundamental objectives hierarchy reveals that to
promote peaceful nuclear programs, the IAEA can and does invest in science, provide resources,
and provide training. To prevent proliferation of militaries or non-state actors, the IAEA can and
does institute safeguards that are more or less verifiable, provide securitizing technology to
states, and make requirements to use non-coercive techniques. These are illustrated in Figure 6.2.

167
Figure 6.2: Problem 2 Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy

Problem 2 Means-Ends Network
Ensuring nuclear security has two fundamental objectives: Promotion of peaceful nuclear
programs and prevention of proliferation. Promotion of peaceful nuclear programs means
investments in research and design programs and providing materials, services, equipment,
facility access, scientific training, and technical training to member states desiring to participate
in nuclear programs.323 Preventing proliferation means promoting bilateral and multilateral
agreements, tight control and supervision over nuclear materials, and conducting safety and
security checks (or inspections) of facilities. An important means to ensuring nonproliferation is
323

From the perspective of developing states within the NPT, this has the added benefit of
serving as a means for wealth redistribution, thus progressing the goal of equality among nations.
See Benjamin Schiff, “Dual Mandate: Safeguards and Technology Transfer in the International
Atomic Energy Agency,” (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1982): 2.
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to make all agreements non-binding. States should be free to withdraw from any agreement
without consequence.324 Coercive treaties and agreements are not as attractive to potential
signatories as non-binding treaties or agreements. Finally, preventing proliferation is a means by
which to promote peaceful nuclear programs because proliferation can beget proliferation. These
tools are reflected in Figure 6.3.

Figure 6.3: Problem 2 Means-Ends Network

324

For example, sanctions against the DPRK following its defection might have reinforced its
belief that the West cannot be trusted, making it more difficult to get them back to international
norms.
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Table 6.9: Means-Ends Network Node Identifiers
Promote
peaceful This is a goal for which the IAEA strives.
nuclear programs
R&D
The IAEA, alongside individual states’ safeguards programs, conducts
research and design in order to develop better detection, monitoring,
and analysis capabilities.
Provide materials
Materials are nuclear materials necessary to run nuclear programs that
are beyond the indigenous reach of some member states.
Provide services
Service is administrative assistance covering member states’
indigenous R&D, training, and accounting of materials and technology.
Provide equipment
Equipment is the physical technical components necessary to run
nuclear programs.
Provide facilities
Facilities are areas designated by the IAEA and member states that
serve to provide R&D, training, and other activities.
Scientific training
Scientific training is advanced-level training that enables scientists to
engage in R&D.
Technical training
Technical training is advanced-level training that enables engineers,
scientists, and other practitioners to engage in R&D.
Prevent proliferation
This is a goal for which the IAEA strives.
Bilateral agreements
These are agreements between two states. For the purpose of this
research, these agreements are security related but do not necessarily
fall under the purview of the IAEA.
Multilateral
These are agreements between three or more states, usually securityagreements
related, falling under IAEA purview.
Control
Export control is the regulation of materials and components that have
dual use capability.
Supervision
Supervision is the regulatory oversight of nuclear material site design,
construction, and operation.
Safety checks
Safety checks include safeguards inspections, as well as the testing,
maintenance, and inspection of facilities, materials, and practices.
Non-binding
Non-binding agreements are included as a means by which to attract
agreements
member states to the regime. These agreements, such as NPT Article X,
assure member states that continued cooperation is not compulsory and
therefore encourages participation.

Problem 2 What FCM
Applying the means-ends network and international agencies’ updated problem statement
to Problem 2’s FCM shows emergence of new links between who and what. Most noticeably is
that production firms, stockholders, and NPT states benefit greatly from the scientific knowledge
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and resources provided by the promotion of peaceful nuclear programs. Research and design
negatively affects the environment to a moderate degree.325 On the proliferation prevention side,
safety checks moderately increase the environment because they help prevent the release of
materials that can be detrimental to the ecosystems. Bilateral and multilateral agreements have a
moderate positive effect on media’s ability to sell stories. Finally, control and supervision over
nuclear materials and components as well as safety checks have a moderate negative effect on
nuclear weapons states’ goal of maximizing sovereignty.
An additional point, here Nonbinding Agreements should positively and strongly affect
Problem 1’s Re-Proliferation Capabilities. This is reflected along the edges of the problem.

Figure 6.4: Problem 2 FCM What

325

Identifying the Production Firms’ and Stockholders’, as well as the environment’s, links also
exposes overlap between Problems 1 and 2, which is therefore modeled along Problem 2’s edges.
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Table 6.10: Problem 2 What Qualitative Link Justification
Sender
Component
Promote
Peaceful
Nuclear
Programs

Receiver
Component
Nuclear Security

Link Reasoning

Promote
Peaceful
Nuclear
Programs
Promote
Peaceful
Nuclear
Programs
Prevent
Proliferation

Maximize
Profits

0.75

Prevent
Proliferation

Promote
0.5
Peaceful Nuclear
Programs

This relationship is moderate. By putting into place
mechanisms to prevent proliferation, the IAEA
acknowledges that states have an inherent right to
peaceful technology.

R&D

Promote
0.5
Peaceful Nuclear
Programs
Promote
0.5
Peaceful Nuclear
Programs

R&D moderately increases peaceful nuclear
programs by decreasing the costs associated with
high tech systems.
The IAEA, through member states, can provide
materials to states seeking peaceful nuclear
programs. This relationship is moderate because
not all states choose to adopt nuclear programs.

Promote
Peaceful Nuclear
Programs
Promote
Peaceful Nuclear
Programs
Promote
Peaceful Nuclear
Programs
Promote
Peaceful Nuclear
Programs

0.5

See above.

0.5

See above.

0.5

See above.

0.5

See above.

Provide
Materials

Provide
Services
Provide
Equipment
Provide
Facilities
Scientific
Training

1

The environment -0.5

Nuclear Security

1

This relationship is very strong. As states seek
technology, they become wedded to the IAEA's
mission if they are working through IAEA
channels. This helps perpetuate non-nuclear
proliferation.
As states decide to build, maintain, or expand
peaceful nuclear programs, production firms and
stakeholders benefit from contract awards and
increased stock prices.
Increased production is moderately harmful to the
environment.
This is self-explanatory. An increase in
proliferation prevention has a commensurate
increase in nuclear security.
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Technical
Training
Bilateral
Agreements

Promote
0.5
Peaceful Nuclear
Programs
Prevent
0.5
Proliferation

See above.

Multilateral
Agreements

Prevent
Proliferation

0.5

Control

Prevent
Proliferation

0.5

Export control moderately increases proliferation
prevention. It does not graduate to strong because
states can circumvent control measures.

Supervision

Prevent
Proliferation

0.5

By supervising the design, construction, and
operation of facilities, proliferation prevention is
moderately increased. It does not graduate to
strong because states can have clandestine sites.

Safety Checks

Prevent
Proliferation

0.75

Inspections increase proliferation prevention by
deterring states from clandestine operations or
material diversions; however, it does not graduate
to very strong because inspections are not perfect.

Nonbinding
Agreements

Prevent
Proliferation

0.5

Nonbinding
Agreements

Re-proliferation
capabilities

0.75

These
agreements
moderately
increase
proliferation prevention by enticing states to join,
giving them a future opt-out ability. It is not strong
because states can join, refrain from withdrawing,
and still pursue nuclear weapons (see Libya and
Iraq, for example)
This relationship is strong because states can enter
agreements to disarm, withdraw, and re-proliferate
under legal frameworks. This node is not a part of
Problem 2 and is only included along the edges
because it exposes overlap between Problems 1
and 2.

By helping to facilitate bilateral technology
transfers, the IAEA can oversee nuclear programs
to ensure the technology is only being used for
peaceful purposes.
See above.
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6.4 Problem 2: Why?

Problem 2 Motivation and Feedback Analysis
The first thing that becomes immediately obvious is a triadic closure between the Nuclear
Security, Stories that Sell, and Prevent Proliferation nodes. That is, as Prevent Proliferation
increases, Nuclear Security increases. As Nuclear Security Increases, Stories that Sell increase
(the IAEA makes a press release). Finally, as Stories that Sell increase, Prevent Proliferation
increases (would-be cheaters are—to some degree, however large or small—deterred).
Therefore, a new causal moderate link between Stories that Sell (sender) and Prevent
Proliferation (receiver) is included.
The second change is feedback loops between Equality and Promote Peaceful Nuclear
Programs, as well as Equality and Prevent Proliferation. While taken together, these concepts
make up the IAEA’s goal of Nuclear Security, each independently and moderately affects the
NPT states’ goal of equality and vice versa. As states become more equal, states have better
access to peaceful nuclear technology, and as access increases, equality increases. Likewise,
equality increases the likelihood that proliferation will be prevented, and increased proliferation
prevention increases equality.
These changes are reflected in the updated FCM.
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Table 6.11: Problem 2 Why Qualitative Link Justification
Sender
Component
Stories that Sell

Receiver
Component
Prevent
Proliferation

Link Reasoning

Equality

Promote
Peaceful
Nuclear
Programs

0.5

Promote
Peaceful
Nuclear
Programs
Prevent
Proliferation

Equality

0.5

This relationship is moderate. NPT states can decide
whether or not to seek peaceful nuclear programs.

Equality

0.5

See above.

Equality

Prevent
Proliferation

0.5

This relationship is moderate. Generally, NPT states
will not withdraw from the NPT or clandestinely seek
nuclear weapons; however, NPT states cannot
prevent others from withdrawing or seeking weapons.

Figure 6.5: Problem 2 FCM Why

0.5

The media can report to different audiences the
findings of the IAEA, which helps deter states from
proliferation. It does not graduate to strong because
states can decide the cost of detection does not
outweigh the gains of cheating.
This relationship is moderate. NPT states can decide
whether or not to seek peaceful nuclear programs.
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6.5 Problem 2: Where?
As in Problem 1, this section identifies the sources of motivation, power, and knowledge.

Problem 2 Boundary Articulation
Based on further analysis of the problem’s boundary, the following boundary critique is
provided. The IAEA wants nuclear security. This is its motivational source; however, its ultimate
function is to help nuclear weapons states navigate towards an end state where nuclear weapons
are no longer necessary to increase the states’ security (Problem 1) and in keeping with the
provisions under NPT Article VI. Therefore, there is a need to assist all states with their
respective nuclear technology programs, while being mindful of the big picture—disarmament.
The primary stakeholders in this problem have relatively high levels of power—more than
nuclear weapons states would prefer. This is exemplified by the fact that nuclear weapons states
are not simply ignoring the problem. If non-state actors and intergovernmental organizations
were powerless, nuclear weapon states could ignore them. Instead, they acknowledge power
beyond the sovereign state. The IAEA and the NPT states, through mechanisms of their own,
have some ability to get nuclear weapons states to do things they would not otherwise do.
Nuclear weapons states, therefore, appear receptive to at least a limited amount of international
cooperation, even at the cost of some measurable amount of sovereignty.

Problem 2 Context Articulation
Following the same format in Problem 1, the following elements are identified for
Problem 2.
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Table 6.12: Problem 2 Context Articulation
Category
Circumstances

Elements
Requirement
to
comply
with
international agreements
Uncertainty, Anarchy
Need to bring new systems online,
limited budgets
States are not expected to give up
sovereignty
Established processes for verification

Factors
Conditions
Values
Patterns

Table 6.13: Problem 2 Force Field Diagram
Driving
Force

Strength Strength
as-is
oughtto-be
International 0.5
0.75
Agreements

Verification
Processes

0.5

0.75

Problem

Restraining
force

Present
State: Uncertainty
States
operate
under
anarchy
and uncertainty,
which hinders the Anarchy
ability of the
IAEA
to
complete
its
Expectation
mission.
s
of
Idealized State: Sovereignty
Nuclear weapons Safeguards
states and outlier Costs
states should be
willing to work
towards
upholding their
commitments
under
NPT
Article VI in
transparent ways,
but should not be
required to give
up total nuclear
sovereignty

Strength
as-is

Strength
ought-to-be

-0.75

-0.25

-0.5

-0.25

-0.75

-0.25

-0.5

0.5
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Similar to Problem 1, there are several competing elements in this problem. The
circumstances—the requirement to comply with international regulations—and the established
processes for verification work in favor of bringing this problem to solution. On the other hand,
the factors of uncertainty and anarchy, as well as limited budgets, new systems coming online
(which further stretch budgets), and the expectations of sovereignty hinder simple solutions.

Proposed Ought-to-Be Changes
Nuclear-armed states, while presently adding to uncertainty, should exhibit more
transparent behavior with the IAEA so that their nuclear systems can work towards upholding
their commitments to Article VI of the NPT in a publicly verified fashion. This proposal does not
call upon nuclear-armed states to give up nuclear sovereignty; rather, it seeks a decrease in
uncertainty by working with the IAEA in manners similar to member states falling under some
form of comprehensive, rather than voluntary offer, agreements to complement their APs.
Furthermore, outlier states should follow suit (mindful that security concerns are addressed in
Problem 1). All states should likewise work under IAEA guidance and observation under
increased budgets to reduce existing fissile stockpiles and weapons. In short, there should be
multilateral efforts made to adhere to NPT Article VI.
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Table 6.14: Problem 2 Where Qualitative Link Justification
Sender
Component
International
Agreements

Receiver
Component
Promote
Peaceful
Nuclear
Programs

Link Reasoning
0.75

This is a strong relationship because documents like
the NPT and IAEA charter set the stage for peaceful
nuclear program promotion.

International
Agreements

Prevent
Proliferation

0.75

See above.

Verification
Processes

Promote
Peaceful
Nuclear
Programs

0.5

Established processes for verification moderately
increase the promotion of peaceful nuclear programs.

Verification
Processes

Prevent
Proliferation

0.5

See above.

Uncertainty

Promote
Peaceful
Nuclear
Programs

-0.25 This relationship is weak because states can choose to
forego programs.

Uncertainty

Prevent
Proliferation

-0.75 This relationship is strong because states can choose
to proliferate clandestinely.

Anarchy

Promote
Peaceful
Nuclear
Programs

-0.25 This relationship is weak because states can choose to
forego programs.

Anarchy

Prevent
Proliferation

-0.5

This relationship is strong because states can choose
to proliferate clandestinely.

Expectation of Prevent
Sovereignty
Proliferation
Safeguards Cost Promote
Peaceful
Nuclear
Programs

-0.75 Ultimately, sovereignty as a norm means that states
can proliferate as desired.
-0.5 The cost of internal safeguarding might be
prohibitive to smaller states.

Safeguards Cost

-0.5

Prevent
Proliferation

See above.
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Figure 6.6: Problem 2 FCM Where

6.6 Problem 2: How?
This section addresses the means by which the international system can move beyond its
present state to reach its desired state—one with synthesis between stakeholder goals. Recalling
the Cynefin framework’s five domains from Problem 1—known-knowns (simple), knownunknowns (complicated), unknown-knowns (complex), unknown-unknown (chaotic), and
disorder—this section analyses the problem’s Cynefin domain and mechanism.

Problem 2 Cynefin Analysis
Problem 2 appears to consist of order. It rests within the complicated domain and lacks
unknown complexity and chaos. The problem is not, however, simple; like Problem 1 knownunknowns—uncertainty and anarchy—continue to plague the contours of the problem.
Additionally, and also like in Problem 1, these uncertainties make hedging or cheating ongoing
problems. While cheating is more difficult to mitigate, nonbinding agreements turn hedging to

180
the IAEA and NPT’s advantage by providing assurances that states can re-proliferate, given a
dramatic change in disarmed states’ security needs. In any case, stakeholders’ objectives should
apply the appropriate mechanisms, as previously identified—human, abstract, and physical.

Problem 1 Mechanism Analysis
The primary mechanism is information gathering. That is, the IAEA, NPT states, and
nuclear weapons states should have at their disposal the mechanisms necessary for continued
information input. Given the uncertain effects of anarchy on the problem, more information that
might highlight various states’ (especially outlier states’) intentions, particularly predictable or
designed international developments, is necessary before action can be taken. This, like Problem
1, requires continued human and financial capital.
The information gathered, through inspections, open sources, or third party actors, should
be vetted using scientific analysis in a transparent capacity. In other words, robust analysis
should be made public. Therefore, two additional nodes are added: Scientific Analysis and
Transparency (Transparency also exists within Problem 1, adding interaction along both
problems’ edges).
This information is subject to intelligence analyses by various states with interest in
maintaining the non-proliferation regime or the status quo. Furthermore, the IAEA, conducts
acquisition pathway analysis (APA). The APA is a “Structured method used to identity and
analyze all technically plausible paths for a State to acquire nuclear material suitable for use in a
nuclear explosive device”326 (emphasis mine). This analysis does not factor judgments of intent;

326

Jill N. Cooley, “State-Level Concept Information” (presentation, Nuclear Nonproliferation,
Safeguards, and Security in the 21st Century, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, NY, June
2018), slide 25.
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whether or not a state intends to use special nuclear materials for military purposes is outside the
APA’s scope. The APA factors the state’s full nuclear fuel cycle: “existing facilities, quantities
and types of nuclear material, knowledge and expertise, past [research and design], capacity to
develop or import technology and/or expertise, resources,”327 etc. The APA, while not explicitly
modeled, serves as underlying state-level and international analytical tools and help detect
cheating or diversion of special nuclear materials.

Table 6.15: Problem 2 How Qualitative Link Justification
Sender
Component
Transparency

Receiver
Component
Sovereignty

Transparency

Nuclear
Security

Transparency

Outlier States

Transparency

Prevent
Proliferation

Transparency

Uncertainty

-0.5

Scientific
Analysis

Promote
Peaceful
Nuclear

0.75

327

Cooley, slide 25.

Link Reasoning
-0.25 States have interest in being the least transparent as
possible, but the negative relationship is weak
because states choose to be transparent by signing
multilateral agreements with the IAEA.
0.75 Transparency increases nuclear security significantly,
but not perfectly. The more the IAEA knows about
states, the better it can do its job, but states still
practice some level of non-transparency.
-0.25 This differs from Sovereignty, but the relationship is
similarly weak. The transparency norm compels
states to cooperate, but Outlier States can choose
which programs and to what degree they are
transparent.
0.5
Transparency moderately increases proliferation
prevention; however, this does not graduate to strong
because states can choose how transparent they
become without outsiders knowing the difference
between varying degrees of transparency.
Transparency moderately decreases uncertainty. The
more transparent, the less uncertain because
knowledge about states' capabilities and intentions
are revealed.
Science programs increase states’ ability to develop
peaceful programs.
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Programs
Scientific
Analysis

Prevent
Proliferation

0.75

Scientific
Analysis

Uncertainty

-0.5

Scientific analyses strongly increase the IAEA's
ability to detect cheating or diversion. This includes
the APA, special radiation detection devices with
isotope identification, and sampling, among others.
Scientific analyses moderately decrease uncertainty
by revealing knowledge.

Figure 6.7: Problem 2 FCM How

6.7 Problem 2: When?
Recalling the inequality from the previous chapter max

!"#"$%&
!"#$

≥ 1, this section seeks

to assess when and if intervention is necessary. Again, what is the actual cost of intervening,
compared to the benefit of intervening? In the system constructed for Problem 2, can the cost of
finding a synthesis between actors seeking sovereignty maximizing and actors seeking more
nuclear security be justified given the potential payout?
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Given high participation among states with the IAEA, it is unlikely that international
verification regimes will be replaced with something else in the near term. Furthermore, it is
unlikely the system of sovereign states will disappear. Finally, given the structure of the problem
and high participation, even among nuclear-armed states, it is feasible that there exists a solution
that is mutually beneficial. On the other hand, Outlier States pose an enormous hurdle, and
finding synthesis with this group will require a large amount of resources. Therefore, the
inequality might not be satisfied.
A final note before simulation: in Problem 1 the timescale was non-defined. In Problem 2
a single iteration represents a calendar year because the IAEA releases its country reports yearly.
Therefore, each tick should represent a year, which provides a baseline of understanding. The
IAEA releases a report, which triggers the flow of information through the problem. Another
way to think about time—which is not included in this model—is as a discrete event simulation.
What would happen if a member state withdrew from the IAEA Charter? This would certainly
weaken the IAEA’s ability to function and influence the problem’s outcome.

Table 6.16: Problem 2 Popularity, Activity, and Feasibility328
Concept

Activity

Popularity

Equality
Nuclear Security
Transparency
Promote Peaceful
Nuclear Programs
Oversight
Stories that Sell

4.949747
3.872983
3.354102
3.316625
2.738613
2.738613
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3.354102
6.324555
0
9.721111

Engagement
Priority
1
2
3
4

Change
Feasible?
N
Y
Y
Y

2.645751
3.708099

5
6

Y
N

Recall that popularity is a measure of links going into the concept in descending order,
activity is a measure of links coming from a concept in descending order, and measuring the
activity rank in ascending order and popularity rank in descending order sets the engagement
priority.
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Scientific Analysis
Prevent
Proliferation
Sovereignty
International
Agreements
Nonbinding
Agreements
Verification
Processes
Safeguards Costs
Uncertainty
Anarchy
Outlier States
Safety Checks
Expectation
of
Sovereignty
R&D
Provide Materials
Provide Services
Provide Equipment
Provide Facilities
Scientific Training
Technical Training
Bilateral
Agreements
Multilateral
Agreements
Control
Supervision
The Environment
Maximize Profits
Re-proliferation
Capabilities

2.44949
2.44949

0
12.32883

7
8

Y
N

2.236068
1.732051

2.738613
0

9
10

Y
N

1.581139

0

11

Y

1.581139

0

12

Y

1.414214
1.414214
1.224745
1
0.866025
0.866025

0
1.414214
0
3.162278
0
0

13
14
15
16
17
18

Y
N
N
N
Y
N

0.707107
0.707107
0.707107
0.707107
0.707107
0.707107
0.707107
0.707107

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N

0.707107

0

27

N

0.707107
0.707107
0
0
0

0
0
0.707107
0.866025
0.866025

28
29
30
31
32

Y
Y
N
N
Y

Running the simulation by pegging sovereignty to 1 and setting an initial increase in
nuclear security to its maximum 1, selecting the sigmoid transfer function with λ set at 5, and
running the simulation for 50 iterations, it becomes clear that by the tenth year (considering all

185
else remains constant and no major international changes occur), most stakeholders end up better
than before. In this simulation, sovereignty is maximized. No state has lost its ability to function
independently of other states or intergovernmental bodies. The initial maximization of nuclear
security simulates a significant cooperative event, such as the P5 signing the CSA and
maintaining the AP, placing ongoing disarmament programs under the verification purview of
the international community. This does not imply that the P5 are dismantling nuclear warheads
universally, but rather they accept that nuclear transparency is necessary to beget international
nuclear transparency.
Under this regime, nuclear weapons states, NPT states, NGOs, and Production Firms
benefit. On the other hand two outcomes call into question this kind of approach to Problem 2.
First, uncertainty and anarchy remain unmoved. The constraining forces in international politics
have not sufficiently been mitigated. Second, and most importantly, under this universal regime
the Outlier States’ prestige is minimized to the maximum degree. States like the DPRK and
Pakistan no longer receive the respect they get under the status quo. Particularly the DPRK,
which is small and insignificant, relative to the major powers, both in terms of military and
economic power, might be forgotten about under this outcome. Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume that Outlier States would choose to simply ignore any such agreements, which means
this is not a feasible solution, given the structure of Problem 2 alone. That stated, the scenario is
stable and complicated.
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Figure 6.8: Problem 2 Stability Analysis: International Verification

At timestamp 0 Sovereignty is clamped at 1, while Nuclear Security has an initial value
of 1. The weight of Sovereignty by timestamp 1, however, shows a significant but short-lived
decrease of Nuclear Security, while other stakeholders, except Outlier States, experience
tremendous benefit. Outlier States reach a permanent maximum decrease by timestamp 1.
At timestamp 2 Nuclear Security is again increased to the max, while Oversight, Stories
that Sell, and Equality decrease. The IAEA’s missions to Promote Peaceful Nuclear Programs
and Prevent Proliferation experience a maximum increase.
Timestamp 2 indicates that the IAEA and its Board of Governors is acting as a final
authority over all things nuclear. NGOs/Activists, the Media, and the NPT States play a lesser
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role. For NGOs and Activists, their roles have simply been usurped by the IAEA. For the Media,
it becomes difficult to sell stories if the Board of Governors’ reports are predictable. NPT States
face the largest loss because Equality is strongly undermined by the IAEA’s role. However, by
timestamp 3 there is a dramatic turn for NGOs/Activists and NPT States.
The aforementioned increase in the IAEA’s missions (Promote Peaceful Nuclear
Programs and Prevent Proliferation) increase NGOs/Activists’ Oversight and NPT States’
Equality. While the simulation does not explain why NGOs/Activists receive their reward at
timestamp 3, it might be due to having increased access to regimes’ nuclear programs through
increased transparency. NPT States benefit from increasing their access to nuclear power, which
makes them more equal to the rest of the world. The Media, at this timestamp remains
diminished. This timestamp also sees a dramatic decrease in the IAEA’s mission to Prevent
Proliferation. This is likely due to combination of timestamp 2’s increase in Promote Peaceful
Nuclear Programs and timestamp 1 and 2’s decrease in Outlier States. In regards to the latter, we
can imagine the DPRK ramping up their nuclear weapons program to deter its destruction by
force. Finally, in timestamp 3 Production Firms’ profits are maximized, as anarchy under a nonnuclear world require substantial efforts to maintain the BOP with conventional forces.329
By timestamp 4 Nuclear Security declines due to movements made by the Outlier States
in timestamp 3, as well as the reduction in Prevent Proliferation. On the other hand,
NGOs/Activists and NPT States continue to benefit, while the Media dramatically increases its
ability to sell stories, due to Outlier States’ behavior and failures to Prevent Proliferation in
timestamp 3. Prevent Proliferation rebounds slightly by the end of timestamp 4. Profits continue
to be maximized, and Promote Peaceful Nuclear Programs still performs marginally.
329

In Chapter 8 I discuss why balancing with conventional forces is not the only way to maintain
the BOP without nuclear weapons.
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In timestamp 5 the IAEA’s Nuclear Security and its mission rebound completely, while
NPT States, NGOs/Activists, and the Media continue performing well. Production Firms’ profits
slow but are still climbing.
By timestamp 6 equilibrium is reached. All stakeholder goals are maximized, with the
exception of Outlier States.
The above scenario is a Type IV error. Hypothetically assuming the international
community adopts this solution, the Outlier States will simply hold onto their nuclear weapons.
And if the P5 disarms, that will significantly shift the balance of power into the hands of states
with relatively weak political bodies (with a probable exception of Israel). This might result in
civil wars or territorial expansions. Needless to say, however, this hypothetical outcome is
beyond the realm of possibilities simply because the solution is extraordinarily improbable
without future developments that bring the Outlier States into the mainstream.330
Therefore, it is necessary again to remind the reader that the preceding simulation is not a
solution to the mess. The simulation is merely to determine system stability and to expose
chaotic elements that would require more structuring or restructuring. The obvious Type IV error
might disappear when Problems 1 and 2 are merged, but alone it is not a solution.

330

If this model is accurate, it might therefore be reasonable to conclude that US President
George W. Bush’s policy that legitimized nuclear trade deals with India simplified this problem
by recognizing India’s prestige in the international community, thereby mitigating its contrast
with the P5 states.
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Table 6.17: Problem 2 Stability Analysis End States331
Component

End
State
1
1
0.999993
0.998894
1
-1
0.998894
Nuclear 0.999909

Sovereignty
Nuclear Security
Oversight
Stories that Sell
Equality
Outlier States
Maximize Profits
Promote Peaceful
Programs
Prevent Proliferation
R&D
Provide Materials
Provide Services
Provide Equipment
Provide Facilities
Scientific Training
Technical Training
Bilateral Agreements
Multilateral Agreements
Control
Supervision
Safety Checks
Nonbinding Agreements
International Agreements
Verification Processes
Uncertainty
Anarchy
Expectation of Sovereignty
Safeguards Costs
Re-proliferation Capabilities
Transparency

331

0.999909
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Recall that a change of +1 means a maximum increase, -1 means a maximum decrease, and 0
means the status quo.
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6.8 Summary
This chapter uses fuzzy cognitive mapping to confront the challenges preventing
synthesis between cooperation and sovereignty. It first identifies stakeholders and their goals and
how those goals interact with other stakeholder goals. It then abstracts the IAEA’s goal, as the
prioritized stakeholder and finds the IAEA’s ultimate goal is nuclear security. Applying the
boundaries, constraints, and mechanisms to the problem, this model then determines interaction
is possible and that the system is stable.
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CHAPTER 7
THE MESS

7.1 The Messy Nuclear Landscape
The “messy” nuclear landscape contains several familiar aspects of international being—
disagreements, varying degrees of power, costs, benefits, and problems with solutions thus far
beyond the reach of practitioners—but at the center of the “messy” nuclear landscape is
something wholly unique in international politics. The entire “mess” has built itself, through
ever-evolving layers of complexity, around a bizarre development of technology not found
elsewhere in the world (outside of science fiction novels and movies). That is, there exists a
technology capable of curing diseases, sterilizing biological contaminants, and providing power
to the entire world population at a cost far below the average, but this same technology can also
cause the extinction of most earthly life.
Compounding this already complex problem is the unholy realization that in dyadic and
equal relationships, simply possessing nuclear weapons simplifies the world around us. If war is
not an option, other, less-malignant bilateral behavior is less unlikely.
Under the veil of ignorance,332 one might be forgiven for choosing a world without
nuclear technologies. They might rationalize that the costs of nuclear war are so high that the
costs of war are relatively acceptable in a world without MAD and the risk of escalation. Indeed,
Chapter 2 attempts to make this connection. They might further rationalize, therefore, that nonproliferation is a norm that must be upheld at any cost. Under these caveats, a lucky chooser
might choose a world where every state—or at least almost every state—has nuclear weapons
332

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1971).
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and a second strike capability, while counting on the threat of guaranteed retaliation and certain
death to maintain universal good nuclear stewardship.
The reality of the present system of states under anarchy is that practitioners do not get to
choose the world they inherit, but they can make changes to the way things are. And given the
choice between doing something for the good of humanity or not if given the opportunity, most
practitioners will choose to go the moral route—on a long enough timeline.333 Some of these
changes might be radical, like the banning of slavery or the reunification of Germany, and others
might happen sluggishly, so slowly that society never notice its passing. American pistol duels
come to mind, where, although outlawed by many states by the 19th century, they continued
occurring into the 20th century. No one noticed the day pistol duels met a timely demise, but,
given today’s standards, it is an unthinkable way to settle scores.
The point is that significant changes occur, despite seemingly structural forces
maintaining the status quo, and often, as Müller points out, these changes occur through a social
process.334 It would be foolish to assert without evidence that nuclear weapons programs are
beyond the reach of change. And whether they inhabit the world out of necessity or habit, their
existence poses fair questions. If these questions were truly unsolvable, then no one would be
having these discussions. But the reality is that dismantling a nuclear weapon is easy. Finding a
world where dismantling all nuclear weapons is not unthinkable; achieving it is merely
sufficiently difficult.
In the previous two chapters, two problems barred the path to global zero. First, nuclear
weapon states are resistant to giving up nuclear weapons, despite agreements to disarm,
according to Article VI of the NPT. This resistance comes despite significant international
333
334

Pinker, see esp. chap. 1.
Müller, 69-70.
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pressure to disarm. International pressure is a moral imperative, even if disguised as issues of
equality or cost. Second, the role that the IAEA plays in ensuring states are using their nuclear
programs safely and refraining from weaponizing fissile materials is contrasted by an unfortunate
effect of sovereignty. That is, despite signatures on international agreements, no state can be
compelled into compliance without ultimately going to war. States have vested interest in
protecting certain information. The largest thing working towards synthesizing this problem is
the fact that the majority of the world believes that IAEA cooperation stabilizes the world. But
this is wholly offset by the fact that it only takes one nuclear-armed state that wishes to disregard
the rules to undermine the whole thing—and there are several of them.
These two problems do not exist independent from one another. They share measurable
levels of overlap, and solving one without regard to the other runs the risk of committing the
Type IV error, where the disregarded problem is exasperated. Therefore, synthesis and solution
is not problem-specific. It requires synthesis on two fronts, while special attention must be given
to the interactions between the problems. Therefore, in order to analyze the mess—both
problems at once—a meta-perspective must be developed. This is shown in Figure 7.1.

The Nuclear “Mess”
Figure 7.1, or the “mess,” appears to be too complicated to understand, but, if one
followed along with the building of Problems 1 and 2 in the previous chapters, one can see that it
looks somewhat familiar. Problem 1 inhabits the top fifty percent of the mess. Problem 2 sits
below (nodes that exist in both problems only appear in the top part of the mess). Between them
are various points of overlap. As one can see, there is a significant similarity between the two.
The media has identical goals between both problems, meaning it is more active than most
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stakeholders. This biases the media in measuring engagement priority. One could take note of
this and run a simulation where the media’s goal is permanently maximized, but this is an
unfeasible change. In order to make the media the happiest, unfortunate events would need to
occur on a regular basis.

Figure 7.1: The Mess
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Figure 7.2: Updated Mess

What also becomes apparent is that some nodal relationships exist but are not represented
in the mess. This is due to insufficient information while modeling problems individually.
Therefore, careful consideration must be given to potential hidden movements, and these links
must be identified. In other words, the “mess” requires restructuring. For example, there is a
feedback loop between the risk of nuclear terrorism and human error with the prevention of
proliferation. That is, the risk of nuclear terrorism or human error increases resources devoted to
proliferation prevention. Additionally, preventing proliferation decreases the threat of nuclear
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terror or human error. These points of overlap and mess-level refinement are identified in Table
7.1.

Table 7.1: Updates to Mess Link Justifications
Sender
Component
Risk of Nuclear
Terrorism and
Human Error
Promote
Peaceful
Nuclear
Programs
Attraction

Receiver
Link Reasoning
Component
Promote
0.5
The risk of nuclear terror or human error increases
Peaceful Nuclear
attention paid and resources allocated to the
Programs
promotion of peaceful nuclear programs.
Risk of Nuclear -0.75 The promotion of peaceful nuclear programs
Terrorism and
reduces the risk of nuclear terror or human error by
Human Error
placing materials under safeguards.
Outlier
Prestige

States: 0.75

Soft power strongly increases prestige, but it is not
a perfect relationship because it is not within the
practitioner's control.

Recalling Hester and Adams’ TAO approach, further modeling often requires
restructuring. With that end in mind, the “nuclear weapons” node can now be modeled more
centrally. Therefore, moving forward nuclear weapons’ involvement in the model is reconsidered
to determine how they interact with other components, and how the problems will change if
nuclear weapons are removed from the system. If removing nuclear weapons has no ill effect on
the problems, then it would be reasonable to conclude that disarmament is feasible in the long
term and would not cause a Type IV error.
As mentioned previously, Richardson’s arms race model is incapable of being reworked
back to zero, particularly because 1) states cannot possess less than one weapon if the other side
possesses more than zero weapons, and 2) the cost of being the second-to-last state to disarm is
high. Diminishing weapons redundant beyond deterrence is simple when the stockpile is large.
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The INF treaty can be viewed as simple posturing when both the US and the Soviet Union knew
that total abolition was not within the set of possible end states. Dismantling 1,000 weapons is
simple if one has 10,000 in deployment. Dismantling 100 is significantly more difficult if one
has 1,000 warheads. The cost rises exponentially as each end line is passed. Terminus appears
endlessly beyond reach.
There is future work in this field, to be certain. The next mathematician might discover a
psychological delta that can compel reductions from ten redundancies to zero. Or perhaps there
is natural random variation, or the trembling of an actor’s hand, that enacts the abolition play
when least expected. But that is not the point of this research.
This research seeks to explore disarmament-ready end states. To find synthesis between
realists, on the one hand, and abolitionist moral crusaders, on the other, is already a heavy burden
to carry, and it is the narrow scope of this research. Modeling the political mine field, where
nuclear options shrink with each step, is not within this research’s scope. Therefore, to save
needless debate about what disarmament would look like, the best course of action is to examine
pre- and post-disarmament scenarios. Is a disarmed world preferable to a world where some
actors have nuclear weapons? If the scope of this research is not satisfying, Perkovich and Acton,
among others, have already performed some of the legwork to analyze what happens when
nuclear stockpiles diminish.335 For the sake of completion, a brief summary is necessary.
Perkovich and Acton argue the problem with reducing redundant weapons is really a trust
problem. How much verification is necessary to displace distrust? This pits technical
considerations against political concerns, with significant overlap between the two. They call

335
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these “political-technical” challenges.336 On the one hand, nuclear weapons states would require
significant verification capability to allay concerns. They do not argue that perfect verification is
necessary,337 but rather, there needs to be a universally acceptable threshold for confidence. On
the other hand, the risk of breakout nuclear weapons programs in a disarmed world requires the
political will to enforce maintenance of a universal nonproliferation regime.338 This necessitates
verification of declared systems, detection of diverted or clandestinely hidden warheads, and the
utilization of intelligence agencies to help ensure compliance.
Verifying declared warheads, components, and facilities takes on processes similar to
existing IAEA inspections—random sampling of containers holding warheads queued for
destruction, tamper-resistant seals, continued monitoring of destruction facilities, comparisons of
radioactive spectrums, among others.339 Accounting for potential hidden weapons requires
accurate auditing with statistical analysis to reconcile past production with current holdings
(which, they point out, would already be being undertaken in the verification of declared
materials), nuclear archeology to reconstruct plutonium production levels in graphite-moderated
reactors, and challenge inspections when the verification body has legitimate concerns that a
state is conducting illicit nuclear activities, while the inspected state retains the right to access
management.340 This also resembles IAEA complementary accesses under the AP. Intelligence
agencies are useful compliance verification tools because, as Richard L. Garwin points out, states
engaged in clandestine nuclear activities must engage in certain telltale behaviors, such as
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informing certain personnel about clandestine nuclear weapons programs in confidence, building
certain security and surveillance facilities, and transporting components in the open.341
Once states can overcome these challenges with a high level of confidence, political will
to offer transparency in good faith becomes simpler. Perkovich and Acton use the South Africa
model to show how strong verification tools from the international community mixed with high
levels of state transparency can increase international confidence that a state has completely
disarmed and not retained significant quantities of nuclear materials.342 In other words, getting to
zero is not unthinkable; one state has already forged the path.343
Michael E. O’Hanlon also explores the means by which redundant nuclear stockpiles can
be reduced to zero. His more conservative approach mimics Perkovich and Acton’s conclusion
(identified in Problem 1344) that the solution is not to permanently abolish states’ rights to
nuclear proliferation, but rather, to dismantle nuclear weapons.345 In other words, O’Hanlon
makes clear that policymakers should strive towards a world where nuclear weapons, their
components, and ready-to-use fissile materials do not exist, while keeping in mind that no
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Richard L. Garwin, “Technologies and procedures for verifying warhead status and
disarmament,” in Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials: The Political and
Technical Dimensions, ed. Nicholas Zarimpas (Solna, Sweden: Oxford University Press, 2003),
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Perkovich and Acton, 61-62.
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On the other hand, a reasonable argument is the reduction of serious security concerns made
South Africa’s disarmament possible—for example, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to
significant threat reductions from Marxist revolutionaries fighting along the Northern border; the
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international accord, particularly one seeking to ban an entire class of weapons, should or can be
permanently binding. His reasoning follows Graham Allison’s. That is, states might need to
periodically reconstitute nuclear weapons to contain threats and provide credible deterrence.
Why is deterrence necessary? In a world where the rising power often militarily challenges the
declining power, “[States] must think the unthinkable to credibly deter potential
adversaries…”346 That is, as will be discussed in the next chapter, periodic re-armament might
prevent tense situations from spiraling out of control. Threats to proliferate or threats of
proliferation signal possible willingness to use nuclear weapons, preserving deterrence.
O’Hanlon is skeptical that any country would agree to dismantle their bombs without a
significant portion of a future treaty discussing how the treaty can be temporarily suspended
under certain conditions.347 O’Hanlon would probably call for language similar to, but more
robust than, the NPT’s Article X, which allows for withdraw if remaining party to the treaty
severely jeopardizes states’ interests.
Under O’Hanlon’s model, disarmament requires three steps. First, international disputes,
such as questions over Kashmir, sea beds off the coast of China and Japan, and security alliances
between the US and former Soviet states or satellites must be resolved. O’Hanlon does not call
for a utopian end state before negotiations can begin, but rather that the list of ongoing
international disputes be limited. Second, once many of these (and any intervening) issues are
resolved, an accord can be drafted that requires all nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissile
materials be destroyed under IAEA-like mechanisms, and states are provided re-proliferation
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capabilities.348 O’Hanlon furthermore argues re-proliferation capabilities must be in short order.
Perkovich and Acton call this “virtual nuclear arsenals” and peg the re-proliferation capability in
weeks, or possible months.349
In neither of these models do the authors tackle the large question—how do states’ calculi
change as warhead numbers decline? O’Hanlon avoids this problem and proposes a reduction in
US-Russian forces to 1,000 while preserving second-strike, land, sea, and air capability350 and
stops there (for now). The answer is not simple, and whatever the answer is must violate the
arms race model. To reiterate a previous objective: This model does not answer that question.
Rather, it seeks to determine what a post-disarmament world would look like, given that certain
changes are made.
Therefore, how do nuclear weapons (and conventional weapons) more broadly and
directly impact the mess’ components?351 Moving nuclear and conventional weapons from
tertiary components in the model to driving forces requires some contextual understanding.

Table 7.2: Updates to Mess with Nuclear/Conventional Weapons Link Justifications
Sender
Component

Receiver
Component

Link Reasoning

Nuclear
Weapons
Nuclear
Weapons

NGOs:
Abolition
Stories that Sell

-1

Nuclear
Weapons
348

Non-state actors have no control over whether or
not a state possesses nuclear weapons.
0.5
The media can sell stories about proliferation, but
they can also sell stories about non-proliferation
and disarmament.
NPT
States: -0.75 Ultimately, NPT states cannot compel
Abolition
disarmament, but they have some measurable

O’Hanlon, Kindle locations 1036, 1040, and 1080.
Perkovich and Acton, 101, 102, and 104.
350
O’Hanlon, Kindle location 1261.
351
Prior to this point in the model, the “Nuclear Weapons” and “Conventional Weapons” nodes
fed the problems but were not affected by the problems. At this point, I examine both how they
affect the “mess” and are affected by the “mess.”
349
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power remaining.
Nuclear
Weapons
Nuclear
Weapons
Nuclear
Weapons
Nuclear
Weapons
Nuclear
Weapons
Nuclear
Weapons
Nuclear
Weapons

NWS: Security
Maximize
Profits

Religious
Leaders:
Abolition
Military
Capability
Avoid Threats

-1

Non-state actors have no control over whether or
not a state possesses nuclear weapons.

1

Risk of Nuclear
Terrorism and
Human Error
Outlier States:
Prestige
Promote
Peaceful
Nuclear
Programs
Prevent
Proliferation

1

Nuclear weapons very strongly increase military
capability.
Proliferating or possessing nuclear weapons can
be very threatening.
The existence of nuclear weapons defines this
risk.

Nuclear
Weapons
Nuclear
Weapons

Int’l
Verification:
Abolition
NPT
States:
Abolition

Nuclear
Weapons

Avoid Threats

Nuclear
Weapons
Nuclear
Weapons
Nuclear
Weapons
Nuclear
Weapons

Transparency
Attraction
Conflict

Nuclear
Weapons

-1

0.75

Outlier States use nuclear weapons to bolster
their prestige.
-0.75 This relationship is strong because peaceful
nuclear programs can be used to proliferate,
especially if the state withdraws from the NPT.
-0.75 If one state has nuclear weapons, it reduces the
success of nonproliferation. This relationship is
crucial because under the status quo, nuclear
weapons exist. This relationship is therefore by
design.
1
Nuclear weapons states decision to proliferate
defines the existence of nuclear weapons.
0.25 This relationship exists because Production Firms
can submit designs for new weapons, but it is
weak because the ultimate authority comes from
NWS.
-0.75 The IAEA plays a large role in the prevention of
nuclear weapon proliferation; however, their role
in convincing NWS to disarm is less pronounced
-0.5 NPT States define abstention from nuclear
weapon possession; however, this relationship is
moderate because the NPT State can withdraw
and proliferate if it chooses.
-0.5 Avoiding threats means abstaining from
proliferation.
-0.5 Being transparent shines lights on nuclear
weapons programs.
-0.25 Soft power through non-nuclear weapons states
makes nuclear weapons less attractive.
0.5
Conflict increases the likelihood that a state will
proliferate, but proliferation is rare, so the link is
moderate for now.
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Re-Proliferation
Capabilities
Safeguards
Improvements
Outlier States:
Prestige
NWS: Security

Nuclear
Weapons
Nuclear
Weapons
Nuclear
Weapons
Conventional
Weapons

Maximize
Profits

Conventional
Weapons

Defense

Conventional
Weapons
Conventional
Weapons

Conflict

1

Re-Proliferation Capabilities means nuclear
weapons are possible by definition.
-0.75 Improvements to safeguards significantly lower
possible proliferations.
0.5
This is moderate because prestige can be
obtained through other means.
1
This link is strong because nuclear weapons
states tend to spend significantly on their
conventional capabilities.
0.25 This relationship exists because Production Firms
can submit designs for new weapons, but it is
weak because the ultimate authority comes from
the state.
0.5
Defense relies partly on conventional weapons.
0.75

Increased conflict is going to increase the
demand for conventional weapons greatly.
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Figure 7.3: The Mess and Nuclear Weapons

7.3 Modeling Nuclear Disarmament
Figure 7.3 shows the updated FCM with nuclear and conventional weapons inhabiting
space in the center of the model and highlighted in yellow. The figure also shows directional
relationships. Of particular note is that nuclear weapons do not directly influence nuclear
weapons states’ security, due to its preexisting influence on military capability, which influences
defense, and which in turn influences security. This indirect relationship was previously
identified in Problem 1 when the fundamental objectives hierarchy and means ends network
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updated nuclear weapons states’ objective from maintaining nuclear weapons to maximizing its
security.
Additionally, the nuclear weapons node, as illustrated in Figure 7.3, is now the dominant
node, with the highest engagement priority. It also becomes apparent that the “nuclear weapons”
node interacts much more with Problem 1 than Problem 2. In other words, nuclear weapons are
more likely to influence the security problem than the cooperation problem. To determine how
nuclear weapons affect the outcome of the mess, emphasis should be placed on components from
Problem 2.

Table 7.3: Mess Popularity, Activity, and Feasibility352
Concept

Activity

Nuclear
Weapons
Stories that
Sell
NWS: Security

9.21954
4457
8.77496
4387
6.63324
9581
6.16441
4003
5.12347
5383
4.89897
9486
4.74341
649

NPT States:
Abolition
Transparency
Safeguards
Improvements
Int'l
Verification:
Abolition
International
Agreements
Int'l
352

4.33012
7019
4.18330

Popularity

Engagement
Priority
8.4557672 1
63
11.618950 2
04
4.7696960 3
07
9.3674969 4
98
1.5811388 5
3
0
6

Feasible
Change?
Y

8.1240384 7
05

Y

1.4142135 8
62
6.3245553 9

Y

N
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y

Recall that popularity is a measure of links going into the concept in descending order,
activity is a measure of links coming from a concept in descending order, and measuring the
activity rank in ascending order and popularity rank in descending order sets the engagement
priority.
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Verification
Agencies:
Nuclear
Security
Uncertainty
NPT States:
Equality
Anarchy
Conflict
Cooperation
Attraction
ReProliferation
Capabilities
NGOs:
Abolition
Prevent
Proliferation
Diplomacy
Military
Capability
NGOs:
Oversight
Religious
Leaders:
Abolition
Promote
Peaceful
Nuclear
Programs
Scientific
Analysis
Avoid Threats
NWS:
Sovereignty
Behavioral
Norms
Outlier States:
Prestige
Nonbinding

0133

2

3.53553
3906
3.53553
3906
3.16227
766
3.16227
766
3.16227
766
3.16227
766
3.16227
766

3

10

N

3.3541019 11
66
0
12

N

0

13

N

0.7071067 14
81
0.8660254 15
04
0.8660254 16
04

Y

3.16227
766
3.16227
766
3
2.73861
2788
2.73861
2788
2.64575
1311

4.7434164
9
13.910427
74
0
2

17

Y

18

Y

19
20

Y
Y

2.6457513 21
11
4.7434164 22
9

Y

2.59807
6211

10.606601 23
72

Y

2.44948
9743
2.44948
9743
2.23606
7977
2.12132
0344
1.73205
0808
1.58113

0

24

Y

1

25

Y

2.7386127
88
0.7071067
81
4.9497474
68
0

26

N

27

N

28

Y

29

Y

N

N
Y

Y
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Agreements
Verification
Processes
Defense
Reputation
Safeguards
Costs
Risk of
Nuclear
Terrorism and
Human Error
Conventional
Weapons
Maximize
Profits
Proper
Response
Safety Checks
Expectation of
Sovereignty
ROI Gains
International
Investments
R&D
Provide
Materials
Provide
Services
Provide
Equipment
Provide
Facilities
Scientific
Training
Technical
Training
Bilateral
Agreements
Multilateral
Agreements
Control

883
1.58113
883
1.58113
883
1.58113
883
1.41421
3562
1.22474
4871

30

Y

7.9529868 31
6
8.4557672 32
63
0
33

Y

2.5980762 34
11

N

1

1

35

Y

1

2.7386127 36
88
0
37

N

0

38

Y

0

39

N

0

40

Y

0

41

Y

0

42

Y

0

43

Y

0

44

Y

0

45

Y

0

46

Y

0

47

Y

0

48

Y

0

49

Y

0

50

Y

0

51

Y

0.86602
5404
0.86602
5404
0.86602
5404
0.70710
6781
0.70710
6781
0.70710
6781
0.70710
6781
0.70710
6781
0.70710
6781
0.70710
6781
0.70710
6781
0.70710
6781
0.70710
6781
0.70710
6781
0.70710

0

N
Y

Y
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Supervision
Self-Restraint
Conformity
Proper
Treatment of
Citizens

6781
0.70710
6781
0.70710
6781
0.70710
6781
0.5

0

52

Y

0.7071067 53
81
0.7071067 54
81
0.7071067 55
81

Y
Y
Y

There are several feasible concepts that can be changed. However, there are certain
constraints on what will be tested. First, remembering that the new world must resemble the old
world in terms of sovereignty and that realist assumptions about world order still apply,
scenarios will not be run that give NGOs (for example) a preponderance of power, despite NGOs
being relatively high on the engagement priority. Instead, non-state actor groups and
intergovernmental organizations will be assessed more than changed. For the purpose of
handling the mess, the state is the referent object, particularly the nuclear weapon state. If the
state does not benefit then the state is not expected to participate in the discussion. Therefore,
several scenarios will be run that focus on the state. Note: To save space, the End State reports
will only include components that exhibit change, with the exception of sovereignty, where
applicable. Concepts that remain at zero will be excluded from discussion unless there is reason
to include them.
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Table 7.4: Mess Scenario Exploration
Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Summary
• NPT states Abolition set initially
to 1, simulating universal
acceptance of NPT
• Nuclear weapons node clamped
to -1 to simulate disarmament
• NPT states Abolition set initially
to 1
• Sovereignty clamped to 0
(compelling no change in
sovereignty)
• Nuclear weapons node is
clamped to -1
•
•

Scenario 4

•
•
•

Scenario 5

•
•

•
•

Security is maximized
clamping security to 1
Nuclear weapons node
clamped to -1

Performance
Stable and Complicated. NWS’ goals
in both problems greatly reduced.
Several key stakeholders are unhappy.
Multiple error types possible.
Stable and Complicated. Multiple key
stakeholders suffer greatly diminished
goals. IAEA and NPT states are happy

Potential Type IV error: NWS and
Outlier States simply refuse to disarm,
opting instead to continue to balance.
Furthermore, this diminishes trust in
future treaties
by Stable and Complicated. This solves
Problem 1, but maintenance requires
is NWS to give up substantial amounts
of sovereignty

Potential Type IV error: This strongly
suggests future security dilemmas and
potential militarized international
disputes
Periodic and Complex. There is no end
Sovereignty is clamped to 0
International verification has an state that reaches equilibrium
initial setting of 1
Nuclear weapons node is This requires further interaction with
the problem
clamped to -1
Stable and Complicated. Solves both
Sovereignty is clamped to 0
Cooperation initially set to 1, problems.
denoting the successful signing
Potential Type IV errors: Neither
of a disarmament treaty
Outlier States’ prestige is anarchy nor uncertainty are reduced.
Therefore, if disarmed under this
clamped to 0.25
potential
clandestine
Nuclear weapons node is framework,
defection
can
occur,
shifting
the BOP.
clamped to -1
Additionally, this might signal to lesspowerful states that proliferating and
then agreeing to disarmament can be
rewarding. Finally, a “security period
of vulnerability” is identified.

210

In Scenario 1 the NPT states are prioritized. Their goal to maximize total adherence to
NPT Article VI means the nuclear weapons states take their Article VI responsibility seriously
enough that nuclear weapons states can disarm. There is no expectation that nuclear weapons
states will enthusiastically accept this scenario’s outcome; however, it is reasonable to test if
only to exclude this solution from future negotiations. This scenario is sparse and should
exemplify the need to include solutions that benefit across stakeholder types.
In Scenario 2, therefore, NPT States are given an initial setting of maximized adherence
to the abolition provision in the NPT’s Article VI. In other words, the nuclear weapons states
have sat down and agreed to take significant steps towards abolition; however, this agreement is
not yet legally binding. They have agreed merely to start working towards their commitments—
gradual disarmament that is subject to the whims of international order or disorder. In order to
satisfy nuclear weapons states that their sovereign goals outside of nuclear policy are taken
seriously, the nuclear weapons states’ sovereignty node is clamped to its maximum state, which
simulates an agreement that does not affect its sovereign abilities outside of the agreement.
Finally, the nuclear weapons node is clamped to its maximum decrease, simulating the
elimination of nuclear weapons. This scenario is likely to diminish nuclear weapons states’ goal
for maximized security, but the scenario requires exploration to see if there exists a path towards
abolition that naturally increases security.
In Scenario 3 focus shifts to security. What happens if moving forward with a nuclear
abolition accord, nuclear weapons states focused all of their attention on maximizing their
security? This would be somehow compelled disarmament in a realist world. No other
stakeholders matter. That is, security is clamped to its maximum increase and nuclear weapons
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are clamped to their maximum decrease. This scenario is included because it is hypothesized that
it will solve the nuclear weapons states’ first problem, but cause a Type IV error regarding their
second problem—in this contradictory world, the nuclear weapons states would have to yield to
the IAEA through treaty rather than through Müller’s social evolution.
In Scenario 4 sovereignty is again maintained at the present-day status quo. No change
will occur between timestamps. The IAEA’s ability to verify compliance is initially maximized
but subsequently left up to nature (the sigmoid transfer function). Finally, nuclear weapons are
clamped to their maximum decrease. It is hypothesized that without constant IAEA supervision,
states, particularly the nuclear weapons states and the Outlier States will constantly vie for
superiority against the IAEA’s continued need to manage nuclear affairs. In other words, the
nuclear-armed states will likely disallow the IAEA from empowering itself beyond the power
granted it by member states. It is unlikely this solution will solve the problem but is included
because it will demonstrate present day assumptions about disarmament. Compelled
disarmament, regardless of security needs will likely result in fierce debate between states and
international organizations, diminishing the role international organizations play in future
debates, particularly debates over nuclear weapons.
Finally, in Scenario 5 the nuclear weapons states’ need for continued guarantees of
sovereignty beyond a successful global disarmament accord is maintained. Rather than
empowering the IAEA directly by setting it initially at its maximum, empowerment is shifted to
the states through the signing of a treaty, including that nuclear weapons states accept the CSA in
addition to their established acceptance of the AP. This is simulated by initially setting the
“cooperation” node to its maximum value. In other words, the state is choosing to cooperate on a
single item for a specific period of time (during the signing and ratification processes only), and
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they are not agreeing to cooperate on any matter beyond the articles in a global disarmament
treaty. As will be discussed later, this is merely symbolic and has no cause and effect relation
with a successfully implemented (rather than merely signed) disarmament treaty. This is because
states can sign the treaty, ratify the treaty, and make public statements about the treaty’s
communal significance, but secretly hide nuclear hedging activities or even entire weapons
unknown to inspectors. In other words, the signing of the treaty is meaningless outside of its
cultural (in the nuclear context) meaning. Here, Outlier States too must be brought in. this
scenario empowers the Outlier States’ prestige to a minor degree. It does not seek to empower
the Outlier State to a maximum degree. That is, Pakistan and the DPRK are not empowered by
being granted veto power at the UN Security Council, but their needs to be recognized as 1) a
nuclear power and 2) an important actor in the international movement towards global zero. The
Outlier State here is brought into the NSG, relieved of any ongoing nuclear (or other relevant)
sanctions, and perhaps, as will be addressed later, temporarily forgiven for any human rights
violations. Some progress has already been accomplished here. Israel, for example, has not
suffered nuclear sanctions, despite its weapons program. India’s access to the NSG has been
greatly increased, despite provisions in the NPT that likely prohibits India’s access. In other
words, the international community might need to apply responses to non-NPT nuclear powers
consistently, rather than calling some “rogue nations” and others Western allies. Further, it will
likely require this consistent reaction to be more like the response towards Israel or India, rather
than towards the DPRK. This is further explicated in a footnote below. Finally, as in Scenarios 1
– 5, the nuclear weapons node is clamped to a maximum decrease, simulating global
disarmament. This scenario will likely “solve” the nuclear weapons problems as defined in the
two previous chapters, but it will likely not resolve the natural problems of uncertainty and
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anarchy. Given the parameters of the “mess,” however, this might be the best path forward thus
far.
Running the simulations with the sigmoid transfer function for 100 timestamps (again, to
ensure the scenarios are either stable or periodic), in the first three scenarios multiple error types
are possible, especially the Type IV error this model seeks to avoid. In Scenario 4, there is no
end state that reaches equilibrium following 100 timestamps. Finally, Scenario 5 reaches a stable
equilibrium in which all stakeholders are satisfied. On the other hand, a “security period of
vulnerability” exists (discussed below) that threatens to undermine a successful and lasting
disarmament treaty. Scenario 5 requires the understanding that nuclear weapons states will not be
burdened beyond the disarmament treaty. IAEA inspectors are not given free reign to investigate
any suspected wrongdoing. Additionally, it requires understanding that the Outlier States must be
brought into the fold.353

7.4 Preliminary Results

Table 7.5: Mess Scenario 1 NPT Signing End States
Concept
NWS: Security
Maximize Profits
Int'l Verification: Abolition
NGOs: Abolition
Stories that Sell
353

End State
-0.99999995
-0.99990920
0.99999995
1
-0.98648523

Significant effort has already been made to include Outlier States in international nuclear
policies. US Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama worked to include India in
international nuclear trade deals, despite India being on the Nuclear Suppliers Group control list
since 1974, preventing its inclusion in trade regimes. US President Donald Trump and ROK
President Moon Jae In furthermore undid a decades old unofficial international policy to not
recognize the DPRK regime as legitimate. This modeling seeks to capture that level of Outlier
State inclusion without giving into Outlier State demands.
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NPT States: Abolition
Religious Leaders: Abolition
Reputation
Defense
Military Capability
Nuclear Weapons
Conventional Weapons
Avoid Threats
Self-Restraint
Proper Treatment of Citizens
Conformity
Attraction
Risk of Nuclear Terrorism
and Human Error
Behavioral Norms
NWS: Sovereignty
Int'l Verification Agencies:
Nuclear Security
NGOs: Oversight
NPT States: Equality
Outlier States: Prestige
Promote Peaceful Nuclear
Programs
Prevent Proliferation

1
1
-0.99999999
-0.99889494
-0.99999999
-1
-0.99990920
0.99990920
4
-0.98568521
-0.98568521
-0.98568521
-0.99877657
-0.99999875
0.98661429
8
-0.99893113
1
0.99999277
5
0.99999990
1
-1
0.99999989
8
0.85749143
5

Table 7.6: Mess Scenario 2 NPT Signing and Recognition of Sovereignty End States
Concept
NWS: Security
Maximize Profits
Int'l Verification: Abolition
NGOs: Abolition
Stories that Sell
NPT States: Abolition
Religious Leaders: Abolition
Reputation

End State
-0.99999996
-0.99990920
0.999999975
1
-0.84571771
1
1
-0.99999999
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Defense
Military Capability
Nuclear Weapons
Conventional Weapons
Avoid Threats
Self-Restraint
Proper Treatment of Citizens
Conformity
Attraction
Risk of Nuclear Terrorism
and Human Error
Behavioral Norms
NWS: Sovereignty
Int'l Verification Agencies:
Nuclear Security
NGOs: Oversight
NPT States: Equality
Outlier States: Prestige
Promote Peaceful Nuclear
Programs
Prevent Proliferation

-0.99889494
-0.99999999
-1
-0.99990920
0.999909204
-0.97127275
-0.97127275
-0.97127275
-0.99648773
-0.99999911
0.986614298
0
1
0.999938261
0.999999951
-1
0.999999928
0.926870161

Table 7.7: Security Maximized
Component
NWS: Security
Maximize Profits
Int'l Verification: Abolition
NGOs: Abolition
Stories that Sell
NPT States: Abolition
Religious Leaders: Abolition
Reputation
Defense
Military Capability
Nuclear Weapons
Conventional Weapons
Avoid Threats
Self-Restraint

End State
1
0.99999995
0.999999946
1
1
1
1
1
0.999992509
-0.00045397
-1
0.999909204
0.999909204
0.986614298
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Proper Treatment of Citizens
Conformity
Attraction
Risk of Nuclear Terrorism
and Human Error
Behavioral Norms
NWS: Sovereignty
Int'l Verification Agencies:
Nuclear Security
NGOs: Oversight
NPT States: Equality
Outlier States: Prestige
Promote Peaceful Nuclear
Programs
Prevent Proliferation

0.986614298
0.986614298
0.998894443
-0.99999938
0.986614298
-0.99999254
1
0.99999995
1
-0.99890360
0.99999995
0.999992547

Table 7.8: Mess Scenario 4 No Changes to Sovereignty, Signing of CSA
Component
End State
No stable end state, periodic flux
This scenario remains complex

Table 7.9:Mess Scenario 5 No Changes to Sovereignty, Signing of CSA, Engaging Outlier States
Concept
NWS: Security
Maximize Profits
Int'l Verification: Abolition
NGOs: Abolition
Stories that Sell
NPT States: Abolition
Religious Leaders: Abolition
Reputation
Defense
Military Capability
Nuclear Weapons
Conventional Weapons

End State
0.999992546
0.99999995
0.999999946
1
1
1
1
1
0.999992509
-0.00045401
-1
0.999909197
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Avoid Threats
Self-Restraint
Proper Treatment of Citizens
Conformity
Attraction
Risk of Nuclear Terrorism
and Human Error
Behavioral Norms
NWS: Sovereignty
Int'l Verification Agencies:
Nuclear Security
NGOs: Oversight
NPT States: Equality
Outlier States: Prestige
Promote Peaceful Nuclear
Programs
Prevent Proliferation

0.999909204
0.986614298
0.986614298
0.986614298
0.998894443
-0.99999938
0.986614298
0
1
0.999999388
1
0.25
0.99999995
0.999992547

Given the five scenarios explored, the most feasible solution is to take steps that ensure
states’ rights under sovereignty are guaranteed, to bring the Outlier States into the fold, to seek
the cooperation of nuclear weapons states through signing the Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement and the Additional Protocol. Under such a paradigm, states will feel more secure
about their neighbors’ intentions (however, uncertainty is an ongoing concern); Outlier States’
needs will be recognized in the international community, reducing the probability that they will
deviate from norms; and sovereign decisions, including the right to withdraw from existing or
future treaties will not be affected (indeed, this is a requirement for any successful international
agreement under the tenets of political realism). Equilibrium is reached relatively quickly. This
scenario is illustrated in Figure 7.4.
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Figure 7.4: Mess Scenario No Changes to Sovereignty, Signing of CSA, Engaging Outlier States

The constraints of this model of the “messy” nuclear landscape lead the research to a
radical conclusion. Bringing in India, Pakistan, and the DPRK (Israel already enjoys substantial
prestige, relative to the other three) seems counterintuitive. Indeed, less-powerful NPT states
might reconsider their nuclear options if they feel the DPRK is rewarded for its nuclear weapons
program. However, this simply suggests continued monitoring (or the Observe step) is necessary
to prevent a Type IV error along these lines.
Paying closer attention to the needs of the Outlier States is not, however, as radical as it
appears. When US President George W. Bush facilitated nuclear trade with India, it signaled a
blow to nuclear safeguards and the NSG. On the other hand, the nuclear deal with India
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benefitted safeguards in two ways. First, it brought substantial parts of India’s nuclear sector
under IAEA purview, including militarized nuclear sectors. Second, it signaled to the other
Outlier States that cooperation with the P5 and NPT states is possible.
Additionally, paying closer attention to the Outlier States is not unreasonable. While none
of the Outlier States are as powerful, as large, as near (not merely in the geographical sense) to
the P5, or as nuclear as Russia, they are as demanding as Russia in other areas (in Problem 2 they
were classified as expectant stakeholders). These states have unique needs that, under the status
quo, are fulfilled by nuclear weapons as a proxy for what it wants most—a secure sense of power
on an international stage,354 a sense of power they feel is unjustly monopolized by the P5 and
foolishly abandoned by the NPT.355 Recalling that their priority in Problem 1 is identical to the
nuclear weapons states (indeed, they were modeled with the nuclear weapons states) and that
their divergence from nuclear weapons states in Problem 2 is a reticence towards following
orders, the Outlier States have the capacity to follow trends as long as they feel like they are as
equals in the driver’s seat with an equivalent capability to forge new paths. And if Outlier
participation makes the world more secure and less prone to nuclear accident or war, then each
stakeholder walks away better than before.
On the other hand, and as mentioned earlier, continued monitoring is necessary to prevent
NPT states seeking prestige. Nonproliferation might be a trend simply because few states believe
the alternative is viable. If a small state not unlike the DPRK perceives DPRK inclusion as a
reward for proliferating, then that small state can enact some level of gain by proliferating and
354

Adapted from Simon Serfaty, “Moving into a Post-Western World,” Washington Quarterly
34, no. 2 (2011): 10.
355
Bull argues that resistance to the NPT by Outlier States is in part due to their needs not being
addressed during negotiations; therefore, it is less likely they will agree to NPT revisions without
taking part in the discussion. Headley Bull, “Rethinking Non-Proliferation,” International Affairs
51, no. 2 (1975): 182.
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then demanding status equal to the P5. Indeed, if the NPT regime’s goal is one of equality, then
it would not be irrational for all NPT states to seek prestige, as each state that joins the nuclear
club experiences a diminished return because influence in the system is spread from a maximum
of 100 percent, making the system more equal. Therefore, each individual nuclear-armed state’s
influence diminishes as additional states proliferate. This fits with the Waltzian model of
horizontal proliferation, which, to the abolitionist, is not a preferred outcome. In fact, given that
the NPT states’ goal in Problem 1 is abolition, this Type IV error has a low probability of
occurring.
At timestamp 0 nuclear weapons have been permanently reduced to -1. Sovereignty
remains at 0. Outlier States are permanently lifted to 0.25. And Cooperation has an initial setting
of 1. By timestamp 1 all stakeholders seeking abolition enjoy a maximum and permanent
increase as a result of the signing of a disarmament treaty. Nuclear weapons states reputation
significantly increase, due to their new role in the nonproliferation regime. Nuclear weapons
states significantly increase their defense budgets, however, as a result of the massive defensive
hole left when their nuclear deterrent was abolished, which is evident by the maximum and
permanent decrease in military capability.356 On the other hand, this decrease in military
capability is offset because these states have avoided threatening behavior, thereby avoiding a
security dilemma. The IAEA’s twin goals to prevent proliferation and to promote peaceful
nuclear capabilities enjoy a permanent maximization. The media’s ability to sell stories declines,
likely due to cooperation being less-than thrilling. And finally, the risk of nuclear terrorism is
permanently eliminated.357

356
357

It is permanent because these states permanently lose their ability to use nuclear weapons.
This is unless a terrorist group can build a weapon independent of a state.
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At timestamp 2 nuclear weapons states have maximized their security, due to the
previous timestamp’s threat avoidance and increased defense budgets. Production firms’ profits
slightly decline, due to the loss of nuclear contracts. The media’s ability to sell stories continues
to decline but stabilizes. Reputation and defense spending continue to rise. At this timestamp,
however, previous nuclear weapons states suffer significant reductions in self-restraint, human
rights, international conformity, and soft power, likely due to each states’ needs to reassert its
previous position without a nuclear deterrent. On the other hand, behavioral norms reaches a
permanent maximization (i.e., the nuclear taboo has permanently extended to merely possessing
weapons). NPT states permanently enjoy maximized nuclear equality. On the down side, at this
timestamp, NGOs and activists suffer a significant reduction in their goal of oversight, due to the
international community and the IAEA increasing their roles.
At timestamp 3 nuclear weapons states continue to enjoy maximized security. Production
firms maximize profits due to previous increased defense spending. The previous timestamp’s
decrease in self-restraint, human rights, conformity, and attraction have caused a significant
increase in the media’s ability to sell stories and have significantly harmed former nuclear
weapons states’ reputations. Defense spending continues to increase. Self-restraint, human rights,
conformity, and soft power continue to decline, but they are stabilizing. NGOs enjoy a
significant and permanent increase in oversight.
At timestamp 4 a curious effect occurs. Nuclear weapons states’ security significantly
reduces (this is discussed more at length at timestamp 5). Production firms continue to enjoy
high profits. Reputations finally and permanently increase due to timestamp 3’s stabilizations of
self-restraint, human rights, conformity, and attraction. Defense spending takes a large cut,
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which might suggest former nuclear weapons states are slowing down defensive buildups. Selfrestraint, human rights, conformity, and soft power all enjoy a permanent increase.
At timestamp 5 nuclear weapons states’ security continues to significantly decrease. This
decrease, which began in timestamp 4, can be referred to as the “security period of
vulnerability,” where former nuclear weapons states are vulnerable to the “Thucydides Trap”
(discussed in the next chapter), due to previous timestamp’s major increases in conventional
weapons and new posturing (in the South China Sea and Eastern Europe, for examples) due to
previous timestamp’s reductions in self-restraint and conformity. This “period of security
vulnerability” is highlighted in Figure 7.5. At timestamp 5 the disarmament treaty is in serious
jeopardy, and at this point it might be reasonable for states to consider temporarily withdrawing
from the treaty. Although this is not the desired outcome, it is preferable to World War III (and
resultant nuclear proliferations anyway, which is also discussed in the next chapter). The model
presented here, however, suggests the treaty will survive. Additionally in timestamp 5,
production firms suffer a two-timestamp reduction in profits, caused by timestamp 4’s reduction
in defense spending. On the other hand, defense spending at this timestamp increases
significantly and permanently.
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Figure 7.5: Period of Vulnerability under Disarmament

By timestamp 6 nuclear weapons states have survived the threat of conventional war, and
previous defense spending increases and abidance of various norms, such as self-restraint, human
rights, and conformity (in addition to increased soft power), have permanently maximized the
former nuclear powers’ security. Production firms’ profits continue to decline.
Finally, at timestamp 7 production firms’ profits maximize, and the simulation reaches
equilibrium by timestamp 8. As noted earlier, because the model is run according to the IAEA’s
schedule, each timestamp represents a year. Therefore, barring an unidentified error in modeling,
and given that the problems do not change significantly, it is reasonable to conclude that all
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stakeholders, including Outlier States, will benefit from a disarmament treaty within eight years
of signing.
In this simulation the two primary objectives are achieved; security is maximized, and the
IAEA achieves nuclear security. Of particular note is the null effect this simulation has on
cooperation. The initial setting of cooperation to 1 has no lasting impact. Cooperation is not
compelled; rather, it remains constant. Anarchy and uncertainty, too, remain unchanged. There
are some added benefits. For example, states are better able to avoid signaling threat by mistake.
On the other hand, military capability decreases for the simple fact that dismantling weapons by
definition makes states incapable of using those weapons. This is countered by the very strong
increase in defense, however, which suggests BOP politics will not end, but instead might
become more pronounced, suggesting a possible Type IV error.
The identified “security period of vulnerability” is a serious hurdle, perhaps the most
profound and likely of the possible Type IV errors. This is a period of time when militarized
international disputes are very likely, culminating in a rush to rearm nuclear forces and, perhaps,
a nuclear first strike to cripple the other side’s nuclear capability. Therefore, I further
hypothesize that the aforementioned re-proliferation capability be automatic and explicitly
modeled in the simulation. In Scenario 6 I repeat Scenario 5 with “Re-Proliferation Capability”
clamped at +1 to attempt to decrease uncertainty and shrink the period of vulnerability.
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Figure 7.6: Disarmament Simulation with Re-Proliferation Capabilities Maximized

Scenario 6 is stable and complicated. The end state is very similar to Scenario 5’s end
state; however, some major differences exist. Transparency and the value of international
agreements increase tremendously. This is largely due to the new significant reduction in
uncertainty, which is itself caused by the knowledge that belligerence will be punished with
automatic rearmament. This increase in certainty has an added benefit; it greatly reduces the
security vulnerability, not in length, but in depth. This risk is not eliminated, but its intensity has
been greatly reduced.
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Figure 7.7: Reduced Vulnerability with Re-Proliferation Capability

Significantly diminished vulnerability
period

Table 7.10:Mess Scenario 6 No Changes to Sovereignty, Signing of CSA, Engaging Outlier
States, Maximizing Re-Proliferation Capability
Concept
NWS: Security
Maximize Profits
Int'l Verification: Abolition
NGOs: Abolition
Stories that Sell
NPT States: Abolition
Religious Leaders: Abolition
Reputation
Defense
Military Capability

End State
0.999992542
0.99999995
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.999908772
-0.00045401
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Nuclear Weapons
Conventional Weapons
Avoid Threats
Self-Restraint
Proper Treatment of Citizens
Conformity
Transparency
Attraction
International Agreements
Risk of Nuclear Terrorism
and Human Error
Behavioral Norms
Uncertainty
Re-Proliferation Capabilities
NWS: Sovereignty
Int'l Verification Agencies:
Nuclear Security
NGOs: Oversight
NPT States: Equality
Outlier States: Prestige
Promote Peaceful Nuclear
Programs
Prevent Proliferation

-1
0.999909197
0.999909204
0.986614298
0.986614298
0.986614298
0.986614298
0.998894443
0.986614298
-0.99999938
0.986614298
-0.99990292
1
0
1
0.999999388
1
0.25
1
1

In other words, this simulation thus far suggests that by recognizing existing sovereign
rights, by bringing Outlier States into the fold, and by achieving universal adoption of the CSA
and AP, disarmament will not disrupt the system, as designed.358 Acting to achieve goals is
feasible in this scenario. On the other hand, this does not exclude a Type IV error in the guise of
states scrambling to rebalance the international anarchical environment.

358

It must be noted that the fidelity present in this model cannot pick up individual disputes as
identified by O’Hanlon. Simulations using agent-based modeling are better adept at handling
both individual disputes and the international system. This is discussed more in the next chapter.
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7.5 Final Simulations
Scenario 6 suggests there is a viable pathway towards disarmament by maintaining rights
to govern the societies of their respective states, bringing in Outlier States to the negotiation
process, signing the CSA and AP (as a measure of good faith, explained in more detail in the
stability analysis), and substantially decreasing uncertainty by factoring into the solution
rearmament capabilities that take effect automatically upon a former nuclear state’s belligerence.
Moving forward, one might ask oneself whether or not nuclear weapons can remain at -1 if the
modeler removes the peg. Therefore, two final simulations are performed to test if the nuclear
weapons node can naturally remain at a maximum level of decrease if all other variables remain
constant.
In the first simulation, I clamp sovereignty, the Outlier States, and re-proliferation
capability to their respective levels, per Scenario 6. All remaining components take on an initial
value equal to their end state in Scenario 6 (shown in Table 7.9).

Table 7.11: Scenario 7 Stability After Disarmament
Component
NWS: Security
Maximize Profits
Int'l Verification: Abolition
NGOs: Abolition
Stories that Sell
NPT States: Abolition
Religious Leaders: Abolition
Reputation
Defense
Military Capability
Nuclear Weapons
Conventional Weapons
Avoid Threats
Self-Restraint

Scenario 6
End State
0.999992542
0.99999995
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.999908772
-0.00045401
-1
0.999909197
0.999909204
0.986614298

Scenario 7
End State
0.999992546
0.999999992
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.999991878
0.241457613
-0.95064491
0.999909197
0.99985127
0.986614298
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Proper Treatment of Citizens
Conformity
Transparency
Attraction
International Agreements
Risk of Nuclear Terrorism and
Human Error
Behavioral Norms
Uncertainty
Re-Proliferation Capabilities
Int'l Verification Agencies: Nuclear
Security
NGOs: Oversight
NPT States: Equality
Outlier States: Prestige
Promote Peaceful Nuclear Programs
Prevent Proliferation

0.986614298
0.986614298
0.986614298
0.998894443
0.986614298
0.999999388
0.986614298
-0.99990292
1

0.986614298
0.986614298
0.986614298
0.998894443
0.986614298
0.999998998
0.986614298
-0.99990292
1

1
1
0.999999388 0.999999388
1
1
0.25
0.25
1
1
1
1

This scenario suggests the nuclear weapons node maintains a strong level of decrease.
That is, by maintaining a strong commitment to not allowing the IAEA to grow too big, by
maintaining a strong commitment to address the needs of the Outlier States, by continuing to be
party to the CSA and Additional Protocol, which does increase the IAEA’s scope but only
through power granted it by member states, and by maintaining a strong commitment to reproliferation when necessary, the role nuclear weapons play in our future scenarios will be
significantly diminished (although not to the maximum degree possible).
In the second simulation I assign all components their initial values equal to the end
states in Scenario 6 (again, shown in Table 7.9). That is, I remove all clamped values.
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Table 7.12: Scenario 8 Nuclear Stability after Disarmament at a Cost
Component
NWS: Security
Maximize Profits
Int'l Verification: Abolition
NGOs: Abolition
Stories that Sell
NPT States: Abolition
Religious Leaders: Abolition
Reputation
Defense
Military Capability
Nuclear Weapons
Conventional Weapons
Avoid Threats
Self-Restraint
Proper Treatment of Citizens
Conformity
Transparency
Attraction
International Agreements
Risk of Nuclear Terrorism and Human
Error
Behavioral Norms
Uncertainty
Re-Proliferation Capabilities
NWS: Sovereignty
Int'l Verification Agencies: Nuclear
Security
NGOs: Oversight
NPT States: Equality
Outlier States: Prestige
Promote Peaceful Nuclear Programs
Prevent Proliferation

Scenario 6
End State
0.999992542
0.99999995
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.999908772
-0.00045401
-1
0.999909197
0.999909204
0.986614298
0.986614298
0.986614298
0.986614298
0.998894443
0.986614298

Scenario 8
End State
0.999992546
0.99999995
0.999999946
1
1
1
1
1
0.99999251
-0.00045091
-0.99999938
0.999909197
0.999909204
0.986614298
0.986614298
0.986614298
0
0.998894443
0

-0.99999938
0.986614298
-0.99990292
1
0

-0.99999938
0.986614298
0
0
-0.99999254

1
0.999999388
1
0.25
1
1

1
0.99999995
1
-0.9989036
0.99999995
0.999992547

Contrary to Scenarios 6 and 7, which suggest nuclear stability can be held as long as
certain commitments are maintained, including a commitment to keep the IAEA from growing
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too big, Scenario 8 suggests that following disarmament, the IAEA will be required to
significantly increase its scope. While international compliance and verification naturally
maintains their maximization under disarmament, and while nuclear weapons naturally maintain
a maximum decrease (making them obsolescent) after disarmament, two costly effects are
observed. Former nuclear weapons states’ sovereignty is required to take a significant loss to
maintain a nuclear weapons free world. Additionally, the Outlier States are required to take their
own significant losses. These are highlighted with bold characters in the table above.
In other words, in Scenario 8, there emerges an IAEA that is more powerful than the sum
of the power granted it by member states. This is approaching a Hobbesian solution, but built-in
and automatic re-proliferation capabilities divorce it from the Leviathan. This capability is
already built into both scenarios; therefore, Scenario 7 is far more feasible. IAEA empowerment
should be limited to the scope of the milieu in which states find themselves. If disarmament is at
any time preferable, states should work towards creating a milieu in which no one wants to
possess nuclear weapons.

“Cooperation”
This model partially focuses on an initial maximum cooperative setting. Each subsequent
timestamp allows the “cooperation” node to act according to the parameters of the model without
user interference. What becomes obvious is that “cooperation” immediately falls to zero by
timestamp 1. Therefore, this presents a good area to begin to test for sensitivity. While
performing five sensitivity tests on “cooperation” according to Scenario 6 by varying the initial
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state of “cooperation” to reflect all positive values “cooperation” can take, in addition to zero.359
I note that varying the “cooperation” node has no observed effect. Rather, its inclusion is merely
symbolic. To make the table simpler to read, I round all values.

Table 7.13: Stability with or without Cooperation
Cooperation = Cooperation Cooperation Cooperation Cooperation
Scenario
1
= 0.75
= 0.5
= 0.25
=0
NWS: Security
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Maximize Profits
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Int’l Verification:
Abolition
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
NGOs: Abolition
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Stories that Sell
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
NPT States:
Abolition
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Religious
Leaders:
Abolition
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Reputation
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Defense
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Nuclear Weapons
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
Conventional
Weapons
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Avoid Threats
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Self-Restraint
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
Proper Treatment
of Citizens
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
Conformity
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
Transparency
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
Attraction
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
International
Agreements
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
Risk of Nuclear
Terrorism and
Human Error
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
-1.00
Behavioral Norms
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
359

I also ran these with “cooperation” set to negative values and noted identical results. It is not
likely, however, that a successful disarmament treaty would show negative values of
cooperation.
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Uncertainty
Re-Proliferation
Capabilities
Int’l Verification
Agencies:
Nuclear Security
NGOs: Oversight
NPT States:
Equality
Outlier States:
Prestige
Promote Peaceful
Nuclear Programs
Prevent
Proliferation

-1.00

-1.00

-1.00

-1.00

-1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00
1.00

1.00
1.00

1.00
1.00

1.00
1.00

1.00
1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

0.25

0.25

0.25

0.25

0.25

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

There are two non-mutually exclusive ways to interpret this result: 1) Cooperation
(signing the treaty) is meaningless in the short and long term. It is merely a symbol of what is
possible at a specific point in time. 2) Cooperation holds no possession value for nuclear
weapons states (or other stakeholders) but rather holds tremendous milieu value for stakeholders.
These possession and milieu goals are discussed later. For now, states seek to attain possession
goals to enhance national interest at the exclusion of others. In this case, security through nuclear
capability is certainly a possession goal. Milieu goals are also for the enhancement of national
interest, but not to the exclusion of others.360 Participation in the signing of a disarmament treaty
is a milieu goal; all international parties participating receive some benefit.

360

Wolfers, 72-73.
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7.6 Stability and Validation

Stability
To determine model stability, I re-ran several scenarios with varying new assumptions,
one factor at a time. That is, I would tweak the end-state output of variable A to a different value
along the Likert-type scale, searching for unexpected or expected emergence, as well as
unexpected or expected non-emergence. If, for example, a minor change of a value from 0 to
0.25 has significant impact on the model, this might intensify uncertainty in the model. While
running various scenarios I noted a few interesting developments, which will be discussed in
turn.
First, I tested Outlier State prestige, holding constant all variation from Scenario 6,
varying the Outlier State’s prestige by values of 0.25 along the Likert-type scale. I noted that the
model ran as expected. Minor variation does not affect the model’s outcome. This is
understandable because the Outlier States, according to the model’s parameters, seek some level
of prestige increase. Therefore, so long as the nuclear weapons states are paying attention to the
DPRK and Pakistan, the model will perform the same. Additionally, if prestige is reduced to a
negative value, then by no means has the nuclear “mess” been resolved, and the Outlier States
will likely simply ignore a proposed resolution.
Next, I varied nuclear weapons. What happens if nuclear weapons’ value increases by
some number according to the Likert-type scale, but still retains a negative value? That is, what
happens if nuclear weapons caches are simply reduced?361 These scenarios performed as
expected. As the nuclear redundancies are increased (nuclear reductions instead of abolition),
361

For example, O’Hanlon posits a successful treaty will probably limit total nuclear warheads to
1,000. O’Hanlon, Kindle location 1249.
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military capability increases dramatically. Movement from -1 to -0.75 (meaning 75% of
warheads have been eliminated retained 84% military capability. Removing 25% of warheads
retained 99% military capability. Running a scenario where nuclear weapons are not varied by
initial state or clamping, I noted increased complexity, resulting in periodic flux. Under this
scenario, equilibrium could not be reached and nuclear weapons alternate from ~1 to ~-1 from
timestamp to timestamp. Therefore, discussion might be better shifted from arms control to
disarmament.
From here I shifted to varying degrees of sovereignty. What would happen if sovereignty
were reduced or, somehow, increased? The simulations show there is no increased amount of
sovereignty that affects the model in a negative way. That is, re-establishing sovereign capability
through withdrawal from various non-disarmament treaties does not affect the disarmament
treaty. Decreasing sovereignty does not affect model performance either; the IAEA, NPT States,
and NGOs certainly would benefit from reductions in nuclear weapons states’ abilities to
function independently of the international environment. On the other hand, sovereignty,
according to the model, only maintains its status quo through clamping it to zero. If left to its
own devices according to the parameters of Scenario 6, the IAEA will assume total jurisdiction
in the former nuclear-armed states, resulting in greatly diminished ability to govern as one sees
fit.
I then ran two simulations where I greatly reduced the IAEA’s influence in the model or
greatly increased it. That is, if there was a link between the IAEA and another component, the
IAEA’s abilities were either erased (zeroed out) or maximized to +1 or -1. Zeroing out the links
resulted in, as expected, increased complexity without model equilibrium. Without the IAEA to
verify compliance through increased technological and legal mechanisms, leaving disarmament
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up to the whims of anarchy greatly destabilized the system. Maximizing the IAEA’s affect along
already-established links was offset by the nuclear weapons states’ unchanging goal of sovereign
right.
Re-proliferation is, as expected, a key variable that increases security through diminished
uncertainty. For example, reducing automatic rearmament capability to 0.5 requires reduced
transparency. If the scenario is run with re-proliferation clamped to -1 (meaning, somehow
nuclear know-how has been erased from human memory), then there are significant reductions in
state security, profits, the IAEA’s missions (which makes sense), NGOs ability to influence
problem resolution, equality within the international system, defense, military capability,
conventional weapons stockpiles, self-restraint, human rights, conformity, transparency, soft
power, and the value of international agreements.
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Figure 7.8: Instability without Re-Proliferation Capability

I finally tested what effect disarmament would have in the status quo. That is, what
would happen to security if we attempt to rid the world of nuclear weapons without dealing with
the half-dozen or so ongoing international geopolitical disputes? I clamped “conflict” to 1,
finding equilibrium (in the model) is reached, but it requires significant decreases in security,
defense, military capability, and conventional forces. In other words, the model performs as
expected; under this scenario and the one preceding it, I have created World War III.
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Validation
In the stability tests, the model performed as expected. There are no overly sensitive
links, and sensitivity exists where it is anticipated. The IAEA is not too empowered, and the reproliferation capability emerges as a key variable towards security, which complicates the
IAEA’s mission towards permanent abolition. This sensitivity test goes hand-in-hand with
validation. That is, there are no surprising results that reality disputes. The question before us
now is: To what degree does the model reflect the “mess” and its constituent problems?
Lewis F. Richardson noted that human behavior “cannot be properly described by linear
equations.”362 Human behavior is multitudes. It is contradictory, often random, and too
generalized to be solvable by computable numbers.363 To that end, Sterman is correct when he
writes, “All models are wrong.” He argues,

Because all models are wrong, we reject the notion that models can be validated
in the dictionary definition sense of ‘establishing truthfulness’, instead focusing
on creating models that are useful, on the process of testing, on the ongoing
comparison of the model against all data of all types, and on the continual
iteration between experiments with the virtual world of the model and
experiments in the real world.364

362

Lewis F. Richardson, “Linear Theory of Two Nations,” in Collected Papers of Lewis Fry
Richardson, ed. Oliver M. Ashford, H. Charnock, P. G. Drazin, J. C. R. Hunt, P. Smoker, and Ian
Sutherland (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 268.
363
Adapted from Turing, 246.
364
John D. Sterman, "All Models Are Wrong: Reflections on Becoming a Systems Scientist,"
System Dynamics Review 18, no. 4 (2002): 521.
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A useful model, he adds, “must address a specific problem and must simplify rather than
attempting to mirror in detail an entire system.”365 It is for this reason that model design does not
attempt to capture the entire international system in which the nuclear “mess” exists; rather, it
attempts to resolve the interactions between specific problems within the system. A better
question might be: To what degree will this model teach practitioners about the nuclear “mess”?
Because this model attempts to be useful to current or future practitioners rather than a
valid representation of the system in which the practitioners operate, it must not merely represent
the problems and the “mess;” it must interact with the actual problems and the actual “mess.”
Therefore, “validation” comes from how useful it is in the real system. Proving its use is to prove
it is not invalid rather than to prove it is valid.
The model I present is a more-or-less simplistic representation of highly complex issues
in international relations. Yet, it captures significant cause and effect, often only sacrificing
fidelity to appease the Waltzian realists. More model complexity will certainly benefit model
performance to some degree, but this requires model interaction with the real world, which has
an unfortunate effect of undermining model validity.
That is, in a perfect world I would have a large conference room on reserve for a week or
two and accommodations made for dozens, if not hundreds, of global decision-makers, from
presidents to the Director General of the IAEA, all manners of stakeholders, each with natural
levels of influence to resolve the “mess.” I would ask them to help re-construct this fuzzy
cognitive map, each mapping out his or her place within the problem, based on experiences to
which they can attest. They would incorporate the FCM methodology laid out in the previous

365

John D. Sterman, “A Skeptic's Guide to Computer Models,” reprinted from Managing a
Nation: The Microcomputer Software Catalog, ed. Gerald O. Barney, W. Brian Kreutzer, Martha
J. Garrett, W. Brian Kreutzer (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1993), 209-229.
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chapters completely. What is their goal? What forces are helping them achieve their goal? What
forces prevent them from achieving it? This goes on until they are satisfied that their needs and
influence are represented. But seated next to a British delegation is a delegation sent by
Greenpeace. Each draws their FCMs, but one stakeholder holds more power than the other.
Furthermore, each stakeholder has a different view of what reality is. As their FCMs come
together and nodes between them identifired, they might disagree on the effect Greenpeace has
on the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons program. This example might be less-than
meaningful due to obvious differences in influence. What happens, therefore, when actors of
similar influence compare FCMs? Certainly, NGOs and NPT States will disagree on who has
more influence on the nuclear weapons states. NGOs can operate between states, and their
lobbies are often powerful. NPT States and Outlier States might furthermore disagree on who
holds more influence. In other words, simply put,

The question of whether some cognitive maps represent reality better than others
might not be possible because the reality with which the model outputs are
compared is mediated through yet another understanding.366

The mere fact that no two stakeholders understand the world identically means there is likely to
be great variation between stakeholders’ views of how the model should work and what good
output looks like.
That stated, this problem with validity does not mean the model is less-than useful. In the
aforementioned perfect world, the model constructed here is a simple demonstration of cause and
366

Emphasis added. Uygar Özesmi and Stacy L. Özesmi, "Ecological Models Based on People’s
Knowledge: A Multi-step Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping Approach," Ecological Modelling 176, no.
1 (2004): 57-58.
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effect that all stakeholders can understand, particularly if one goes beyond the model’s current
parameters and includes costs levied by even a small nuclear war, as illustrated in Chapter 2. It
furthermore invites debate between the stakeholders. The validity problem means that
stakeholders involved in a future version of this model will have the ability to reason through
their various levels of influence and the differences between them. They will be better able to
critically evaluate their capabilities the components driving and preventing the attainment of
their individual goals.
Furthermore, the FCM is explicitly limited by present reality. As the situation changes, as
new stakeholders emerge or established stakeholders decline, and as stakeholder capability
varies, so too do the model’s assumptions. The FCM designed here is not merely subject to
rigorous scientific standards; it is also subjected to ongoing rigorous changes to reality. Much
like the real world around it, it evolves, unlike Lewis F. Richardson’s arms race model.
Finally, due to its ability to evolve as real-world timestamps progress, and because a
model within a perfect world will have real-world stakeholder input, a demonstration not unlike
the one I make in this study should appease all stakeholders. All stakeholders receive some
benefit from partaking, flexing their milieu goal muscles.

7.7 Summary
This chapter seeks to determine if the two problems from the preceding chapters can be
solved simultaneously to avoid making a Type IV error. It identifies each of the “mess’”
constituent problems, restructuring the “mess” so that interaction between them becomes more
apparent. Several scenarios are run, and finally, a feasible solution is uncovered.
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First, any future disarmament negotiation must respect that the IAEA cannot become too
empowered. States still dominate the international system. Any states party to the treaty will not
be intruded upon in areas outside of the agreement, and these states can furthermore choose to
withdraw from the treaty if they later wish to do so. Second, special attention should be paid to
the Outlier States, bringing them into the negotiation process, and treating them as equal to the
P5. Third, security is best (and perhaps only) guaranteed through a guaranteed and automatic
rearmament process to re-establish certainty in international affairs. Once these steps are taken, a
symbolic treaty can be signed that weds the nuclear weapons states to the CSA, the AP, and
Article VI of the NPT; the disarmament process can begin.
This process is not without its potential problems, however, and these potential Type IV
errors are identified and discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 8
DEALING WITH THE UNKNOWNS

8.1 Possible Type IV Error
In the previous three chapters, I construct the “mess” by modeling two problems and the
interaction between the problems. Running several scenarios, I determine that a feasible way to
disarm is to prioritize the universal signing of an international treaty that weds states to the
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with Additional Protocol; maintaining guarantees that the
treaty will infringe on sovereign governance to the least degree possible; bringing in outlier
states, such as the DPRK and India, during the negotiations for disarmament, and establishing
automatic mechanisms to reconstitute nuclear capabilities if and when new international crises
develop. Once these steps have been taken, international nuclear diplomats will have a stable, but
complicated, landscape in which to begin the long process down to global zero. But the debate
between nuclear realists and nuclear moral crusaders along nuclear security lines is filled with
hazards, pitfalls, and structural forces that construct all manners of unfortunate complications.
From security dilemmas to Hobbes’ and Thucydides’ traps, the constructed mess is—in reality—
a landscape where practitioners would be wise to tread very lightly. As students from almost
every academic field learn, sometimes actors with good intentions cause catastrophe.367

367

In 2000 New Mexican officials started a controlled burn to reduce fire hazards at the
Bandelier National Monument. The controlled burn became uncontrolled, and the result was
about 48,000 acres burned, the displacement of 400 families, and almost a billion dollars (in
2000 US dollars) in damages. In April 1999 NATO forces targeted a railroad bridge near
Grdelica, Serbia that was used to provide supplies to Yugoslavian fighters. A commuter train
carrying dozens of civilians crossed the bridge at the precise moment the rocket intercepted the
bridge. At least 20 civilians were killed, and the damage to the bridge (due to a train being in the
way of the rocket) was minor enough that it was only out of commission for a few months. In
1218 Shah Muhammad II of Khwarezm received notice from an envoy that Genghis Khan
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Multiple error types often cause catastrophic accidents under the best intentions. Actors
might have misinterpreted data, formulated wrong problems, or merely choosing the wrong
solution. Often, the Type IV error is at least partially to blame.368 Simply put, actors can make
their situations worse. In this study, supposing that the previous chapters have formulated the
correct problems and “mess” as they stand today, a very real potential Type IV error is glaringly
obvious. As discussed previously, O’Hanlon makes reference to this error when he insists that
disarmament negotiations should wait until there have been significant reductions in specific
international disputes, disputes that cannot be captured in this model’s fidelity; however, each
dispute might benefit from practitioners’ use of FCM.
If the world were rid of nuclear weapons by design before the end of 2019, what would
happen in 2020 to—for example—security guarantees the US and NATO provide to former
Eastern Bloc states? If Russia were no longer deterred from going further into Ukraine or
Georgia, would Russia decide to annex territory? While I do not attempt to predict Russia’s
behavior in a disarmed world, there are several side effects of the disarmed world that
practitioners would be wise to take under consideration. Furthermore, if the world were suddenly
void of nuclear weapons tomorrow, how close to parity would China be to the US in terms of
wanted to open bilateral trade. Believing this to be a ploy precipitating an attack, the Shah
arrested the envoy. Khan sent a second envoy in an attempt to open up diplomatic negotiations.
The shah had this envoy executed. Khan finally retaliated by attacking the Khwarezm,
completely annihilating the society. In January 1969, in an effort to mobilize fellow
Czechoslovak citizens to protest and rise up against the recent Soviet Occupation, Jan Palach, a
young college student, set himself on fire, inspiring a violent uprising against the Soviet Army.
The dissenters were outmatched, and the Czechoslovak middle class disavowed the protestors’
violence. Palach died in vain. In 1958 Communist Party of China Chairman Mao Zedong created
a labor policy that favored industrial production over the agrarian economy. His effort to
modernize China’s industry sector, along with drought and other poor weather patterns,
contributed significantly to the Great Chinese Famine, which lasted two or three years and killed
15 to 30 million people.
368
To refresh, the Type IV error is when you correctly solve one problem but make another
problem worse.
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power? And how would the Chinese-US dynamic change under these new conditions? If one
looks at these potential effects individually, they are huge. If these effects compound the other,
they are astronomical. If Russia moved into Europe, and if China sought to dramatically expand
its military presence in the South China Sea or to finalize its sovereign claims over the Senkaku
Islands against Japan, or if the US worried China was making significant advances on its
hegemonic position in terms of military power, it could be the rumblings of World War III, due
precisely to the loss of MAD.
In any event, O’Hanlon argues for a re-proliferation clause in a future disarmament treaty
that will be immediately and automatically enacted to quickly reduce the risk of major war—
wars that might result in a rush to build new nuclear weapons, culminating in at least one side
using at least one on the battlefield. In other words, O’Hanlon’s re-proliferation clause would be
wise for at least two reasons: 1) It can mitigate major conflict, and 2) states are likely to reproliferate during the outbreak of major conflict anyway, which could have disastrous effects if
not preemptively managed through the disarmament treaty. MAD is certainly preferable to
WWIII and nuclear annihilation.
Therefore, this section attempts to overcome the limits of the model by discussing why
disarmament, even under conditions set forth by the model, is likely only viable given major
reductions in international disputes and uncertainty. This section examines the theoretical
implications in terms of disarmament of balance of power with a global hegemon, the roles
presently-nuclear states might play in a disarmed world, the major disputes that must be
overcome prior to a successful (and Type IV error-avoidant) disarmament treaty, the benefits of
a re-proliferation clause (including a hypothetical scenario), and overcoming the Thucydides’
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Trap with the IAEA. Later in this chapter, I discuss lingering uncertainties and the model’s
remaining limits.

8.2 Thucydides and Power Balancing
The foundational text on the logic of realism, power shifts, and war is Thucydides’’ The
History of the Peloponnesian War (431 BCE). Thucydides, an exiled Athenian general during
the Peloponnesian War, provides one of the war’s only historical, eyewitness369 accounts.
Although he does not cover the war’s conclusion, he provides remarkable insight into a long and
bloody war from antiquity—a war, we find from sources beyond Thucydides that resulted in the
destruction of two kingdoms, Athens and Sparta, and culminated in the severely weakened
Sparta claiming a short-lived victory. The spark, writes Thucydides, that set the whole Aegean
Sea ablaze was a shift in the traditional balance of power.
Sparta, a warrior culture and the dominant military power comprising the Peloponnesian
League, maintained a tepid peace with Athens, a sea faring, trading nation. While Sparta was
certainly the more powerful state, Athens had been enjoying significant growth, both
economically and in terms of military power. In fact, Athens had accumulated, through purchase
and alliance, a naval force consisting of hundreds of ships. This, along with Athens’ decision to
rebuild its city walls following the Spartan-Athenian victory over the Persians, added stress to
the fragile truce. Thucydides, desiring that future diplomats avoid costly wars, takes the reader
through the difficult—and seemingly impossible—diplomatic crisis while everyone involved
tried in vain to prevent an “inevitable” war. He writes, “The real cause [of the war] I consider to
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be the one which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, and
the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon [Sparta], made war inevitable.”370
Thucydides, injecting mild hyperbole, picks up on a dynamic that has shaped
international relations as far back as the human race can remember and as far forward as the
human race can imagine. “Balance-of-power politics,” as Waltz puts it, “prevail whenever two,
and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units
wishing to survive.”371 Thucydides recognized a third requirement: Fear (or “alarm,” as it is put
in Richard Crawley’s translation). I make few distinctions between (Thucydidean) classical
realism and (Waltzian) neorealism. Rather, suffice it to say that both theories are compelling
arguments. Realism, as a general definition, explains the world of politics around us. And if the
Thucydidean trap is good prediction, therein lies trouble for the US and China in a world no
longer ordered through nuclear deterrence.
Allison Graham notes, “Intentions aside, when a rising power threatens to displace a
ruling power, the resulting structural stress makes a violent clash the rule, not the
exception.”372,373 He calls this phenomenon the “Thucydides Trap,” a term since adopted by
diplomats and academics, from General David Petraeus to Henry Kissinger to former Deputy
Permanent Representative of China to the UN, Wang Xuexian. Graham notes sixteen cases of
balance of power shifts during the previous five centuries. In twelve of those cases, the rise of
the challenger resulted in war. In only four cases, the challenger rose in terms of power without
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disrupting the relative peace. In other words, all other things equal, war between a rising China
and a declining US has 3:1 odds of occurring when the states reach power equilibrium, if history
is any indicator. While China balances both in terms of traditional power as well as
economically,374 the prior would be the main consideration in a world devoid of nuclear
weapons.
If nuclear weapons maintain the peace by defining cause and effect in no uncertain terms,
then how much certainty would China have in the South China Sea or the Senkaku Islands if 1)
nuclear weapons did not exist, and 2) two sides in dispute had robust conventional forces? More
important, how certain could a US encroacher in these maritime regions be that a Chinese
military buildup was not a precursor for a Chinese military campaign against the US or its allies?
Another way to put it is: If nuclear weapons are abolished tomorrow, the difference of power
between the US and China would be narrowed significantly, along with the expected costs of allout war. If we trust Thucydides, or more modern writers such as Powell,375 this would put
tremendous stress on the US to reduce China’s military capability. And if the Peloponnesian War
is an indicator, we can imagine a world where China and the US reduce each other’s power
through a protracted war, and Russia gaining absolute advantage over both its adversaries. And
because China and the US are aware of this possible future, it can, at the first hint of malicious
intent, invoke re-proliferation, leading to a re-proliferation cascade.
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Allison notes, through examination of the power shifts that did not result in war, a rising
China does not necessarily mean there will be war with the US. The states can avoid this war;
given both states acknowledge two difficult truths. First, the current trajectory is leading to war.
Second, war is not necessarily a resultant conclusion of power shifts.376 Furthermore, the US and
China must increase dialog, engage in constant dispute resolution, and, most important, seek to
change attitudes and actions.377 While Allison is writing about the status quo—a world where
both China and the US have nuclear weapons378—these acknowledgements and actions are even
more necessary in a world where neither have nuclear weapons.
The role of the US and NATO in Europe is another potential for major war in a nonnuclear world. In 2008, following increasing unrest from Abkhazian and South Ossetian
separatists, Russian military forces invaded Georgia and occupied these territories. In 2014 the
Russian Federation annexed Crimea from Ukraine, following a violent Ukrainian revolution that
ousted the pro-Kremlin president. Of particular note are the strong Russian links between Russia
and the annexed or occupied territories. Crimea’s population, for example, was over 65% ethnic
Russian in 2014. This contrasts with Ida-Viru County, Estonia, with an ethnic Russian
population at over 73%. What differentiates Ukraine from Estonia is Estonia’s membership in
NATO, which, on paper, guarantees Estonia’s security through Article V, also known as the
collective defense article in which NATO member states will militarily defend all of its member
states. Ukraine and Georgia have no NATO membership or collective security guarantees. In a
nuclear world Russia’s cost of going to war with NATO by invading or attempting to annex IdaViru greatly outweighs its benefit. If the cost of a nuclear attack is removed from Russia’s
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calculus, it might feel the benefit of annexing Ida-Viru outweighs the cost. If Russia invaded any
neighbor following global disarmament, particularly a NATO member, NATO, or more
specifically the US, would be left with either accepting the new status quo, thus rewarding
Russia for deviant behavior, or entering a costly war. Again, this scenario does not rule out the
possibility of re-proliferation. Therefore, the resolution of this dispute takes high precedence
before any disarmament treaty can be signed.
The Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan,379 two nuclear weapons outlier states,
is another dispute requiring immediate resolution. This became apparent in the previous chapter
when the needs of Outlier States became a necessary consideration. This dispute has been
ongoing for over seventy years, with periodic wars and skirmishes (some of which have occurred
after both India and Pakistan proliferated nuclear weapons380). This dispute is further
complicated and has become more important to resolve due to the entrance of non-state actors
and jihadist groups, such as al Qaeda and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. These non-state actors could
inherit nuclear weapons programs if they grew strong enough to pose a credible threat to existing
or future regimes.
Three other ongoing disputes need attention, but their resolutions might not be necessary
prior to disarmament treaty negotiations. First, Israeli-Arab/Iranian disputes in the Middle East
complicate satisficing capability. On the one hand, Israel’s nuclear weapons program provides
the Jewish state with negotiation leverage that Arab states and Iran do not possess. Furthermore,
Israel’s nuclear weapons program is not necessarily viewed as a guarantor of its survival but
rather a dead man’s hand in the event that it feels its existential security is about to be reduced to
379
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zero. Its program, while the ultimate deterrent, is also means of revenge in the case of defeat.
This does not imply that negotiating Israel’s disarmament is impossible. Israel could follow the
South African model, identified in the previous chapter. In the event that Israel achieves a true
and lasting peace with its neighbors, finds reconciliation with Palestinians with legitimate land
claims within Israel’s borders and along the West Bank and Gaza, and enters into a legally
binding collective security arrangement with the US (or, albeit unlikely, a collective security
regime within the Middle East) then it is reasonable to hypothesize that, like South Africa
following its threat relief, Israel could find that nuclear weapons no longer serve its needs.381
Another area of concern in the Middle East is the possible proliferation of Arab states or Iran.
Several of these states, including Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya have had bona fide nuclear
weapons programs that have been curtailed or halted. Therefore, a disarmament treaty should
address these states’ security needs.
Second, there is the issue with Taiwan’s security. It is not difficult to imagine that, with
the US losing its nuclear deterrent, China moves significant conventional forces to the island and
self-fulfills its territorial claims. Because Taiwan is aware of this threat, it might consider its own
nuclear deterrent, particularly if the US reduces its commitment to Taipei as part of negotiations
with China.
Finally, the ongoing dispute between the ROK and the DPRK is the last major area of
concern. Recent events, however, suggest that Kim Jong Un is willing to discuss disarmament if
its security concerns are alleviated. The environment of the post-2018 Winter Olympics in
PyeongChang, ROK is skeptically optimistic. Kim and ROK leader Moon Jae In have made
significant progress, relative to the preceding decades. US President Trump has furthermore
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brought the DPRK into the spotlight382 and demonstrated that the West takes its needs seriously,
which, as Problem 2’s modeling indicated, is a requirement for a successful treaty.
At a minimum the major issues need to be addressed.383 Beyond that, resolution of
secondary issues makes the “mess” less messy, which would benefit future practitioners.
Because the model in the previous chapters cannot account for these international disputes, it
does not consider them while determining if max
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≥ 1 has been satisfied. Therefore,

borrowing from O’Hanlon, “The right time horizon for seriously pushing a new nuclear accord is
when most of the world’s half dozen or so major territorial and existential issues are resolved—
and this cannot be set to a calendar as precisely as the Global Zero movement would like.”384 In
other words, while the previous chapter’s models suggest intervention is warranted and possible
in the present, a more holistic view of the problems reveal serious hurdles that could result in one
or more error types if action is taken prior to their resolution, particularly a Type IV error—
World War III (followed by systemic re-proliferation).
In summary of the above, Allison agrees with O’Hanlon in prescription.385 Preexisting
disputes must be resolved before disarmament treaties can be negotiated.386 Although this level
of fidelity does not appear in my model, it must be implicit.
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8.3 The Type I Error and the Benefits of Re-Proliferation
Thucydides’ observation on human behavior is, at its core, that humans are inclined to
commit the Type I error (a false positive) due to evolutionary pressures selecting individuals that
take precautions. As mentioned in earlier, committing the Type I error can be costly, but
committing the Type II (the false negative) error can be deadly. While Sparta suffered great cost
by incorrectly assuming Athens had malicious intent in building fortifications and its naval
forces, Sparta could have lost significantly more if Athens continued to build its power,
unchecked, until it could easily defeat Sparta (for example, through a naval blockade and
scorched earth tactics).
Realism, both classic and new, is also the proposition that states are more likely to make
the Type I error than they are the Type II error. Both variants of realism are concerned with
survival, but the former focuses on fear as a driving force towards the Type I error, while the
latter focuses on cost-benefit calculations.
Suspecting danger is a natural condition in human affairs. Early morning joggers often
cross the street to avoid the unfamiliar dog taking her morning walk, despite its tether. Police
officers must constantly choose between making the Type I and Type II errors when facing
belligerent suspects (a Type I error might result in criminal charges against the officer, while a
Type II error might result in a flag-draped coffin). In international politics, the US committed the
Type I error when it erroneously assumed Saddam Hussein had a weapons of mass destruction
program. Iraq committed a Type II error when it erroneously assumed the US would not retaliate
against insubordination towards IAEA inspectors. If it had risked the Type I error, Saddam might
have remained in power until his natural death. Most profoundly, the US committed a Type I
error when it erroneously believed Nazi Germany was actively seeking atomic weapons during
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WWII.387 And the belief that another state might harm you with nuclear weapons is a good
reason to seek nuclear weapons of your own.
In this sense it can be surmised that, given the model parameters, and given holistic
treatment of the system (solving ongoing disputes prior to acting), then periodic nuclear
reconstitution can be a good thing. This self-fulfilling prophecy tests the problem’s limits and
quickly restores order in the event of crisis. The following hypothetical scenario illustrates the
point.
I imagine that in the distant (but not too distant) future, major disputes in international
affairs have been resolved or largely mitigated. The nuclear weapons problem remains structured
as it was in the 2010s. Ukraine has little reason to worry about further Russian encroachment.
Kashmir is satisfied with its new arrangements. Iran has enjoyed years of economic and nuclear
diplomacy—expanding the BRICS to the BRIICS—and poses no major threats to Israel, which
also enjoys new peace arrangements with the Western-backed regimes to arise from the ashes of
the Arab Winter. China, following tense negotiations, and after overtaking the US as the most
dominant economic power in terms of power purchasing parity and actual gross domestic
product, has agreed to a maritime treaty that benefits all stakeholders (using fuzzy cognitive
mapping, of course). The US has spent years investing in computer science and has emerged as
the global network security provider. The Koreas have been engaging in ongoing peace talks.
Kim Jong Un’s heir apparent has just finished her first year at university in Geneva. Although
few new democracies have entered the community, at the moment the international environment
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begins to resemble Francis Fukuyama’s thesis.388 Conflict has largely declined in the Northern
hemisphere. The IAEA has increased its budget commensurate to the size and scope of its
mission and for years has found compliance is the norm. The United Nations has largely turned
to humanitarian missions, focusing on women’s rights in developing nations, access to potable
water and food in areas affected by natural disasters, and developing coed soccer-based missions
along historically disputed borders. Next year is the NPT Review Conference, and there is talk
that the NAM, led by the Republic of South Sudan since its ascendency to the NPT, is going to
push for a universal disarmament treaty.
The P5 objects. Although major international disputes have been resolved, the memory of
conflict still lingers. The Outlier States object on different grounds. They view the P5’s objection
as hypocritical and worry that a disarmament treaty will exempt legal nuclear weapons states,
according to the NPT. The Outlier States will not agree to a treaty that punishes them and
rewards the major powers. At the NPT states’ urging, UN Secretary General Malala Yousafzai
calls a session between key stakeholders and introduces a necessary clause that allows current
nuclear weapons states and any state currently in possession of nuclear weapons to re-proliferate
in the span of six weeks in the event that those individual states’ national security needs
substantially change. This requires two things: 1) withdraw from the treaty takes effect
immediately after announcement, and 2) states are legally permitted to store under safeguard
enough special nuclear material and technologies to proliferate within six weeks. After tense
negotiating, the P5 agrees to the treaty’s terms. The Outlier States agree on condition that they
388
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play a larger role in verification. At the NPT Review Conference the treaty is signed and, over
the next year, all existing nuclear weapons, special nuclear materials, and components are
dismantled, destroyed, mothballed and/or placed under safeguards. There is now universal
adherence to the NPT and Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the Additional Protocol.
A few years later Japanese fishermen suffer navigation system failure and head towards
the closest land, which is a man-made island presently occupied by the Chinese Navy. The
fishermen are accused of being Japanese spies, intent on testing the limits of the maritime treaty
in hopes that China will back down and chip away at the treaty. Japan vehemently denies this
accusation and calls upon the UN to intervene and return the fishermen to their native lands.
Fearing further encroachments in China’s territorial waters, China deploys twice as many Naval
vessels to police the South China Sea, de facto expanding China’s sea claims with a fifty-mile
buffer zone. A US-led coalition with Japan and several South East Asian nations deploy forces to
counter the new Chinese threat and to protect free navigation as part of the maritime treaty. A
few small skirmishes between trawlers and the Chinese Navy ensue, leading to US-led
countermeasures. China mobilizes its reserve forces, which sparks worry in India. India deploys
standby forces to the border. China, fearful that its national security is at stake, expels IAEA
inspectors and threatens to invoke the re-proliferation article of the disarmament treaty.
The US, India, and Russia immediately view this threat as a ploy to become a global
military hegemon. Pakistan worries that India will invoke re-proliferation to counter the Chinese
threat. The entire world hears the rumblings of WWIII. Satellite images capture US teams
funneling resources to its enrichment facilities at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the IAEA
is concerned that the US will break the tamper-proof inspection seals on canisters containing
safeguarded plutonium in New Mexico. Attempting to deter the US from clandestinely
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proliferating, an event that could have catastrophic results, the IAEA makes an emergency
statement condemning the US’s movements. Russia and China read the statement, and, fearful
they will be attacked without a nuclear deterrent, invoke the re-proliferation article. Within
months nuclear re-proliferation has cascaded through the international system. At least six states
now have the ability to inflict a second strike on any aggressor, while England, France, Japan,
Saudi Arabia, and Australia reconsider their nuclear options.
We might assume this would demonstrate the infeasibility of universal disarmament. On
the contrary, it demonstrates that disarmament is possible when the system demands it. In
addition to avoiding WWIII by using nuclear deterrence as a buffer against war, the treaty
successfully dismantled all existing nuclear weapons and provided a known pathway towards
future disarmament. During the ensuing years while the international community deals with
newly emerged disputes that threaten global war, diplomats can once again use preexisting
frameworks to address the nuclear weapons problem.
But more important, this escalation of military violence that compelled re-proliferation
serves to strengthen my central argument. That is, Perkovich and Acton’s Abolishing Nuclear
Weapons offers some insight. Nuclear deterrence can give way to deterrence through
proliferation threats. By offering previously proliferated states the option to proliferate in short
order, deterrence of even small wars is maintained because the calculus demands the outcome be
identical to MAD.389 In other words, MAD is replaced with the threat of MAD against states
behaving belligerently (Threaten). Figure 8.1 highlights this.
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Figure 8.1: Maintaining MAD without Nuclear Forces: Extended Form Game

This game illustrates how two states in conflict seeking to maximize security can be
deterred by the potential threat of MAD, The purpose of this game is for either side to maximize
security along the lines of realist schools of thought. Four assumptions are given. First, in the
scenario illustrated in Figure 8.1, two former nuclear powers are in a competitive and conflictual
relationship. Neither their histories nor their present arrangements leave either side completely
trusting of the other. Second, this is not a fictional universe where the knowledge of fission has
been erased: nuclear know-how exists. Third, both sides have the ability to produce a second
strike capability within a relatively short timeframe (six weeks is sufficient). Fourth, both sides
have stated their resolve to resume their nuclear weapons programs if the other side resumes
theirs. Finally, if the game progresses to the final stage, where MAD is reestablished, then
neither side can move. The payouts for attack under MAD is, as the name implies, assured
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destruction. Therefore, MAD is secure, but it is costly, given both sides must resume their
weapons programs and engage in counter attacks.
In other words, Figure 8.1 illustrates a scenario where two sides in conflict with nuclear
know-how—and with perfect information about the other side390—must choose between
behaving according to the new status quo—global powers without nuclear forces—and behaving
according to the former status quo under MAD.
Player 1’s payout are listed first, followed by a comma “,” and Player 2’s payout, except
in the final round along Player 1’s “d” move, where both sides receive the same payouts under
MAD and are therefore combined into a single payout.
Working backwards with a payout of MAD, Player 1, at movement “d,” has the option of
proliferating and receiving MAD (which requires the costs of a limited war LW and the costs of
proliferation PC) and insecurity ~S. MAD is preferable to insecurity. It is also stable, and any
preceding war will be limited once nuclear weapons are added, due to the longstanding reasoning
that nuclear weapons erase uncertainty of the other’s capabilities, thus compelling conflict deescalation.391 As previously mentioned, MAD’s stability applies an equal payout to both players
1 and 2.392
From there, Player 2, at its “b” position, gets to move only if Player 1 has attacked it. Its
payouts include proliferating and achieving MAD and not proliferating and leaving the resolution
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of the war up to potential attrition. In other words, its payout is security S minus the costs of a
limited war LW and the costs of proliferation PC against inevitable security393 minus the costs of
a total war that is uninhibited by proliferation. Considering it prefers a limited war to a total war,
and that proliferation costs are sufficiently low, due to onsite Plutonium reserves and immediate
access to mothballed weapons components, Player 2 will choose the route that achieves MAD.
At Player 1’s “c” position, Player 2 has previously defected D from the nonproliferation
agreement, prompting Player 1’s next movement. Player 1 knows that if it attacks, Player 2 will
proliferate, and if Player 2 proliferates, Player 1 must proliferate, or else it risks annihilation. At
this stage, if Player 1 does not attack it receives security S minus some reputational cost. Player 2
receives security S minus some undefined costs δ due to violating international norms relating to
decency. The calculus is not perfect here. It is reasonable to assume most states would prefer
reputational costs to the costs of limited wars, but this is not always the case. For example, it can
be argued Saddam Hussein preferred the costs of a limited war to reputation costs during the
1990 – 1991 Gulf War. Indeed, Baudrillard argues the war was carefully scripted to maximize
Iraq’s and the coalition force’s reputation, while both sides willingly inflicted war costs on Iraq’s
civilians.394 Furthermore, reputational costs might also be associated with sanctions or other
punishments. Therefore, one can assign some probabilities to this round. It is reasonable to
assume Player 1 will choose to back down and not attack with probability p and will attack with
probability 1-p. P can be set to 0.25 for the sake of illustration, but p’s value does not affect the
game’s ultimate outcome.
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Considering that Player 2 instead chose to continue to cooperate C with the
nonproliferation agreement, Player 1, at its position “b” must choose between attacking Player 2,
despite Player 2’s continued nuclear cooperation, and receive eventual security S minus the costs
of total war CW and receiving security S minus some reputational costs RC due to its belligerent
actions taken at its position “a.”
At Player 2’s position “a,” Player 1 has violated international standards of decency by
threatening its former nuclear neighbor. Player 2 must choose between continued cooperation C
and defection from the nonproliferation agreement D. If it chooses D it knows it is setting in
motion a cascade of events that will culminate in MAD. On the other hand, if it chooses C, it has
some probability of achieving and maintaining a payout of security S based on Player 1’s
preferences between reputational costs RC and the costs of a total war CW. Therefore, this game
cannot determine with certainty Player 2’s movement at its position “a.”
Finally, at Player 1’s position “a,” it can continue to be in good standing with the
nonproliferation agreement and refrain from threatening behaviors ~T or it can threaten its
former nuclear neighbor T. An example might be a maritime power asserting dominance over
shipping lanes previously agreed to be international waters. If it plays T, it knows it will lose
something. It will eventually achieve security, but will suffer some costs. It would be a limited or
total war, there could be reputational costs, and there could be the additional costs of
proliferation. Otherwise, Player 1 can play T and continue to enjoy security S without any
additional costs.
In order for this game to be accurate, any disarmament accord and nonproliferation treaty
must make certain steps immediate, and they must have high probabilities of detecting
clandestine defection. This includes IAEA monitored cameras in plutonium and uranium storage
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areas and electronically monitored seals that can alarm if tampered with. Additionally, it might
require IAEA inspectors under diplomatic privilege live in country so that they can visit and
inspect any anomalies within twenty-four hours. Without these provisions, clandestine defection
might be preferable, rendering the game irrelevant.
Figure 8.2 illustrates how this game is solved. The unbroken green line from the first
round to a final payout is the desired path.

Figure 8.2: Maintaining MAD without Nuclear Forces: Solved

This game’s outcome suggests the logic set forth by Perkovich and Acton; in a world
where nuclear weapons have been abolished, maintaining the relatively peaceful nuclear-free
world requires an understanding of Mutual Assured Proliferation, as negotiated in a future
disarmament treaty, as a means for reestablishing MAD. That is, simply threatening a belligerent
actor with proliferating can maintain relatively peaceful relations between nations. And because
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the cost of proliferating is MAD, and because MAD is costlier than the status quo, proliferation
contradicts each side’s preference to maximize its utility. The costs of proliferation are high and
the benefits are zero if one cannot use the weapons they proliferate. In short, Mutual Assured
Proliferation in a disarmed world can be as effective as MAD was during the Cold War.

8.4 Dealing with the Remaining Uncertainties
This final substantive section identifies three remaining major areas of concern pertaining
to the model developed in earlier chapters. First, Outlier States remain a foremost area of worry,
particularly because recent history has not treated many Outlier States well. Second, there is a
reasonable assumption that not all negotiations will occur in good faith. Some stakeholders,
particularly individual states, might misrepresent their preferences in order to avoid a worst-case
scenario outcome. Finally, the model’s data is user defined along a Likert-type scale. This
presents several points culpable to flaw during the “knowledge capture” phase of modeling.
These uncertainties demonstrate a need to tread lightly when attempting to negotiate to global
zero.

Outlier States
IAEA safeguards failed twice in Iraq. Prior to the Persian Gulf War, the IAEA and the
international community incorrectly believed Iraq was in compliance with the IAEA and the
NPT (a Type II error). Although Iraq was party to the NPT and the IAEA, it secretly funded a
nuclear weapons program without the IAEA’s or the international community’s notice.
Following the 1991 war, the IAEA discovered Iraq’s burgeoning militarized nuclear program,
which included enough nuclear material to build a weapon (although many technical hurdles still
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existed). After this discovery, the international community held Iraq to higher scrutiny. Saddam
Hussein, however, slowly decreased IAEA inspectors’ access to facilities under safeguard,
culminating in Iraq’s complete refusal to allow inspections. US President George W. Bush
viewed Saddam’s refusal as a tacit acknowledgement that Iraq had resumed its weapons of mass
destruction programs. In February 2003, shortly before the war, Saddam sat down for an
interview with Dan Rather, an American news anchor for CBS Evening News. Among other
things, Saddam insisted Iraq was not manufacturing or in possession of weapons of mass
destruction. He also insisted he would not step down. After this interview aired, Bush decided to
invade Iraq and force a regime change. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the IAEA and other
inspectors found no evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs (in other words,
they committed a Type I error). Saddam fled, was captured several months later by US forces,
stood trial for war crimes, was convicted, sentenced to death, and subsequently handed over to
Iraqi officials a few months shy of his seventieth birthday. Had the US forces held onto Saddam
until he reached seventy, he would have been ineligible for capital punishment under Iraqi law.
Saddam was executed by year’s end.
Saddam’s ouster over its WMD program signaled to Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi,
the extent to which the US was prepared to curb nuclear proliferation. Libya had a long-standing
desire to proliferate, although its attempts to build weapon components, enrich uranium, or
purchase weapons on the black market were usually unsuccessful. But following the US’s
response in Iraq, Gaddafi changed course. He sought to work with Bush, the IAEA, and
international organizations in exchange for sanction relief. The disarmament of Libya was a
strong success, and Gaddafi spent the next decade increasing his international image as
Chairperson of the African Union. By early 2011, however, the Arab Spring had broken out, and
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Gaddafi’s Libyan regime swiftly faced a civil war. US President Barack Obama and NATO
backed the Libyan rebels, viewing this as an opportunity for regime change in Libya. NATO
forces attacked Gaddafi’s convoy in October 2011. The leader was quickly captured and
assassinated.
Following a lengthy war with Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran sought to acquire a
nuclear deterrence. Being a revolutionary government founded upon the overthrow of a Westernbacked monarchy, Iran inherited many of the tools necessary for uranium enrichment. For the
next three decades—during which time Israeli strikes, cyber-attacks, and international sanctions
were imposed—the international community viewed Iranian proliferation as an immediate area
of concern. By 2005 the nuclear standoff reached its apex when Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad removed monitoring devices the IAEA had installed on materials placed under
safeguard. For the next decade the international community and the IAEA engaged Iran with
sanctions and diplomacy in hopes of bringing Iran back into good standing with the IAEA and
the NPT. The results of years of maneuvering was the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
which eased Iran’s sanctions in exchange for robust nuclear safeguards that effectively stopped
Iran from proliferating in the short- to mid-term. The agreement was signed by leaders from the
P5, Germany, the European Union, and Iran. While this agreement demonstrated that nuclear
nonproliferation was still viable as a product of diplomacy, the agreement’s future is uncertain.
At the time of this writing (January 2019), the US, under President Donald Trump, is no longer
party to the plan and has announced its blueprint for re-imposing Iranian sanctions.
These developments highlight the effects of uncertainty and the need to understand that
states might be apprehensive to engage with the major powers out of fear of being punished.
Saddam Hussein was executed. NATO attacked Muammar Gaddafi, which led to his
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assassination. The US sanctioned Iran. All of these developments occurred despite these leaders
and countries changing course and abandoning nuclear weapons programs.395 Therefore, it is
reasonable that Outlier States might approach negotiations with trepidation, particularly the
DPRK.
Recalling Richardson’s arms race model, where a state’s military spending is a function
of its adversary’s military spending, we can see that modeling human behavior is far from
perfect. Richardson himself acknowledges this limitation, writing, “Such a psychological effect
[holding a grievance] cannot be properly described by linear equations.”396 In other words, it is
necessary that we understand the history between the two nations that led to hostilities,
especially because nations might not balance against their adversaries. In this model,
understanding international history, particularly what happened to leaders who abandoned their
programs and paid the ultimate price anyway, takes place outside of modeling, but is essential to
the success of a nuclear disarmament treaty. Would Kim Jong Un agree to total nuclear
disarmament and strict IAEA jurisdiction if doing so would remove all deterrent from NATO
strikes designed to help overthrow the Kim Dynasty? Would Pakistan trust that Western allies
would protect Pakistani leaders during civil unrest if there are no nuclear weapons to keep out of
the hands of non-state actors?
There is some hope for the DPRK and Pakistan. The India-Nuclear Suppliers Group
agreement between India and the US under George W. Bush contradicts US activities against
Iraq, Iran, and Libya. India was rewarded with increased access to the nuclear energy market,
despite India being a non-recognized nuclear weapons state. And given that it cannot be
guaranteed that components sold to India will not be used in its weapons program, the Bush deal
395
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could be in violation of NPT Article I, which prohibits states from assisting states in their nuclear
weapons programs. In other words, there is no necessary cause and effect between proliferation
or nonproliferation actions and reward or punishment.
Furthermore, this model does not reflect other wants, goals, or capabilities not explicitly
part of the problem. Outlier States seek prestige in this model, but they also have other interests,
both domestic and abroad. These apply to all states and include internal stability, access to
international markets, alliances with friendly neighbors against neighborhood threats, and others.
Non-state actors have other interests as well, including prosperity, security against disease, and
access to potable water and food, etc. While these interests do not have a substantial effect on
decisions to proliferate or disarm, the impact is not zero.
These uncertainties, however, which exist even in the presence of binding international
law, do not offer the model’s results considerable strength. I would recommend that states tread
lightly when negotiating a future global disarmament treaty, but the Outlier States will already be
highly skeptical, at best.

Good Faith Goals and Negotiations
Brazil’s proposed late 2020s nuclear-powered submarine, the French-designed SN Álvaro
Alberto, presents a unique conundrum for future nuclear safeguards negotiations. IAEA
safeguards agreements and the NPT were negotiated at a point in time when nuclear weapons
already existed, and the nuclear haves were not ready yet to become nuclear have nots.
Therefore, exempt from IAEA safeguards inspections are nuclear technologies for military
purposes. The logic of these agreements is straightforward along two lines: First, the recognized
nuclear weapons states already have nuclear weapons and therefore do not need to divert
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materials to clandestine nuclear weapons programs. Inspections would be a waste of energy and
resources. Second, inspections of military capabilities risks the inspected state being forced to
divulge secret military information to the international community, a violation of state
sovereignty. Therefore, at the time it was reasonable to include provision prohibiting the
inspection of militarized nuclear technologies. Furthermore, at the time of negotiation, nuclear
have nots were more interested in securing their current and future rights to nuclear energy for
civil purposes, rather than nuclear energy for military purposes. The problem facing the IAEA at
the present is that Brazil has a right to nuclear submarines, and once it secures a nuclear
submarine (which carries with it a reactor capable of producing plutonium), the IAEA will be all
but powerless to prevent Brazil from proliferating.397
The scenario above illustrates conflicting goals. On the one hand, some states desire
nuclear propulsion for their navies; on the other hand, many states, as active members within the
IAEA, want to safeguard all points along the nuclear fuel cycle to prevent proliferation. These
are not the only conflicting goals. Some states (namely New Zealand) presently take the position
that even nuclear power is dangerous.398 In other words, there are several competing goals, and
synthesis between them falls under the domain of social choice theory or collective choice
theory. This is also certainly true for the problems defined in earlier chapters.
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In a non-dictatorial international community, where future nuclear weapons states
negotiate under the assumption that a disarmament treaty is binding, the logic of realism is not
displaced. Rather, given competing goals and the ability to cast a (very weighty) vote, nuclear
weapons states can partake in strategic voting, where it changes its preferences in order to secure
a non-worst-case-scenario election outcome.
The concept of strategic voting was first independently formulated by Gibbard in 1973399
and Satterthwaite in 1975.400 The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem holds that in an election that is
non-dictatorial and has non-limited alternatives, possible outcomes are susceptible to strategic
voting. Using Brazil and the nuclear submarine as an illustration, strategic voting might occur
when the IAEA brings Brazil to the negotiating table as the late 2020s launch date approaches.
The future Brazil might prefer to maintain the same level of sovereignty over its military forces
as the P5 (we will call this A). In other words, its submarine is off limits to inspectors, during
fueling, operation, and refueling, and at no point during the nuclear fuel cycle are inspectors
allowed. Its second preferred state might be to remain in good standing with the IAEA and the
international community to avoid costly sanctions (B). Its least preferred state might be to incur
sanctions costs (C).
Therefore, Brazil’s preferences are

A>B>C
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And assuming there are several other voters, it might be the case that many future states are
members of Nuclear Free Zones and therefore take the New Zealand position and strongly
support sanctions for states that violate the taboo against nuclear propulsion. That is, they
strongly prefer C to B or A. A considerable chunk of the international community supports
strengthening the IAEA’s ability to conduct inspections while ensuring NPT states’ right to
nuclear technology. That is, they prefer B over A or C. Facing the threat of sanctions, Brazil
might change its vote from A to B. In other words, this hypothetical future Brazil has engaged in
strategic voting in order to prevent the worst outcome.
Strategic voting might also mar a FCM’s outcome, particularly if one expands the P5 and
Outlier States into individual stakeholders. In a model where the US and the DPRK are
negotiating the DPRK’s nuclear disarmament, it is reasonable to question whether or not, for
example, US President Donald Trump and DPRK Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un are negotiating
in good faith or whether or not either or both of them are misrepresenting the order of their
preferences in order to attain a better outcome.
Taking this into a larger context (the “mess”), uncertainties grow. Future practitioners
and modelers should be aware of these uncertainties and work on ways to mitigate them. While
uncertainty can never be eliminated, understanding that uncertainty exists can help satisfy
Sterman’s requirement for a more “useful” model.401

Knowledge Capture
Despite Outlier State involvement and overcoming strategic voting, useful models need
to accurately represent the world in which they are operating. The model shown in the preceding
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chapters contains 55 components with 166 non-zero links between them.402 If one includes the
zero (or non-links), the number of possible combinations is quite large. This leaves nontrivial
space for modeler error. Indeed, using the sigmoid transfer function and not limiting it with a
Likert-type scale, the number of possible variable value combinations reaches infinity.
In a perfect world this study would have been created with input from government
leaders, particularly the P5, the International Atomic Energy Agency, non-governmental
organizations, and other relevant stakeholders. This is not a perfect world, however, and there are
major limitations to my ability to secure meetings with leaders like Kim Jong Un. These
limitations have the potential to translate directly into the study. Therefore they must be
addressed.
Jetter and Kok identify three sources for knowledge: the modeler, documents, and expert
survey. This study relied on the first two solely without expert input. Certainly, expert
involvement would increase the model’s fidelity, but its contribution at this phase—when the
international community has not yet resolved major international disputes—is not likely to
change much of the model’s performance.
Due to the application of the Likert-type scale, variation is subjectively defined. This
limits potential inaccuracies and increases robustness when real-world scenarios change by small
amounts. For example, as the model stands, the IAEA can moderately increase nuclear weapons
states security. If the IAEA increases its budget by 10%, this needn’t translate into a precise
value; rather, the Likert-type scale might still define its ability to increase security as moderate.
Therefore, while future models, particularly those used in practice rather than study, will
benefit from increased participation of experts, especially if these experts are relevant
402
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stakeholders. For the purpose of an exploratory study, however, it is reasonable that experts are
not necessary at this time.

8.5 Summary
The preceding chapters carefully build a model of the nuclear weapons “mess” and its
constituent problems. This chapter attempts to acknowledge areas of remaining concern and to
address possible ways to mitigate some of this concern. It cannot be stressed strongly enough,
however, that future leaders should approach global disarmament negotiations according to the
realists before them: With a strong dose of skepticism. But this does not mean future negotiations
are futile.
The threat of war can be moderated. Leaders most likely will not be able to even have
disarmament talks if there are remaining major international debates, such as the South China
Sea and Crimea. While it is not impossible for these international problems to flare up again
following successful disarmament talks, especially if Graham Allison’s Thucydides Trap
accurately points to pattern, it is also likely that successful disarmament talks would be the
resultant and perhaps necessary conclusion of successful resolution of areas of global concern.
Additionally, disarmament in the twenty-first (or beyond) century is not to harken back to a time
before fission was discovered. A disarmed world cannot appear unrecognizable; therefore,
former nuclear weapons states, either by design or by default, will have the capability of reproliferating and reviving their second-strike capabilities in a matter of weeks. These
capabilities, instead of making a disarmed world less likely, will benefit the disarmed world by
maintaining MAD with a small tweak; MAD will be amended with the threat of MAD, or mutual
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assured proliferation, which must result in the revival of MAD. In other words, the disarmed
world is not as uncertain as realists might assume.
Finally, there are less major (but not minor) uncertainties still remaining. Outlier States
have no guarantees, especially if history is a good indicator, that they will not be punished after
dismantling their nuclear weapons programs. Western states have a growing history of
supporting regime change in states that have changed course from rogue to team player.
Therefore, Outlier States with current or burgeoning nuclear deterrents will understandably
approach disarmament negotiations with healthy levels of suspicion. On the other hand, there is
no discernable cause and effect; other Outlier States have been rewarded by the international
community, despite having gone rogue. Finding the cause behind the reward might allay Outlier
States’ distrust.
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CHAPTER 9
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

9.1 We Cannot Get to Disarmament Now
The preceding chapters highlight an obvious truth; disarmament is not a feasible outcome
in the present, despite what the simulation suggests. This study opens with an undeniable fact
that I do not intend to conceal. There exist too many ongoing geopolitical disputes to undermine
the realist position on nuclear weapons. Namely, while realism cannot explain the lack of
horizontal nuclear proliferation, it explains perfectly why nuclear weapons states fail to live up to
their expectations in the NPT Article VI. To do so would, for example, substantially lessen the
power gap between the US and China in the South China Sea and remove most disincentives for
war. The ultimate Type IV error in global disarmament is World War III and a resultant race
towards rearmament, an outcome that does not preclude the possibility of a nuclear war. The first
side to rearm would require a demonstration of their nuclear deterrent, and they might be
persuaded to attempt to destroy another side’s nuclear facilities to prevent it from gaining its own
deterrent. This study does not attempt to ignore reality or place the reader in another universe,
and therefore it accepts that disarmament is neither easy nor likely in the short term.
On the other hand, recent history has witnessed the elimination of Libya’s nuclear
program (2003), the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that abolished Iran’s nuclear program
(2015), and, most notably, the DPRK-ROK-US ongoing peace and disarmament talks (beginning
in 2018). These demonstrate that significant progress can be and is being made. Therefore, the
abolitionist must not worry that global zero is perpetually out of reach, as my study reveals. But
the abolitionist would be wise to refrain from pushing too hard now; doing so might convince
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nuclear weapons states to withdraw from treaties they feel undermine their national interest,
pushing global zero further into the future, a Type IV error.
But the realism in international relations scholarship that holds us to our nuclear arsenals
also faces anomalies from within. On the one hand, we have the Waltzes and Mearsheimers who
claim that simple cost-benefit calculations under the perfect certainty nuclear weapons provide
make it not just rational for states to possess nuclear weapons; they strongly imply or explicitly
state that possessing nuclear weapons is the preferred state, even when speaking in terms of our
foes. On the other hand we have the Sagans and Booths who accept the balance of power and
anarchy as dominant ordering mechanisms, but reach a radically different conclusion, despite
working with the same bank of evidence.403 They argue it might actually be preferable to rid the
world of nuclear weapons and that this conclusion can be reached without violating the basic
tenets of political realism.
Chapter 2 highlights this study’s urgency. Although the risk of nuclear war is low,
following realist logic, the costs of even a small nuclear war are sufficiently high to warrant a
sincere discussion about the role nuclear weapons play in international affairs. These costs
include not only the loss of human life, but major psychological, economic, and social stresses
that play against global meteorological consequences, reducing resources and leading to chaos in
some regions. Additionally, the simple fact that capability matters more than intent requires that
we accept that any country with nuclear weapons has the capability to use them, despite their
intent to deter and be deterred. The fact that nuclear deterrence can break down, and the fact that
a resultant nuclear war—whether limited or total—would be catastrophic, including the
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possibility of the human extinction, means it is, for many, a moral obligation to work towards
nuclear abolition. For others, it might be simply a different calculation of survival dressed up as
morality. It is rational to take action that prevents the human extinction.
Jonathan Schell, in his 1984 essay, “The Abolition,” stumbled upon an alternate structure
to realism, seemingly by accident. He notes that human beings tend to be altruistic, willing to
contradict the very sanctity of their mortality. Every now and then, an individual is called upon
to lay down his or her life in exchange for the well being of a loved one or a community. And
often this individual answers that call. These are not people suffering from depression or other
risks associated with suicide. Often these are parents sacrificing their lives to save their children.
The child’s future is worth more than the parent’s future to the community. Indeed, their
communities often shame parents that eschew this moral obligation. Schell carries this to a likely
conclusion in nuclear affairs. If we are able to rationally sacrifice our lives for a single other
person, and because a major nuclear war means likely extinction, which means the death of the
individual for whom we are ready to sacrifice our lives, then we can rationally seek the abolition
of nuclear weapons—to prevent extinction and save lives.404 Indeed, the abolition of nuclear
weapons is the only cause that can necessarily prevent human extinction. Altruism means
abolition, otherwise our altruistic sacrifice is meaningless.
In this sense, realist authors face a serious external challenge to overcome. Do emotions
such as love matter? Is love a guiding force—a structure in the system of human behavior? Does
love overcome the cost of death? Human beings are altruistic, but is altruism a choice or a
necessary conclusion? If altruism is a choice, then realism tells us altruistic suicide is irrational.
Émile Durkheim struggled with this in the nineteenth century, ultimately contradicting realist
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rationalism, arguing that, “Now, when a person [commits altruistic suicide], in all these cases, it
is not because he assumes the right to do so but, on the contrary, because it is his duty. If he fails
in this obligation, he is dishonored and also punished...”405 If duty is a structural force, then
realism needs to account for it. Altruistic suicide is also not as rare as one might imagine. The
US Congress often awards its highest military award, the Medal of Honor, posthumously to
military personnel who deliberately end their own lives to save their fellow soldiers. Durkheim
also implies that spending one’s life being labeled a coward is worse than death. Therefore, at the
very least, it is possible realist logic has miscalculated human preferences.
Altruistic suicide means that human beings are not necessarily calculating to maximize
their power in an environment where there is no acceptable alternative to survival; as individuals
we are willing to accept death under certain conditions, and according to Durkheim, death under
these conditions is rational and preferable to one or more alternatives. In other words, there are at
least two non-mutually exclusive alternatives to Waltzian realism if individual behavior
translates to international decision-making: our desire to see our loves ones survive, even at our
own expense, and the fear of dishonoring our communities and failing to live up to their
expectations. These two alternative considerations do not attempt to erase realist considerations.
The balance of power in international relations still dominates our ways of thinking, but it is not
the only thing we think about. And overcoming the balance of power is not outside the realm of
possibilities or observed human behavior.
Schell argues our morality is a viable alternative to the balance of power because, as I
demonstrate in Chapter 2, law does not bind deterrence. The failure of deterrence necessitates a
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“moral deterrence” that guides our behaviors, despite the consideration for our foes’
capabilities.406
Schell is aware of longstanding realist tradition governing nuclear weapons. He is under
no illusion that utopia is simpler than deterrence. But he likens the moral obligation towards
abolition to an awakening. Slavery, he writes, once a normal US institution, is now considered
abhorrent following a global awakening against it.407 Wartime rape, gladiator death matches,
torture, and pistol duels all met similar fates to social awakenings (more or less), what Wheeler
and Booth might call “confronting the unthinkable.”408 And if we accept that each of these
former institutions benefitted human beings in some way, thus helping to maximize utility for
someone at some particular point in time, then we can make a reasonable hypothesis about
torture, for example. We can reasonably hypothesize that torture existed on a massive scale
simply because people received benefit from torturing people. If this is true, we can also
reasonably hypothesize that states resist efforts at nuclear abolition merely because at some level
those states benefit from possessing and possibly using nuclear weapons.409 But this benefit can
be erased not merely through deterrence breakdown, but also by a social awakening. This
elementary argument basically follows lines of thought offered by social constructivists. In other
words, states have nuclear weapons simply because it is normal to have them. Their value is
constructed before, after, or both before and after they are proliferated and by the possessor and
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the rest simultaneously.410 In short, nuclear weapons have meaning because we give them
meaning. Constructivist reasoning does not deny the balance of power; it only challenges the
idea that it is structured into the international system. Human beings, contrary to Waltz, have
agency and free will insofar as they can choose to balance or not. Altruistic suicide, therefore,
appears both a duty and a choice.
Therefore, while we are stuck with nuclear weapons in the present, it is not unthinkable
that states will be willing to give up nuclear weapons in the future. As argued in Chapter 2, this
process will likely be greatly accelerated if deterrence ever fails. The survivors of nuclear war
will likely take disarmament efforts very seriously in order to avoid a recurrence of nuclear war.
They will have a moral-realist obligation to disarm—moral to protect society and realist as a
result of calculations that maximize the likelihood of survival. On the other hand, we do not need
to suffer a nuclear holocaust. If we accept that the costs of nuclear war will be sufficiently high
that our preferences will change in the event of nuclear war, then we can begin thinking about
our preferences now while we work diligently towards resolving the half dozen or so ongoing
international geopolitical disputes identified by O’Hanlon that inhibit disarmament. My model
demonstrates that this is ultimately feasible in the long-term.

9.2 How Can We Get to Disarmament?
The model I construct concludes that future disarmament is feasible, given three steps are
taken during disarmament negotiations: first, a global disarmament agreement must not
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unreasonably affect states’ sovereign rights outside of the agreement; second, states outlying the
NPT must be brought into the negotiations (as well as being made to feel as a part of the
international community instead of as “rogue” or “hermit” states); and third, present states with
nuclear arsenals adopt the IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the Additional
Protocol as a measure of good faith. Additionally, states’ rights to the technology inevitably
means states should have an ability to re-proliferate in the event of future international instability
that threatens global security.
But up until now I have deliberately avoided ongoing international geopolitical disputes
that stop the disarmament process dead in its tracks.411 This gives this study an unfair advantage.
It creates a tautology underneath the highly complex workings of the nuclear “mess”: If we make
it easy to disarm, it will be easy to disarm. I would like to bring this study back down to earth
and offer insight into ways it is possible to get to the disarmament process, rather than simply
beginning at the disarmament process. But first I’d like to point out that the tautology is not a
fairy tale. A footnote in Chapter 7 discusses reductions in major South African security concerns
that made the post-Apartheid state’s disarmament possible. Reducing realist security concerns
are key, a starting point, and not necessarily a circular argument.
The disputes O’Hanlon identifies include international disputes around Eastern Europe,
the South China Sea, Kashmir, Taiwan, the Middle East, and Korea. Solving the first three is
necessary, and solving the last three is helpful. These are the six geopolitical disputes that hinder
or completely prevent efforts towards global zero.
If Chapters 3 – 7 are good indicators, then a good candidate for conflict resolution is
fuzzy cognitive mapping using input from living stakeholders. If our goal is to satisfy the realist,
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then this method should suffice. Realism suggests states are cost-benefit calculators. If option A
benefits the state while option B imposes costs on the state, then the state will always choose
option A. If we accept that the realist constantly wants to upgrade its position (or at the very least
not downgrade it), and if, as I’ve demonstrated, fuzzy cognitive mapping is a good way to
determine paths towards mutual upgrade, then the realist will often be satisfied with the outcome.
The Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy might be of use, as it updates stakeholder goals.
In Problem 1 I updated nuclear weapons states’ goals from simply possessing nuclear weapons to
maximizing security. If one applies this approach to Russia and Eastern Europe, one can say the
same. Russia’s attempted territorial annexation of part of Georgia (2008) and its actual territorial
annexation of part of Ukraine (2014) is an example of security maximization. This follows realist
thinking. Russia’s goal was not simply to gain land; the gaining of land served a security need.
Once we identify what Russia’s actual goal is, then we can begin to talk about alternative ways
that maximize security without annexing territory. By taking seriously Russia’s actual needs, the
international community can find ways to accommodate it in a mutually beneficial way. We can
apply this method to the other five disputes.
On the other hand, the 2019 geopolitical climate might make nuclear weapons states
skeptical. While conflict resolution might make China gain, China might fear gaining less than it
would have if it did not engage in dispute resolution or if it believed it was being required to
resolve a dispute the wrong way. Therefore, the relevant stakeholders (i.e., the states) must be
enticed by the high probability that their interest will be maximized.
Additionally, steps towards disarmament are usually thought to include negotiated arms
reductions or adherence to various test ban treaties; however, the geopolitical concerns above
demonstrate the robustness of realist theory. US and Russian non-compliance with parts of the
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Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the subsequent February 2019 bilateral USRussian suspension of the treaty is a direct result of these ongoing disputes. Russian missile
testing and US missile defense systems in Europe, while on paper for national defense, are
certainly offense-capable, and the US withdrawal allows it to balance against Chinese missile
systems, a very realist move.
But this helps to bolster the argument. Because the geopolitical disputes are at least partly
about nuclear problems, solving them requires taking steps towards disarmament. This does not
dismiss the fact that geopolitical concerns obstruct the signing of the CTBT and help facilitate
cheating on and the undoing of the INF Treaty. That is, cause and effect go both directions. In
order to stop the cycle, work towards resolution should also go both directions.
What this study illuminates, however, is how many variables are involved in international
political problems and “messes.” This study identifies 55 nodes with 166 non-zero links between
two nuclear problems, and it acknowledges in Chapter 8 that the possible number of links
(including zero links) is very large.412 Therefore, getting to global zero is far more of a complex
issue than abolitionists assume. Although after disarmament, former nuclear weapons states
achieve quick maximized security, due to the other sides not having nuclear capability, and
although this study ultimately concludes with maximized security without nuclear weapons, the
simulation revealed a “security period of vulnerability” (Figure 7.5), where the drop in military
capability, the buildup of conventional forces, and new strategic posturing to maximize security
leads to a security dilemma where the former nuclear powers are worse off than they were prior
to disarmament. This “security period of vulnerability” is ultimately overcome, due to increased
conventional military spending, increased adherence to international norms, more conformity
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between the major powers, and maximized verification by the IAEA, but the risk of defection or
war is remarkably high during the vulnerable period.
This study also reveals that the international system is far more complex than the realist
assumes. It is complex enough that states can gain more security by multilaterally eliminating
nuclear weapons than by keeping them, particularly if one considers the reality that deterrence is
not a foregone conclusion. This is because realists assume a lot of things simply do not matter.
This model explicitly demonstrates that this assumption is incorrect. Realism can recover if it
accepts that it can maximize its security with international components it previously assumed
were irrelevant.
In short, it is possible to get to a disarmament treaty. Even though we are not there yet,
global zero might be just beyond the horizon, and, indeed, global zero does not belie realism
because, as my model shows, it is possible to maximize security more without nuclear weapons.

9.3 Disarmament and the Milieu
A major question remaining is: What does this study inform? The results of the
simulation suggest that realist states can achieve more through interacting with the social
environment, rather than merely focusing inward at their own possession goals. The simulation
shows not only maximized security along realist lines, it also shows that by participating in the
disarmament negotiations and subsequent treaty, and despite increased conventional military
spending, former nuclear powers have avoided the security dilemma, thereby collapsing Lewis F.
Richardson’s arms race model. But also multilateral self-restraint increases, human rights
violations decrease, international transparency increases, states begin to conform, the values we
place on international agreements increases, agreement on behavioral norms converges, and
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uncertainty decreases tremendously. None of these are possession goals; rather states still seek
these goals, even if it means giving up something, because these goals increase states’ abilities to
shape the social context of their environment. Being transparent, while a concession to the state
opening their doors to international inspectors, fosters increased transparency. Being transparent,
therefore, shapes the environment and serves as a model of acceptable behavior. These social
goals do not necessarily undermine realism; seeking social goals serves the self-interest of the
state.
Arnold Wolfers is sympathetic to the realist. He acknowledges that states “place
exceedingly high value on the so-called possessions of the nation—above all, on national
survival, national independence, and territorial integrity—and to react in fear against any threats
to these possessions.”413 That is, states seek to increase their national interest because doing so
increases their chances of survival in an anarchical environment. But he also notes that states can
increase this national interest in another way—by interacting in social contexts. He writes,
“actors can be said to act under external compulsion rather than in accordance with their
preferences.”414 South Africa’s decision to unilaterally disarm in 1989 illustrates this compulsion
to act according to the environment to serve self-interests. Seeing nuclear weapons as merely
possession goals would mean South Africa would maximize its deterrence, but other goals
served its self-interest, and these goals were external in nature. South Africa desired to re-enter
the international community, gain access to international markets, and to, perhaps, remove
incentives for the newly formed Namibia to seek a nuclear deterrence of its own. By acting
unilaterally against its self-interests, South Africa increased its prestige in the social environment
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in which it found itself. Further, it was able to influence the environment to reward the postApartheid state by seeking this milieu goal.
Wolfers, therefore, goes beyond the basic assumptions of realism, turning realism on its
head. Yes, states are cost-benefit calculators, but these states are not merely comparing its power
to its neighbors; it is also interacting with the social context, shaping it, influencing the way in
which states behave. Wolfers identifies these goals, writing,

One can distinguish goals pertaining, respectively, to national possession and to
shape the environment in which the nation operates. I call the former “possession
goals,” the latter “milieu goals.” In directing its foreign policy toward the
attainment of its possession goals, a nation is aiming at the enhancement or the
preservation of one or more of the things to which it attaches value. […]
Milieu goals are of a different character. Nations pursuing them are out not to
defend or increase possessions they hold to the exclusion of others, but aim
instead at shaping conditions beyond their national boundaries. […]
Milieu goals often may turn out to be nothing but a means … toward some
possession goal. A nation may hope to increase its prestige or its security by
making sacrifices for the establishment and maintenance of international
organizations. But this need not be its exclusive aim. Instead, the nation in
question may be seriously concerned about the milieu within which it operates
and may expect such organizations to improve the environment by making it more
peaceful or more conducive to social or economic progress.415

In other words, possession goals increase our sense of security directly. Milieu goals increase our
sense of security by making the environment less uncertain. The milieu goal can be altruistic,
utopia seeking, but often seeking milieu goals is to seek selfish goals.
Wolfers, therefore, understands the balance of power, but he shows that states will often
go beyond balancing, emphasizing that interaction within the social setting is a means by which
415
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states can alternatively increase their security needs by making the world more predictable on
their own terms.
This study emphasizes that states seeking to maximize security can do so better through
social interaction, increasing global transparency and other multilateral goals, by diverting our
attention away from solely power as a means towards security. This is not to say that we will
always supersede our primary possession goals.
Wolfers notes that if a state faces nuclear annihilation, it will cede to the state threatening
it because keeping its citizens (and itself) alive is more important than any other goal (including
other possession goals).416 In Chapter 2 I make the case for this study’s urgency. But it also notes
that, if for no other reason outlined in the rest of this study, states will take disarmament very
seriously in the event of even a small nuclear war. The demonstration of the existential threat
nuclear weapons pose and the global aftermath of nuclear exchange will give states the options
to possess nuclear weapons without the certainty of deterrence or world to eliminate them at the
global level in a way that is—more or less—certain, depending on how much authority with
which the states wish to empower the IAEA. That is, working to shape the milieu in this setting
better serves the national interest than its possessions.
None of this means, however, that disarmament is inevitable given the development of an
international reality where Colin Gray would say disarmament is possible only because it is
possible for the time being. Nuclear weapons are firmly embedded in the international structure.
Even if Mueller is correct that nuclear weapons have served their purpose and are obsolescent, it
could be simply that shining a light on them during dismantlement makes them very relevant
again. States will continue to endow their possession goals with more important when necessary.
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9.4 What about the Outlier States?
Outlier participation is key. Although the model does not maximize Outlier States,417 and
although it merely weakly increases their prestige (permanently), the model does not function
without increasing our acceptance of the Outlier States. Various exploratory simulations during
the early stages of the model revealed that there is unlikely a feasible way to satisfy Outlier
States without directly engaging them. In this sense, it is not unreasonable that US President
Trump parted ways with the longstanding tradition of not meeting with the Supreme Leader of
North Korea in 2018. He instead chose to legitimize the Supreme Leader, something the DPRK
has wanted for generations. This resulted in better relations between the US and the DPRK.
Rather than isolation, states outlying the NPT are much more receptive when they are brought
into the international fold.
This does not mean merely including them in negotiations, although that is obviously
very important. Rather, it means reducing or eliminating economic sanctions, bringing them into
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (with specific safeguards provisions for components and materials
obtained), temporarily forgiving human rights violations until the treaty is ratified,418 and
recognizing them as nuclear powers. This last step might require invoking Article VIII,
paragraph 1 of the NPT, which gives Parties to the Treaty the right to propose amendments to the
NPT. Specifically, the proposed amendment would update the text of Article IX, paragraph 3,
which defines legal nuclear weapons states as any state with nuclear weapons prior to January
1967. Updating this cutoff date to a future date would legitimize India’s (first weapon, 1974),
Pakistan’s (1998), and North Korea’s (2006) nuclear programs, as well as Israel’s undeclared
417
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other humanitarian concerns.
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weapons (likely 1979). This might be politically unpopular domestically, especially in states
identified in my model as NPT States, which presents a new set of problems; however, it might
be crucial to getting the Outlier States onboard with the NPT. Getting the DPRK, India, Israel,
and Pakistan in good standing with the NPT also weds them to Article VI, which requires they
make good faith efforts towards disarmament. Wedding the Outlier States to the NPT therefore
has a legitimizing effect on Article VI. In order for the P5 states to call on the DPRK to disarm
under Article VI, it requires that the P5 acknowledge that it also shares a duty to disarm.
Furthermore, bringing in the Outlier States to the international fold vis a vis the Nuclear
Suppliers Group for India, Israel, and Pakistan, or in general for the DPRK also legitimizes and
reinforces the norm of international cooperation. In the same way that West Germany and Japan
were included in rebuilding the international system following World War II, including the
Outlier States, particularly the DPRK, demonstrates that the international community is sensitive
to all of their needs, not merely whether or not they possess nuclear weapons.
The adapted realism I use in this study, particularly in Chapter 2, suggests that the likely
candidates for nuclear war are among the Outlier States. India and Pakistan have danced close to
the brink a few times, and during summer 2017 the DPRK came too close for comfort to a
nuclear attack by the US. Traditional realist logic tells us the DPRK would be foolish to give up
its nuclear deterrent because it remembers General MacArthur almost overthrowing it in 1950,
and it watched Iran, Iraq, and Libya all suffer recent punishments despite giving up their nuclear
programs. On the other hand, this form of realism suggests the DPRK’s survival might be better
guaranteed without nuclear weapons. The worst-case scenario is: with nuclear weapons it risks
being completely annihilated. Surviving nuclear war offers the DPRK a probability of zero.
Without nuclear weapons, it risks only a bloody conventional war. The probability of surviving a
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conventional war is a non-zero number. Therefore, getting the DPRK to the negotiating table is
not as difficult as one might imagine (indeed, we’ve already seen it). And once the Outlier States
are at the disarmament-negotiating table, the P5 states are more likely to take their own
obligations under NPT Article VI seriously.

9.5 Can We Stay There?
It would be foolish to assume that once we’ve arrived at global zero we can stay there
permanently. The knowledge of fission is a permanent fixture in the minds of scientists, barring a
global cataclysm that knocks human beings back to the Stone Age (perhaps a nuclear war).
Although, as already acknowledged, this does not mean nuclear weapons are permanent fixtures,
but it is (hopefully) unlikely human beings will ever forget how to split the atom.
Because this knowledge has staying power, nations will have to live with a natural
tendency towards nuclear bipolarity. Quester illustrates this using a mathematical notation with
realist theory:419

‘0’ > 1 < 2 > 3 > 4 …n

where three nuclear weapons states are preferable to four, and two are preferable to three, but
one is not preferable to two because then a single state would have the capability to dominate
international politics, forcing another state to balance. And zero may be preferable to one, but
states’ natural skepticism towards each other means that at some point, one state is going to
preemptively balance against a perceived future proliferator, causing a balancing move by

419

Quester, 205.

290
another state, self-fulfilling the prophesy towards two nuclear weapons states. Waltz argues this
is the preferred state of international politics, writing the bipolar system compels bipolar focus,
where the actions of one superpower dominate the attention of the other; the bipolar system
makes small losses tolerable; and the bipolar system keeps pressure on both sides through
continued crises, which causes both powers to exercise continued caution (with nuclear
weapons).420 Quester and Waltz, taken together, imply that in the disarmed world a small crisis
(such as the one I hypothesize in Chapter 8, which began with Japanese fishermen getting
stranded on a manmade Chinese island that served as a small naval base) might spiral out of
control until two sides reconstitute at least a first strike capability. Once rearmament has been
achieved, the system will cease its spiral and stabilize. The war will likely de-escalate once
nuclear weapons are reintroduced.421
Traditional realist thought tells us that the disarmed world is only temporary and that
there will be tremendous pressure to shift away from zero nuclear weapons states to at least two
nuclear weapons states. O’Hanlon accepts this logic but adds that nuclear disarmament should be
a goal, but not a permanent solution.422 What realists, including O’Hanlon, do not show us is
what happens once a disarmament treaty is signed. Does the signing of a treaty violate realist
thinking? It depends on what matters.
Immediate cheating (i.e. hiding away a couple dozen or so weapons before opening your
doors to IAEA inspectors423) notwithstanding, my model shows step-by-step effects on security.
Most notable is the net gain in security without nuclear weapons, which defies realist thinking.
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Realists, however, might simply point to my “security period of vulnerability” as the point where
the disarmament treaty falls apart. On the other hand, it is possible that realist thinking here is
incorrect (or at least needs to be slightly altered) for two related reasons. First, as I write in
Chapter 2, nuclear war is unlikely, but unlikely things happen all the time. Because the
probability of a nuclear war between two nations is not zero, nuclear war between two nations
will occur on a long enough timeline. It might be possible for states to look ahead far enough
into the future and see that their survival is more guaranteed without nuclear weapons than with,
as the model suggests at its end state. Second, if realists assume states are always calculating cost
and benefit, and that they will act to maximize their security, then they will be better off under
disarmament. If zero represents the status quo, and if the end state gives us a maximum increase
in security, then realist thinking about nuclear weapons should be updated to reflect that a
disarmed world is more secure than an armed world.
Additionally, mechanisms to prevent war are inherently a part of my model vis-à-vis the
re-proliferation capabilities. Schell, Schelling,424 O’Hanlon, Acton, and Perkovich each
understand the need for short order rearmament capabilities in order to stabilize developing
international crises. O’Hanlon, Acton, and Perkovich do not appear concerned with small crises.
They might not notice my anecdote of the Japanese fishermen, China’s response, and the former
nuclear powers’ overreaction to China’s response. They might only notice once leaders begin to
rethink their nuclear options and support that move in order to re-stabilize the system. Schell is a
little more concerned with the small crises. He believes that the small crises are unlikely to spiral
because former nuclear weapons states, enjoying a short-order re-proliferation capability, carry
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with them “weaponless deterrence.”425 Schell argues that in a world with short-order rearmament
capabilities, the state of nature is proliferation deterrence, which guides states’ responses. In this
case, Schell might notice when the former nuclear powers reacted, but it is likely it would have
stopped there. Realist thinking implies the Japanese fishermen will likely meet an untimely
execution by Chinese officials simply because it is not in Japan’s national interest to start a
skirmish that leads to a nuclear China. Accordingly, even if Japan called on the superpowers for
help, they, not wanting a nuclear China, would likely merely attempt to exhaust their diplomatic
capabilities. If they could not get the Japanese prisoners freed using diplomacy, it would stop
there. Wheeler and Booth support Schell’s assessment (with a subsequent short critique), calling
it “an intellectual tour de force.”426
My argument in Chapter 8, using the extensive form game, is that this is structural. States
are cost-benefit calculators, and they know that every move they make either leads them towards
security through MAD, which is a costly path to follow, or security through threat avoidance.
China might have called on Japan’s ambassador to explain the situation, rather than escalating
the situation. Because in my model the re-proliferation capabilities are automatic,427 there is little
room for mistake in international affairs.
The implication of this automatic re-proliferation capability is that it might compel
peaceful relations, giving states usually hostile towards each other the ability to find alternative
ways of living with one another. The Koreas might engage in trade simply because trade is a
better alternative than war, leading to more trust. Trust begets trust. And on a long enough
timeline, the realist edicts telling states to calculate cost and benefit might not even need to
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assume the costs include war. Can there be perpetual peace through “weaponless deterrence”? It
is unlikely, but it is also not beyond possibility.
In other words, it is possible to stay at disarmament, but staying there requires automatic
re-proliferation capabilities that discourage testing the re-proliferation rule.

9.6 Disarmament, Complexity, and the Hurdles
This study began by analyzing two complex problems and then moved on to analyze
known interactions between the problems. Movement in the mess takes us from less order to
more order. Kurtz and Snowden phrase this movement as “shifting a system from complexity to
order and maintaining it there in such a way that it becomes predictable.”428 This study
illuminates that unknown-knowns existed within the mess. The knowledge was there, but we did
not yet understand it. The interactions between problems and nodes within the problems and
“mess” refine our understanding so that we are left with known-unknowns. In other words, the
security dilemma during the “security period of vulnerability” is still a problem, but we can act
towards disarmament in a way that is predictable and beneficial.
As stated before, this study reveals the enormity of the “mess” complexity. It is far more
complex than realist power calculations suggest. The realist, while focused on power capability,
misses the net security increase offered by multilateral disarmament that erases nuclear weapons’
existential threat to the human species. It also misses the net security increases caused by
increased cooperation and transparency (negotiated in the disarmament treaty). The realist might
argue this is temporary, but that would require the realist to assume states are not security
maximizers on a long enough timeline. It also illuminates that the “mess” is even more complex
428
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than the Sagans and Booths of realism. Yes, the international system can work towards
disarmament, but it requires acknowledging several competing moving parts in a system. When
problems get more complex than the realist assumes they can get, then the realist needs to
expand his or her tool set. It finally illuminates that the issue’s complexity means that
abolitionists need a better understanding of cause and effect. The “security period of
vulnerability” is a very serious issue that could undermine the entire disarmament process, lead
to conventional war, and maybe to a nuclear exchange, fulfilling the abolitionists’ nuclear
holocaust hypothesis. The abolitionist needs to accept that periodic nuclear reconstitution is a
good thing.
The hurdles that are holding states to their nuclear weapons are not necessarily structural.
If they are structural, then there is a competing structure working against them—human empathy
for others. And if the hurdles are not structural, then realists need to admit that humans, and
therefore states, have agency to choose to balance or to do something else. The disputes in
Eastern Europe, the South China Sea, Kashmir, the Middle East, Taiwan, and Korea are
manageable (perhaps using fuzzy cognitive mapping to maximize states’ security needs). The
remaining known-unknowns are also manageable. Sovereignty and its resultant anarchy, security
dilemmas, uncertainty, among others can all be mitigated through understanding the complex
relationships between problem components and between problems.
Once these known-unknowns are managed and a successful disarmament treaty is signed,
two competing scenarios are possible (illustrated in Scenarios 7 and 8, respectively). First, longterm disarmament under the threat of re-proliferation is viable as long as states take their
international commitments seriously. If total nuclear security is a milieu goal, then these
commitments enact some level of benefit. Second, a similar long-term disarmament is also viable
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as long as the IAEA takes its responsibilities seriously at the expense of the former nuclear
powers. In other words, either the states empower the IAEA to a degree commensurate to milieu
goals or, if disarmament is still preferable without much state participation, the IAEA will decide
states’ possession goals despite the states’ wishes. It is far more likely that a viable path forward
requires that states shift their understanding of security beyond mere focus on the possession of
power and towards creating a milieu where no one wants to possess nuclear weapons. IAEA
empowerment should be limited by the scope of the milieu; otherwise, a disarmed world looks
unrecognizable.
To summarize this my findings, I propose that global nuclear disarmament is not
unthinkable, but temporary disarmament is more viable than a permanent solution. This
acknowledges that in addition to the milieu goals states possess, which compel them to work
toward a world without the threat of nuclear war, states’ possession goals make permanent
disarmament unlikely, unless, of course, the milieu changes significantly in the future. Therefore,
I am skeptically optimistic. The path forward requires us to think less about our internal national
security, and more towards how our national security can be gained through social interactions.
But we must not forget that ultimately the balance of power and the threat of death are
compelling and unalterable reasons it is a good thing we are stuck with nuclear knowledge.
A final note that the realist either does not see or does not think is important: For the bulk
of this study, I have viewed the nuclear problem as significant because the probability of nuclear
war is not zero and the costs of nuclear war reach infinity (human extinction). But the problem is
actually defined by a point made in Chapter 5 (Problem 1). That is, all stakeholders, including
nuclear weapons states and Outlier States, agree that nuclear weapons are a problem and that
abolishing them is a (milieu) goal. If nuclear weapons states and Outlier States did not view them
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as a problem, they would simply ignore the problem. The fact that they have chosen to
participate in this debate highlights that power is not the only concern states have. Security
through MAD is not as reassuring as realists might believe. This study illuminates the
complexities that make this a reality. This study shines a light on the way states shape the milieu
and are compelled to act according to these external circumstances.
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